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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Constance A. Morella (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Morella, Tom Davis of Virginia, Norton and Watson.

Staff present: Russell Smith, staff director: Heea Vazirani-Fales, counsel; Robert White, communications director, Shalley Kim, legislative assistant/clerk; Jon Bouker, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mrs. MORELLA. I am going to call to order the Subcommittee of the District of Columbia, Government Reform Committee, for our hearing on "Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital."

A few weeks after the terrorist attacks of last September 11th, this subcommittee held its first hearing on emergency preparedness in the Nation's Capital. The news then was not good. Although our first responders, the firefighters, police, and emergency medical technicians, did wonderful work, there was widespread acknowledgment that the regional response, in terms of coordinating the evacuation of employees and communicating with the general public, was sorely lacking.

To review: The Emergency Broadcasting System, which is designed for this type of emergency, was not put to use. People believed the Metro system was shut down when, in fact, it was operational. Federal and local government employees and many private sector workers were let out of their jobs starting at around 10 a.m., about the same time that at least one of the major Potomac River crossings was shut down, creating even more traffic chaos.

At the time of last year's hearing I said, "Washington must be the most prepared city, and region, in the event of a terrorist attack or other emergency." So, one of our hopes today is to determine how far we progressed toward that goal.

Is the Nation's Capital now the best-prepared city? And is the National Capital Region the best-prepared region? In the event of another catastrophic emergency, would the Federal Government and local governments communicate well with each other? Would our residents, businesses, and tourists receive quick notification of what to do and what not to do?

As you all know, we now have a nationwide color-coded terror alert warning system, and we are currently in Code Orange, and we have been for a week and a half. I know there is concern among the general public over what these color warnings translate to. Does Orange mean that you should work from home on that day? Does Red mean we should pull the kids out of school? We don't have the answers.

We do have a large and noteworthy panel of local, State, regional, Federal, and private sector leaders here today. And I appreciate you all coming, and we hope that you will be able to help us answer these questions. It is unusual, to say the least, for us to have 10 witnesses in one large panel, but this was done for a reason.

One of the lessons that we learned on September 11th is the difficulty of communicating among different levels of government, between government and private sector, between law enforcement and transportation. So now we have all of these elements at the same table, or at least at the same tables but we have done it with one table. And I think will help us to knock down some of those communication barriers.

I am asking the panel to indulge the subcommittee and to keep your opening statements to about 3 minutes so that we can have an opportunity to ask questions. Please know that your total testimony, verbatim, will be included in the record. And we will get things moving a little bit quicker.

A great deal of our discussion today will center on the various plans that have been developed in the wake of the September 11th attacks. The Council of Governments has a Regional Emergency Coordination Plan for the region. And I will note that in addition to the testimony of Takoma Park Councilman Bruce Williams, I am going to enter into the record testimony from D.C. Councilwoman Carol Schwartz, who heads COG's Emergency Preparedness Task Force, but could not be with us today.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Schwartz follows:]

Statement from
The Honorable Carol Schwartz
Council Member At-Large, The District of Columbia
Chair, COG Board Task Force on Homeland Security
For the
Hearing on Emergency Preparedness
House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
Rep. Constance A. Morella, Chairwoman

September 20, 2002

The Regional Emergency Coordination Plan for the National Capital Region is the product of extensive and sustained engagement by key local, state and federal government stakeholders, plus valued representatives of the private and community sectors.

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) provided a table for public and private sector leaders to articulate the region's needs, forge solutions and reach consensus on actions.

COG and its partners focused on difficult issues such as transportation, public safety, communications, health, solid waste and debris management and energy and water.

The Plan addresses a broad spectrum of potential hazards and builds upon and recognizes the essential roles of local governments as first responders.

The Plan also recognizes the roles accorded the states for emergency management and the unique responsibilities of the federal government in the National Capital Region.

As we know, many of the symbols most often associated with the United States – and recognizable worldwide – the White House, the Capitol, the Washington Monument and the Pentagon are here in the National Capital Region.

With thousands of workers in hundreds of owned and leased properties, the federal presence provides unique resources and daunting challenges. We benefited greatly from a strong and growing partnership with key federal agencies such as the Office of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office of Personnel Management and others.

COG and its partners have produced a comprehensive, first of its kind plan. It will be a living document that will be updated, tested and evaluated.

This is not the end of our work, but the beginning of a new phase guided by the preparedness and response blueprint we have developed.

No one wants to see the day when we must use this plan for the purpose it was intended. But we are prepared to use this plan, whether facing a natural or human-induced emergency.

Because we are prepared, we have made a difference, and will continue to do so.

###

Mrs. MORELLA. The Governors of Maryland and Virginia and the mayor of the District of Columbia held a summit and signed a joint statement pledging cooperation on many emergency preparedness and security issues. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has told us that it is working on a regional response plan, and the Office of Personnel Management has developed a framework for notifying Federal employees about emergency situations.

So we have no shortage of plans. The mere existence, however, of these plans, which represent real progress—much thought and hard work has gone into their creation, but we have to make sure that these plans are coordinated as much as possible, and we have to make sure that these plans are tested so that we are confident that they will work in an emergency.

One reason for the effectiveness of our first responders on September 11th is that they routinely participate in mutual aid drills where they learn to work together and put into practice the plans that exist on paper. There must be similar efforts in terms of our emergency readiness proposals.

In looking at these plans, I also want to get feedback from the panel on legislation that was introduced by Senator Sarbanes to amend the proposed Homeland Security Act. His bill would create an office within the new Homeland Security Agency to oversee and coordinate the various Federal counterterrorism and preparedness programs in the National Capital Region. I endorse the concept of this legislation. I think we have come to the point where we need someone high in the Federal Government who is solely responsible for coordination of Federal responses within the National Capital Region. And I am very interested to hear our witnesses' thoughts on that proposal.

Another important factor that we must not forget is the role of the private sector. There are about 350,000 Federal workers in the National Capital Region, but there are another 2.4 million private sector employees. About 80 percent of the region's critical infrastructure, power plants, water distribution, and communications providers lies in the hands of businesses, not the government.

Our government, Federal, State, local, regional, must have a way to effectively communicate with our businesses and their workers in times of emergency, as well as to involve them in the decision-making progress and process. And true emergency preparedness demands that everyone—business, government, the general public—is in the loop.

And so I now, after that opening statement, will yield to my ranking member, the distinguished Congresswoman, Ms. Norton.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Constance A. Morella follows:]

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA
8TH DISTRICT, MARYLAND

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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Chairwoman Connie Morella
House Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
Opening Statement
"Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital"
September 20th, 2002

A few weeks after the terrorist attacks of last September 11th, this Subcommittee held its first hearing on emergency preparedness in the Nation's Capital. The news then was not good. Although our first responders – the firefighters, police and emergency medical technicians -- did wonderful work, there was widespread acknowledgement that the regional response, in terms of coordinating the evacuation of employees and communicating with the general public, was sorely lacking.

To review: The Emergency Broadcasting System, which is designed for this type of emergency, was not put to use. People believed the Metro system was shut down, when in fact it operational. Federal and local government employees, and many private sector workers, were let out of their jobs starting at around 10 a.m. – about the same time that at least one of the major Potomac River crossings was shut down, creating even more traffic chaos.

At the time of last year's hearing I said, "Washington must be the most prepared city – and region – in the event of a terrorist attack or other emergency." So one of our hopes today is to determine how far we progressed toward that goal. Is the Nation's Capital now the best-prepared city, and is the National Capital Region the best-prepared region? In the event of another catastrophic emergency, would the federal government and local governments communicate well with each other? Would our residents, businesses and tourists receive quick notification of what to do, and what not to do?

As you all know, we now have a nationwide, color-coded terror alert warning system – we're currently in Code Orange, and we have been for a week and a half. I know there is concern among the general public over what these color warnings translate to – does Orange mean that you should work from home that day? Does Red mean we should pull the kids out of school? We don't have the answers.

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We do have a large and noteworthy panel of local, state, regional, federal and private sector leaders here to help us try to answer these questions. It is unusual, to say the least, for us to have 10 witnesses in one large panel, but this was done for a reason: One of the lessons we learned on September 11th is the difficulty of communicating between different levels of government, between government and private sector, between law enforcement and transportation. So now we have all these elements at the same table, and I think that will help us knock down some of those communication barriers.

I am asking the panel to indulge this Subcommittee and keep your opening statements to no more than three minutes. Your entire testimony will be entered into the record, so if witnesses can simply sum up or highlight their testimony, it will move things along a lot quicker.

A great deal of our discussion today will center on the various plans that have been developed in the wake of the September 11th attacks. The Council of Governments has a Regional Emergency Coordination Plan for the Region. And I will note that, in addition to the testimony of Takoma Park Councilman Bruce Williams, I will enter into the record testimony from D.C. Councilwoman Carol Schwartz, who heads COG's emergency preparedness task force but could not be with us today. The governors of Maryland and Virginia and the mayor of the District of Columbia held a summit and signed a joined statement pledging cooperation on many emergency preparedness and security issues. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has told us it is working on a regional response plan, and the Office of Personnel Management has developed a framework for notifying federal employees about emergency situations.

So we have no shortage of plans. The mere existence of these plans represents real progress – much thought and hard work has gone into their creation. Now we have to make sure that these plans are coordinated as much as possible, and we have to make sure these plans are tested so that we are confident they will work in an emergency. One reason for the effectiveness of our first-responders on September 11th is that they routinely participate in "mutual aid" drills, where they learn to work together and put into practice the plans that exist on paper. There must be similar efforts in terms of our emergency readiness proposals.

In looking at these plans, I also want to get feedback from the panel on legislation introduced by Maryland Senator Paul Sarbanes to amend the proposed Homeland Security Act. His bill would create an office within the new Homeland Security Agency to oversee and coordinate the various federal counter-terrorism and preparedness programs in the National Capital Region. I endorse this legislation. I believe we have come to the point where we need someone high in the federal government who is solely responsible for coordination of federal responses within the National Capital Region. And I am very interested to hear our witnesses' thoughts on Senator Sarbanes's proposal.

Another important factor we must not forget is the role of the private sector. There are about 350,000 federal workers in the National Capital Region, but there are another 2.4 million private sector employees. About 80 percent of the region's critical infrastructure – power plants, water distribution, and communications providers – lies in the hands of businesses, not the government.

Our government – federal, state, local, regional – must have a way to effectively communicate with our businesses and their workers in times of emergency, and to involve them in the decision-making process. True emergency preparedness demands that everyone – business, government, the general public – is in the loop.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank you for calling this hearing in a timely fashion, 1 year after the first attack.

Two weeks ago, I traveled to New York to the site of the first Congress and the Nation's first capitol for a commemorative joint meeting of Congress. Members of the House and the Senate visited Ground Zero and participated in a unique and moving ceremony. At the same time, I was struck by how contained the area of the Twin Towers devastation appeared and how normal the rest of New York was.

In contrast, the District of Columbia was not directly hit, but there are telltale footprints of September 11th throughout downtown Washington. Today, we want to learn just what we have learned and what lies beneath the outward and visible signs of September the 11th and the anthrax tragedy that took the lives of two dedicated postal workers on October 21st and 22nd.

It would be difficult to overestimate the complexity of the District's post-September 11th challenge and similar challenges faced by the region. The city must meet its primary obligation to protect almost 600,000 local residents. The city must secure the seat of government and the entire Federal presence. The city must collaborate with a large number of Federal, county, and State authorities and police agencies to whom the District is now tied, and must link itself in entirely new ways.

As the Joint House and Senate Intelligence Committee hearings that began this week are demonstrating, neither the Federal Government nor any part of our Federal system of governance was prepared in any way for either September 11th or the anthrax attack. The shocking irrationality and brutality of the unprecedented attacks left governments scrambling to afford greater security. The District was still recovering from the most serious financial crisis in a century and had just begun to rebuild protective and emergency services sufficient to protect its own residents, not to mention the Federal complex and the 370,000 Federal employees who work here and in the region.

After some prodding, the Appropriations Committee realized that the ball was in its court and that the District is the only first responder of any significant size here, because it is the only big city in the region. Congress appropriated $156 million for the District and $39 million for Metro in the D.C. appropriation. The total for the region as a whole appropriated by the Congress has been $432 million.

It was clear that the September 11th attack on the civilian population necessitated immediate action without a period of careful planning. The new money was necessary just to supply the basics, particularly gear and basic equipment for frontline workers in case of another attack. The past year, therefore, is best understood as an emergency response year where the least difficult, most obvious, and most pressing needs were tackled.

No one pretends that there has been time to move from the raw basics to where we must go, to a seamless prevention and response capability, first in the city and then in the region covering 17 different jurisdictions. Until now, the region has depended almost entirely on the Council of Governments, or COG, for regional coordi-

nation. COG received $5 million in the fiscal year 2002 Defense supplemental appropriation, and under the able leadership of Executive Director Michael Rogers has facilitated communication and coordination, even though COG has no enforcement authority. COG will continue to play an indispensable role. However, I have been working in the Congress to afford even greater capability for the region, and each jurisdiction in the region must do the same within its own jurisdiction, and jointly.

On Wednesday, for example, the Senate passed an amendment to the pending Homeland Security Act that includes and extends a provision I added in the House requiring the Homeland Secretary to work directly with the mayor of the District of Columbia on security matters. The Senate provision adds the Governors of Maryland and Virginia, and establishes an office and a director for the National Capital Region. That office will coordinate, plan, and execute activities to enhance emergency preparedness.

This new capability, tied directly to the Homeland Secretary, appropriately recognizes that this city and region contain virtually our entire government, including the White House, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and 370,000 Federal employees; and that special focused attention is required if we are serious about the unique demands for security in the National Capital Region. This provision is an example of the new multijurisdictional coherence that should be the lodestar as we strive to create mechanisms equal to the threats we face.

Even with all that must be done, what has been done persuades me that the District of Columbia is the most secure city in the world today. Nevertheless, the emergency preparedness actions of the Federal Government often have been clumsy, ineffective, excessive, and insensitive. Our residents do not walk the city in fear. What they do fear is that in great haste and with little experience, authorities will be too quick to close down the city and too slow to assure that the District remains the world's symbol of an open society. Today, I will be listening to hear whether we are learning to meet the two great challenges of security and openness at the same time, without sacrificing one for the other and without stealing the gloss from our shining city on the hill.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton follows:]

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

SUBCOMMITTEES

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

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CIVIL SERVICE AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Statement of Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia Hearing on
"Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital"

September 20, 2002

Two weeks ago, I traveled to New York to the site of the first Congress and the nation's first capitol for a commemorative joint meeting of Congress. Members of the House and Senate visited Ground Zero and participated in a unique and moving ceremony. At the same time, I was struck by how contained the area of the Twin Towers devastation appeared and how normal the rest of New York was. In contrast, the District was not directly hit, but there are tell tale footprints of 9-11 throughout downtown Washington. Today, we want to learn just what we have learned and what lies beneath the outward and visible signs of September 11 and the anthrax tragedy that took the lives of two dedicated postal workers on October 21 and 22.

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No one pretends that there has been time to move from the raw basics to where we must go: to a seamless prevention and response capability, first in the city and then in the region, covering 17 different jurisdictions. Until now, the region has depended almost entirely on the Council of Governments (COG) for regional coordination. COG received $5 million in the FY 2002 Defense Supplemental Appropriation, and under the able leadership of Executive Director Michael Rogers has facilitated communication and coordination, even though COG has no enforcement authority. COG will continue to play an indispensable regional role. However, I have been working in the Congress to afford even greater capability for the region, and each jurisdiction in the region must do the same, within its own jurisdiction and jointly.

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Even with all that must be done, what has been done persuades me that the District of Columbia is the most secure city the world today. Nevertheless, the emergency preparedness actions of the federal government often have been clumsy, ineffective, excessive, and insensitive. Our residents do not walk the city in fear. What they *do* fear is that in great haste and with little experience, authorities will be too quick to close down the city and too slow to assure that the District remains the world's symbol of an open society. Today I will be listening to hear whether we are learning to meet the two great challenges of security and openness at the same time, without sacrificing one for the other and without stealing the gloss from our shining city on the hill.

Mrs. MORELLA. I am now very pleased to recognize our colleague from Virginia, Tom Davis, who is my predecessor, who has chaired this subcommittee.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I want to thank you for organizing today's followup hearing on the progress of emergency preparedness in the District of Columbia.

I want to note, we have George Foresman from the Commonwealth of Virginia here, and with him is our former lieutenant Governor and now a member of our Governor's cabinet who works—when it comes to homeland security and State security, work in a bipartisan fashion in Virginia, John Hager. And it is good to see you here as well.

Over the past year, our National Capital Region and jurisdictions around the country have been working to bolster their emergency response plans. In the midst of crisis, the District must be prepared to handle concerns common to other major metropolitan areas. This includes ensuring the health and safety of residents, employees, and visitors, implementing a coordinated emergency management plan, conducting quick and safe evacuations, and coordinating with local jurisdictions.

However, Washington's crisis response capability is often complicated by the needs of the Federal Government. Because of the District's unique status as the Nation's Capital, a multitude of local, State, and Federal Governments and agencies must coordinate their efforts to effectively respond to emergencies. For example, Federal agencies have the authority to close streets which may impact evacuation procedures. Local officials have to scramble to reallocate personnel and other resources in order to successfully accommodate Federal agencies while safely evacuating citizens.

I understand that coordinating State, local, and Federal Governments and a host of public health and law enforcement organizations is a mammoth task. However, I do have some concerns that I hope witnesses can address.

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments developed a regional emergency coordination plan to facilitate communication and coordination among the local jurisdictions. The plan released last week contains many solid recommendations and clearly represents many hours of diligent work, but questions remain.

As the Northern Virginia Transportation Alliance noted on Wednesday in testimony before the National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board: "in focusing almost exclusively on change of command, procedures, play books, and technology, COG's plan is devoid of substantial recommendations regarding the fundamental issue of lack of system capacity and reliability." The question for today's panel is, why is there not yet a list of key infrastructure improvements necessary to respond to future disasters?

Since this plan has not yet been incorporated into an emergency response plan, our COG is considering alternate procedures. Additionally, it is my understanding that the current Federal Emergency Decision and Notification Protocol, which outlines the procedures for closing Federal agencies, does not integrate the Homeland Security Advisory System into its process. I am concerned that

this could lead to inconsistencies and the closure of Federal agencies, and can jeopardize the welfare of the Federal employees.

The Senate has approved amendments to its version of the Homeland Security Department legislation that would create an office for National Capital Region coordination, in essence, creating a Federal homeland security director for the D.C. region. I understand the rationale for this move. Just as private sector companies with technology to aid in homeland defense have had difficulty determining where to turn for an audience and for answers in the Federal Government, so too are regional governments, organizations, and transit operators grappling with a wide array of different players with different levels of authority. I am certain, too, that COG, WMATA and others are eager to find a direct route to work within the administration on the annual budget process.

I am eager to hear about the pros and cons of this approach, including panelists' thoughts on whether the Senate language simply adds another layer of bureaucracy that will slow down, rather than streamline, regional preparedness efforts.

Madam Chairman, last month's Security Summit, organized by the Office of Homeland Security, brought together State, Federal agencies, and the private sector. Virginia, Maryland, and the District agreed to use the Emergency Management Assistance Compact to share personnel resources in emergencies and to work toward a variety of security objectives.

I commend the participants for their effort. I am confident that local jurisdictions and governments can work together to create an emergency preparedness plan that corrects the present deficiencies and is flexible enough to respond to a wide array of crises.

Thank you.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas M. Davis follows:]

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HOUSE SUBCOMMITTE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

OPENING STATEMENT

SEPTEMBER 20, 2002

Good morning. I would like to thank Chairwoman Morella for organizing today's follow-up hearing on the progress of emergency preparedness in the District of Columbia.

Over the past year the National Capital Region, and jurisdictions around the country, have been working to bolster their emergency response plans. In the midst of crisis, the District must be prepared to handle concerns common to other major metropolitan areas. This includes ensuring the health and safety of residents, employees, and visitors, implementing a coordinated emergency management plan, conducting quick and safe evacuations, and coordinating with local jurisdictions. However, Washington's crisis response capability is often complicated by the needs of the Federal government. Because of the District's unique status as the Nation's Capital, a multitude of local, state, and federal governments and agencies must coordinate their efforts to effectively respond

to emergencies. For example, Federal agencies have the authority to close streets, which may impact evacuation procedures. Local officials have to scramble to reallocate personnel and other resources in order to successfully accommodate Federal agencies while safely evacuating citizens.

I understand that coordinating local, state, and federal governments, and a host of public health and law enforcement organizations is a mammoth task. However, I do have some concerns that I hope witnesses can address. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments developed a Regional Emergency Coordination Plan to facilitate communication and coordination among local jurisdictions. The plan released last week contains many solid recommendations and clearly represents many hours of diligent work. But questions remain:

* As the Northern Virginia Transportation Alliance noted on Wednesday in testimony before the National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board, "...in focusing almost exclusively on chains of command, procedures, playbooks and technology, COG's plan is devoid of substantial recommendations regarding the fundamental issue of lack of system capacity and reliability." The question for today's panel is: why is there not yet a list of key infrastructure improvements necessary to respond to future disasters?

* Since this plan has not yet been incorporated into an emergency response plan, are COG members considering alternative procedures? Additionally, it is my understanding that the current Federal Emergency Decision and Notification Protocol, which outlines the procedures for closing federal agencies, does not integrate the Homeland Security Advisory System into its process. I am concerned that this may lead to inconsistencies in the closure of federal agencies and could jeopardize the welfare of our federal employees.

* The Senate has approved an amendment to its version of Homeland Security Department legislation that would create an Office for National Capital Region Coordination, in essence creating a federal homeland security director for the D.C. region. I understand the rationale for this move. Just as private sector companies with technology to aid in homeland defense have had difficulty determining where to turn for an audience and for answers in the federal government, so too are regional governments, organizations and transit operators grappling with a wide array of different players with different levels of authority. I am certain, too, that COG, WMATA and others are eager to find a direct route to work within the Administration on the annual budget process. I'm eager to hear more about the pros and cons of this approach, including panelists' thoughts on whether the Senate language simply adds another layer of bureaucracy that will slow down rather than streamline regional preparedness efforts.

Madam Chairman, last month's security summit organized by the Office of Homeland Security brought together states, federal agencies, and the private sector. Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia agreed to use the Emergency Management Assistance Compact to share personnel resources in emergencies and to work toward a variety of security objectives. I commend the participants for their efforts and am confident that local jurisdictions and governments can work together to create an emergency preparedness plan that corrects the present deficiencies and is flexible enough to respond to a wide array of crises.

Mrs. MORELLA. And now, in conjunction with the policy of this subcommittee and the full committee, I will ask those who are testifying if you would stand and raise your right hand so I can swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you. The report will designate an affirmative response by all.

Our first witness will be Terrance Gainer, the Chief of Police, U.S. Capitol Police.

Chief Gainer, I know that you are going to be leaving after you present your testimony, so that you can participate in the 11 o'clock graduation ceremony of 44 police officers at the Dirksen Building.

So I will start off with you, Mr. Gainer. Thank you.

STATEMENTS OF TERRANCE W. GAINER, CHIEF, U.S. CAPITOL POLICE; PETER G. LaPORTE, DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; DONALD L. KELDSEN, ACTING DIRECTOR, MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; GEORGE FORESMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE GOVERNOR FOR COMMONWEALTH PREPAREDNESS, ACCOMPANIED BY LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR JOHN HAGER, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; JOHN R. D'ARAUJO, JR., ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, RESPONSE & RECOVERY DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; BRUCE WILLIAMS, CHAIRMAN, METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS; GEORGE VRADENBURG, COCHAIR, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TASK FORCE OF THE POTOMAC CONFERENCE, GREATER WASHINGTON BOARD OF TRADE; RICHARD A. WHITE, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY; JOHN V. COGBILL III, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION; AND SCOTT HATCH, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Chief GAINER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, and members of the committee. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the emergency preparedness in our Nation's Capital, and I appreciate the help that Congress has given my agency to better prepare itself.

I think I am in somewhat of a unique position, because just 3 months ago I was the Executive Assistant Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department and sat on the opposite side of the table during many of the discussions that were going on between the city and the capital complex area. But we all know that no single event in the history of Washington tested the area's emergency preparedness and interagency cooperation more than the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Likewise, the October 15th anthrax attack once again necessitated public safety and public health agencies to formulate a plan to address the myriad of issues posed by that act of terrorism.

Each agency has emergency response plans which will guide their individual operations; however, it is clear that no single agen-

cy in the Washington metropolitan area has the personnel and resources to unilaterally handle a terrorist or a critical incident.

I am pleased the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments took a leadership role and developed a task force on homeland security and emergency preparedness for the National Capital Region in order to help coordinate and optimize resources in the event of a critical incident. As a result of their work, the U.S. Capitol Police and other public and private sector stakeholders will partner in the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan and the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System.

We have also learned that the actions taken by one agency to meet their public safety responsibilities may adversely affect the operations of another agency. A clear example is the issue of street closures. There sometimes are legitimate needs to close streets or restrict traffic within the Capitol Complex during emergency situations or due to security concerns. However, we understand that such actions place a burden on the Metropolitan Police Department and other city agencies, as well as the citizens, especially when Constitution and Independence Avenues are affected.

That is why we closely coordinate with the City and other agencies when we must close our streets or alter traffic flow within the Capitol Complex. And I can say, I think the last thing that Mayor Williams said to me as I left that city agency and the first thing that the Congresswoman Norton said to me is as I approached this new job, was: Don't dare close those streets without strong communication between the city and the Capitol Complex community. In fact, in response to that, the U.S. Capitol Police, the Metropolitan Police, and the District Department of Transportation have recently formed two groups which will coordinate security projects or programs that may impact the city's ability to manage vehicular traffic.

An Executive Leadership Steering Committee, consisting of Mr. Dan Tangherlini, Director of the District Department of Transportation; Chief Charles Ramsey of the Metropolitan Police Department, and myself will meet periodically to address new and current issues.

The second group is the Traffic Flow Committee composed of senior representatives of those three agencies. These two groups will ensure that there is a close coordination between our agencies and to resolve any issues raised by security projects or programs prior to their implementation.

The U.S. Capitol Police has also taken specific actions to increase our response and mitigation capabilities, such as purchasing new emergency equipment and specialized vehicles, increasing the number of sworn personnel—which will grow by 44 in just 45 minutes—implementing a comprehensive training program, and developing a chemical biological strike team that will be rivaled by none in the United States. We also participate in regional multiagency emergency response training exercises, one of which was held by Mr. LaPorte just last week, which are very critical to our joint preparedness.

I believe it is no longer a question of if another terrorist attack will occur; regrettably, it is now a question of when, where, and in what form. We must learn the difficult lessons from prior incidents,

and pledge to increase our vigilance and preparedness. In order to be successful in our efforts, the leaders of all public safety agencies in the National Capital Area must support and adhere to three guiding principles—coordination, coordination, and communication—cooperation among all public safety and public service agencies across all Federal, State, and local boundaries with regard to consequent management and resource sharing; coordination of emergency response plans and emergency response actions; and communication of incident information, planned actions, and requests for assistance all are key to effective preparedness and response.

A major goal of the U.S. Capitol Police is to carefully balance our security requirements with reasonable access to this area while maintaining the historic vista of this Capitol Campus. The U.S. Capitol Police has made significant strides since last year's heartless attacks, and we are now better prepared for any such future incidents. We will continue to work closely with Congress, the Council of Governments, our public safety partners, and private stakeholders to improve the security, the safety, and preparedness of our Nation's Capital.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Chief Gainer follows:]

PHONE: 224-9806

UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
119 D STREET, NE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7218

Testimony of
Chief Terrance Gainer
United States Capitol Police
before the
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
U.S. House of Representatives
regarding Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital

September 20, 2002

Madam Chairwoman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss emergency preparedness in the nation's capital.

No single event in the history of Washington tested the area's emergency preparedness and interagency cooperation more than the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Likewise, the October 15th anthrax attack once again necessitated public safety and public health agencies to formulate a plan to address the myriad of issues posed by that act of terrorism.

The intervening months have been a tumultuous time for the public safety agencies in the Washington Metropolitan area. I believe that the leaders of all agencies that are responsible for law enforcement, fire, emergency medical, public health, and mass transit assessed their internal level of preparedness to handle situations in this new threat environment and took steps to improve their capabilities. At the other end of the spectrum, those same leaders began to look outward in order to assess their cooperative relationship with other agencies in the region regarding issues of homeland defense.

While each agency has emergency response plans which will guide their individual operations, it is clear that no single agency in the Washington Metropolitan area has the personnel and resources to unilaterally handle a terrorist or other critical incident. I am pleased the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments took a leadership role and developed a Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for the National Capital Region in order to help coordinate and optimize resources in the event of a critical incident. As a result of their work, the U.S. Capitol Police and other public and private sector stakeholders will partner in the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan and the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System.

We have also learned that the actions taken by one agency to meet their public safety responsibilities may adversely affect the operations of another agency. A clear example is the issue of street closures. There are legitimate needs to close streets or restrict traffic within the Capitol Complex during emergency situations or due to security concerns. However, we

understand that such actions place a burden on the Metropolitan Police and other city agencies, especially when Constitution and Independence Avenues are affected. That is why we closely coordinate with the city and other agencies when we must close our streets or alter traffic flow within the Capitol Complex.

In fact, the U.S. Capitol Police, the Metropolitan Police, and the District Department of Transportation have recently formed two groups that will coordinate security projects or programs that may impact the city's ability to manage vehicular traffic. An Executive Leadership Steering Committee consisting of Mr. Daniel Tangherlini, Director of the District Department of Transportation, Chief Charles Ramsey of the Metropolitan Police Department, and myself will meet periodically to address new and current issues. The second group is a Traffic Flow Committee composed of senior representatives of the three agencies. These two groups will ensure there is close coordination between our agencies and resolve any issues raised by security projects or programs prior to implementation.

Madam Chair, I believe the long history of mutual support enjoyed by the public safety agencies in Washington has served the citizens and visitors of this city and region well over the years. Together, we are responsible for protecting all three branches of the federal government and millions of people who reside in and visit the nation's capital. We have worked together during security events like the Inauguration and visits by heads of state, during peaceful and violent demonstrations, and during times of crisis. That is the foundation upon which this new level of mutual aid is being built and sustained.

For example, the U.S. Capitol Police activates a command center for all scheduled major events at the Capitol and for emergency situations. Within that command center are representatives of the D.C. Fire Department, the Metropolitan Police Department, the D.C. Emergency Medical Service, the U.S. Park Police, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Supreme Court Police, the Library of Congress Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Amtrak Police, the Federal Protective Service, the U.S. Public Health Service, and the Federal Aviation Administration. The U.S. Capitol Police also sends representatives to command centers operated by the Metropolitan Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the D.C. Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Secret Service when those facilities are activated.

The United States Capitol Police has also taken specific actions to increase our response and mitigation capabilities such as: purchasing new emergency equipment and specialized vehicles, increasing the number of sworn personnel, implementing a comprehensive training program, and developing a chemical/biological strike team. We also participate in regional, multi-agency emergency response training exercises.

I believe it is no longer a question of if another terrorist attack will occur, it is now a question of when, where, and in what form. We must learn the difficult lessons from prior incidents and pledge to increase our vigilance and preparedness. In order to be successful in our efforts, the leaders of all public safety agencies in the national capital area must support and

adhere to three guiding principles: cooperation, coordination, and communication. Cooperation among all public safety and public service agencies across all federal, state and local boundaries with regard to consequence management and resource sharing; coordination of emergency response plans and emergency response actions; and communication of incident information, planned actions, and requests for assistance are all keys to effective preparedness and response.

The United States Capitol Police has made significant strides since last year's heartless attacks and we are now better prepared for any such future incidents. We will continue to work closely with Congress, the Council of Governments, our public safety partners, and private stakeholders to improve the safety, security, and preparedness of the nation's capital.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Chief Gainer.

I know you have got to leave, but I am going to allow Ms. Norton ask you one question; then any other questions, we will submit to you in writing for your response.

Chief GAINER. Thank you very much for accommodating that graduation of ours.

Ms. NORTON. I appreciate the chairwoman's indulgence.

I want to thank you, Chief Gainer, for the improved communication in advance of changes in our streets. For example, when these new barriers were put up, or the barriers that are now in the ground and can go up on Constitution and Independence, apparently key people in the District of Columbia didn't know. I must tell you, I didn't know. And the press came—went crazy because they didn't know. And, therefore, I would like to make a suggestion.

In addition, the community also didn't know, and so all kinds of calls came in. Are they trying to keep us from getting out of town in case something happens?

The lesson to be learned from that is, it is not enough to tell the administrator or somebody in DMV, or whoever it is, when—particularly given the nature of this city and the people who live here. When they see things happening and don't know about it and the press hasn't been informed, the press assumes the worst, because they want a story. So I am going to ask you in advance of any changes of that kind not only to notify the District of Columbia, but to notify this subcommittee, the chairman and me.

Chief GAINER. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. NORTON. I am going to ask you also if you would simply go before the press yourself and explain to the press, and thereby inform the public, what is happening so that we don't get conspiracy theories and we don't get people's backs up. Already, we see improved communication with the District government; now the public believes it has a right to know.

I am asking you if you would get back to me on precisely how the extended jurisdiction of my bill from 1993 is being carried out now.

And finally, let me ask you a question about the IMF. I am very pleased with how you are working with the District of Columbia. Your men are going to be on the front line. You have been working hand in glove with the District Police. When I called Mr. Livingood, our Sergeant at Arms, about perhaps sending a Dear Colleague to inform staff and Members that they might want to take public transportation, I found out that he was way ahead of me.

I do want to ask you this. We have noted, the Chief has called me concerning what appears to be an attempt to up the ante. These people are going to try to close down the District. They have always, of course, foment all kinds of trouble around the place, but they are now talking about closing down choke points such as the circles around the city, such as the highways where you get in and out of the city. They are talking about smashing the windows of downtown office buildings, even of places like McDonald's.

I have every confidence in you and in our own D.C. police to be where you need to be in order to take care of these things, but I have to ask you, particularly given the desire of some of these peo-

ple to keep people from moving in and out of the city, whether or not—given the emergency procedures that we have adopted after September 11th, whether or not this complicates dealing with demonstrations, peaceful or not, that come into the city and how—how you find it different, if you find it different at all, to deal with such demonstrations in the face of the need to keep the city open whether for ambulances, which is always the case, but now even for emergency preparedness.

Chief GAINER. Yes. Thank you.

With the events that will transpire, starting a week from today, in conjunction with the threat level that the metropolitan area is at, there are additional risks. We are uncertain, although we have no specific information, whether terrorists could use this type of disruption—these mostly peaceful protests, along with the hooligans—to their advantage. And to the extent the protest organizers are indicating they are going to shut down the city, particularly on Friday, I think it is a particularly dangerous situation that we could find ourselves.

However, that having been said, Chief Ramsey and the Metropolitan Police Department in conjunction with not only the surrounding law enforcement agencies, but agencies as far as away as Macon, Georgia, or Chicago, in addition to Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, are sending sufficient forces that we think that we will be well positioned to try to mitigate any of the disruption. But it does make it tougher. And I think that the chiefs and Deputy Mayor Kellum's suggestion that we use public transportation and minimize car use, listen to the police and press reports about where and what could happen will be essential to making this easier.

We have also sat down with the U.S. Attorney and Main Justice to talk about whether these types of activities are so deleterious to the security efforts that we ought to take very proactive actions, whether there are violations of law that are so potentially egregious that they outweigh the First Amendment rights of someone to come in and speak what they want and shut down our intersections.

So we are trying to balance those two things.

Mrs. NORTON. Thank you, Chief.

I just want to say, I am pleased that after some discussions with the White House, we were able to get money to pay the police who are coming from other jurisdictions.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Ms. Norton. And thank you, Chief Gainer. We look forward to working with you and watching what happens next week, too. Thank you very much.

Chief GAINER. Thank you for your leadership, ma'am.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

I would like to recognize the fact that we have been joined by a very important member of the committee, Ms. Watson, from California. I don't know whether you have an opening statement or want us to just proceed with testimonies.

Mrs. WATSON. Please proceed.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Ms. Watson.

So I am now pleased to call on Peter LaPorte, Director of the District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency. Thank you for being with us, Mr. LaPorte.

Mr. LAPORTE. Good morning, Chairperson Morella and members of the committee. I am going to synchronize my comments here and synopsize them.

Mrs. MORELLA. We appreciate that.

Mr. LAPORTE. Right after September 11th, Mayor Williams convened a Domestic Preparedness Task Force that has evolved into a preparedness council focusing on rewriting our District response plan. We rewrote our response plan based on the emergency support function model of the Federal Government. Having the two plans, being able to be synchronized in the same language and vocabulary, has served us well; and those particular plans match up exactly with Maryland and Virginia in the same language.

Beyond just redoing our District Response Plan, we have made a real effort to be part of getting the word out to the community. In doing so, we have rewritten again our Family Preparedness Guide. Our preparedness guide is found in seven different languages as well as Braille. Recently, it's been redone again to show the event routes of the city, those specific routes that are being coordinated with Maryland and Virginia to expedite the commute of people getting out of town. We have reached out—over a million copies of this have been mailed around the country to other States, other jurisdictions.

Additionally, we focused a great deal on training. The District has invited members of other jurisdictions into our training—Arlington, Montgomery, P.G., Alexandria. The training includes personal preparedness, the response plan, incident command, COOP planning, as well as many others.

In addition to the 1,500 District and regional personnel that have been trained in various emergency preparedness response classes, the District is reaching out to the community, businesses, and schools. Over 120 businesses have been trained. Eleven of the 14 colleges that make up the Consortium of Colleges and Universities in the area have gone through a great deal of training. Approximately 300 public school officials and over 300 community leaders have participated in emergency preparedness training. In the month of September alone, over 75 courses have been offered to support the District's training programs.

The history of collaboration and training has been well evidenced much earlier than this. In March 2002, the District participated with the Army Corps of Engineers in a senior leadership exercise. On May 29th of this year, we held a biological tabletop where over 300 participated—from FEMA and CDC and a number of agencies. And, as Chief Gainer has said, just last week, on the 13th, we had over 200 people participate in a chemical exercise scenario, along with the Council of Governments and the Federal partners.

We also held a summit on the 5th of August where Maryland, Virginia, and the District, with Homeland Security, agreed to eight action items. Those items committed to information sharing and protective actions and moving forward on the EMAC and training. Focusing on community education is one of the key components of that.

With this collaboration between the partners, we have really made some great strides in this area. But the goal is to be the most prepared jurisdiction in the country, and we are coming a lot closer to getting there.

Through the RICCS program that the Council of Governments representative will speak to, through the Washington Area Warning System where we can touch 67 difference agencies throughout the region with the push of one button, our preparedness and coordination has gotten a lot better. But we have to strive to get even better. The private sector, nonprofits, business and industry—it's got to be a comprehensive, collaborative approach, including all our jurisdictions—local, State, Federal, horizontal and vertical.

The coordination and challenges we face day in and day out are very real. It's been a great deal of work that has gone on over the last year in this region. We have come a long way, but we still have a long way to go.

We look forward to the support of this committee. As we have seen it in the past, it's been just stalwart. And we look forward to working with you and with our partners here at the table. Thank you.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. LaPorte. This is a very engaging book, looks pretty clear.

[The prepared statement of Mr. LaPorte follows:]

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THE HONORABLE CONNIE MORELLA, CHAIR



TESTIMONY OF

PETER G. LAPORTE
DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY

SEPTEMBER 20, 2002

10:00 A.M.

Good morning, Chairperson Morella and members of the Committee. I am Peter LaPorte, Director of the District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to testify today about the District's level of emergency preparedness and coordination with surrounding jurisdictions.

The events of Sept. 11, 2001, have profoundly changed the way we do business in the District. Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, many of the threats to the District of Columbia were localized, requiring minimal inter-jurisdictional coordination in order to achieve the District's mission. Now the nature of the threats to the District of Columbia have radically changed requiring more preparedness and coordination between federal, state, and local agencies. For example, a weapon of mass destruction event in the District would have significant regional impacts. For that reason, we have adopted a more regional view when it comes to catastrophic events.

Immediately following Sept. 11, 2001, Mayor Anthony Williams convened an interagency Domestic Preparedness Task Force to review the District of Columbia's emergency management planning and activities. Through their meetings and dialogue, the Task Force enhanced critical linkages and operational relationships with federal, state, and regional partners, as well as regional stakeholders. The Task Force identified the development of a comprehensive emergency management program capable of responding to any incident as a top priority for the District of Columbia. This Task Force has since evolved into the Mayor's Emergency Preparedness Council and includes, District agencies, business, schools and universities, utilities and the Council of Governments.

During the week after September 11, 2001, the District stepped up its efforts to enhance preparedness in the District and reach out to regional jurisdictions. This work included revising the District of Columbia's emergency response plan, renaming it the District Response Plan (DRP). The DRP, organized by Emergency Support Functions (ESF), is designed to mirror the Federal Response Plan. This format was selected to enhance the District of Columbia's response during an incident that requires coordination with other agencies. While revising of the DRP, The District gathered input from regional partners and stakeholders. This living document was implemented in April 2002 after it was approved by the District's City Council.

The District also published a Family Preparedness Guide in early October 2001. The guide was distributed to the citizens of the District of Columbia as an insert in the Washington Post in late November 2001. To reach more citizens, 81,000 copies were delivered to District of Columbia Public Schools for distribution to each student and staff member. In addition, thousands of copies have been distributed to business groups, regional partners, and community members at various meetings. The new Family Preparedness Guide includes updated information on preparing your family for an emergency and an added section on protective actions and evacuation (attached). The new guide is currently available on the District's website and is being translated into seven additional languages as was the original.

The District has expanded the number and types of training. The District of Columbia has invited members of neighboring jurisdictions such as Arlington County, Montgomery County, Prince George's County and Alexandria, to participate. The training now includes Personal Preparedness, The DRP, The Incident Command System, and COOP Planning, and many others. In addition to over 1,500 District and regional personnel that have been trained in various Emergency preparedness and response classes, the District is reaching out to the community, business and schools. Over 120 businesses, 11 of the District's 14 colleges and universities, approximately 300 public school officials, and over 300 community leaders have participated in emergency preparedness training. In the month of September, over 75 courses have been offered to support the District's training program.

The District of Columbia has a history of collaboration and coordination with its surrounding jurisdictions in exercises. On March 12 and 13, 2002, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers hosted a terrorism exercise that tested the effectiveness of the District Response Plan and the overall capabilities of the greater Washington, D.C. area to respond to a terrorist threat. The exercise included representatives from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. On May 29th the District hosted a biological terrorism exercise, in which over 200 of our regional partners participated. The exercise included medical personnel from hospitals within the District and surrounding areas as well as

representatives from the CDC, FEMA, DC agencies and our colleges and universities, just to name a few.

Last week, on September 13, 2002 the District hosted a chemical attack exercise, where over two hundred participants focused on a coordinated response of District, Federal and Regional resources to a chemical event within the nations capital. Participants included representatives from the District, Virginia, Maryland and several federal agencies including FEMA, FBI and CBIRF. We are currently working with the Counsel of Governments on an exercise scheduled for late October 2002, that will further prepare the District for responding to a disaster within the District, as well as how we can support neighboring states and the whole country if requested.

During the Regional Summit on homeland Security held on August 5th of this year, the District, along with Virginia, Maryland and the Office of Homeland Security, signed a joint statement that will help federal partners and representatives from state and local agencies encompassing the National Capital Region improve coordination in preparing for and responding to a terrorist incident. The Joint Statement describes cooperating on eight strategies including information sharing, protective actions, EMAC, as well as training and exercises.

The Joint Statement signed by the District, Maryland Virginia and others, codifies existing informal arrangements that have been developed since the events of September 11th. For example, the E-Route signage program is currently underway and will be completed in the fall and the District, working with our neighbors, has identified event/evacuation routes that extend out towards the capital beltway and beyond. During a public emergency, 70 critical intersections within the District will be manned with uniformed police officers to expedite the flow of traffic, prevent bottlenecks, and direct motorists should the emergency warrant the closing of the current event/evacuation route. Full operational synchronization, such as that contemplated between the District and Maryland, may take as long as one to two years. The agreement signals interest at the highest levels of the regional transportation operating agencies to cooperate and coordinate on an ongoing basis from this point forward.

In addition to coordinating with the regional partners and using policy tools such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which makes it easier for the District to request resources from other states, the District is also doing more to coordinate with the federal government. Several of the coordination vehicles that the District is presently using are the DC White House Task Force, the bi-weekly OHS State Advisor's conference calls and the President's State and Local Senior Advisory Council (SLSAC).

The District is a partner with the other 16 member jurisdictions of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) through the Homeland Security Task Force. COG has developed a Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) to fill a gap in interagency communications exposed on Sept. 11, 2001. RICCS facilitates communication about regional incidents/events such that decision makers can respond in a coordinated, consistent, and efficient manner. The essential mission is to provide a comprehensive, real-time connectivity among all participants under all scenarios.

The District of Columbia is also the control point for the Washington Area Warning Alert System (WAWAS). The District's Emergency Management Agency sends out emergency messages to 67 regional response organizations including Maryland, Virginia, military installations, airports, railways, and District and federal agencies during a regional emergency. Combined with the RICCS, WAWAS allows the District and regional partners to receive and distribute quick and accurate information, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the emergency may be occurring.

As I have presented here, the District is dedicated and working to ensuring the safety of the citizens of our Nation's capitol. We will continue to work with federal, state and local agencies to improve our emergency response preparedness.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you the District of Columbia's level of emergency preparedness and coordination with surrounding jurisdictions.

Mrs. MORELLA. I now would like to recognize Donald Keldsen, who is the acting Director of the Maryland Emergency Management Agency. You demonstrate this truly is regional.

Mr. KELDSEN. Thank you, Madam Chair, and other members.

The State of Maryland has been actively involved in increasing preparedness not only within the State, but with a priority for the National Capital Region. As examples, in the planning arena we have been key players, active in bioterrorism task force planning, completed State planning for handling the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile; and will actually be exercising elements of that plan in Montgomery County on the 25th of this month.

As Peter mentioned, our State Emergency Operations and Terrorism Annex mirror the structure of the Federal Response Plan and the other regional partners, which is a key indication of how they will work together. Additionally, we have been a key partner in transportation planning; coordinating routes, signal timing and communications.

We have been actively involved, not only as a State but also our jurisdictions, in the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments Task Force and the Regional Coordination Plan. We also will be one of the hubs for the Regional Incident Communications and Coordination System.

We've also been actively involved with the Potomac Conference, Greater Washington Board of Trade, which is key, because the private sector is key, as the chair pointed out, not only from an employee standpoint, but much of the infrastructure that we need to think of when we look at the larger region comes from the private sector. So that relationship is key.

Peter covered the aspects of the summit. One of the things that I think is important as we move forward from that summit is the active Federal participation by various Federal agencies in those commitments to action.

In the training arena, we continue to collaborate among the jurisdictions—D.C., Virginia, and Maryland—on training and on exercising, focusing not only on first responder training, but as was pointed out, some senior official training and also medical, health, and even public works people that need some training, because they may come in contact with some of the incidents.

We have participated with the Metropolitan Washington Council Of Governments on the Familiarization Workshop, which was an effort to educate Federal and other regional partners on how we operate, so we can understand and operate better together.

In the realm of exercises, we have had a history of working together. Again, it was alluded to, the exercise last Friday and that cooperative effort, and also looking forward to a full field exercise involving the District, elements within the Federal Government from the District, Virginia, and Maryland.

The final aspect that I would really like to emphasize is, aside from the plans themselves, I guess Washington said it best. The plan really is nothing; it's the planning that's important. And the planning is going on. The relationships that are established—and almost everybody here at the panel knows each other very well and speaks almost on a weekly basis. We know each other better. We will be able to coordinate things. Because the plan will not always

go according to how it was laid out; we'll need to adapt, and we will be able to do that because we are working together.

Thank you.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Keldsen.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keldsen follows:]

Hearing on Emergency Preparedness
In Washington, DC

US House of Representatives
Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia

TESTIMONY By
Donald L. Keldsen, Acting Director

STATE OF MARYLAND
MILITARY DEPARTMENT

MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

September 20, 2002

STATE OF MARYLAND
MILITARY DEPARTMENT

MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
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TESTIMONY TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[By Donald L. Keldsen, Acting Director]
September 20, 2002

The State of Maryland has been actively involved in increasing preparedness across multiple disciplines since the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax incidents. We have focused not only on the National Capital Region, but also, the other regions in Maryland and, our neighboring states. Maryland has done extensive planning, training and exercising over the last five years, establishing a base upon which to build more intensively since the attacks.

In the **Planning** area, we have been key players in the National Capital Region. Active in the Bio-Terrorism Task Force planning, we have moved to completion in State planning for the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and will exercise key aspects of that plan with Montgomery County on the 25th of this month.

In **Transportation Planning**, Maryland has been an essential Regional partner in coordinating routes, signal timing and communications. Our revised State Emergency Operations Plan and Terrorism Annex mirror the structure of the Federal Response Plan and Plans of our Regional counterparts in the use of Emergency Support functions for a consistency of operations. Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia Emergency Management Directors and planners, frequently coordinate planning initiatives. Maryland has been an active participant in the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments' Ad Hoc Task Force on Emergency Preparedness and Homeland Security. We have also been involved in the Potomac Conference/Greater Washington Board of Trade initiatives in this area.

Aside from functional area planning, Governor Glendening and his staff conducted the National Capital Region Summit with Governor Warner, Mayor Williams and Governor Ridge to make joint commitments on key processes essential to preparedness. These **Commitments to Action** cover:

1. Citizen Involvement in Preparedness Decision-making and Coordination
2. Emergency Protective Measures
3. Infrastructure Protection
4. Media Relations and Communication
5. Mutual Aid
6. Terrorism Prevention
7. Training and Exercises

In the **Training** area, we continue to support First Responder and the other responder training and have established core competencies for all disciplines at the Awareness, Operations, Technician, and Specialty levels. Traditional First Responder Training is normally decentralized to the local jurisdictions and the counties near the National Capital have continued to aggressively train for the complete spectrum of weapons of mass destruction terrorism. At the State level, we have also focused on training health/medical professionals, transportation workers, and police. Additionally, we have focused on Senior Officials' training for the

Governor's Cabinet, the Department of Transportation, Prince George's County and their municipalities. We look forward to collaborating with our Regional Partners for a Senior Officials' Workshop for the National Capital Region. We will continue these efforts to include inter-jurisdictional training with our Regional Partners. We also participated in the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments' Familiarization Workshop to educate Federal, and other Regional Partners, on how each other operates.

In the realm of **exercises**, Maryland has exercised with the District, Virginia, and FEMA on multiple terrorist attacks in the Region. We also participated in a District exercise last Friday. Maryland has had hospital, transportation and maritime exercises and supported local jurisdictions. We look forward to a Regional exercise involving the District, Virginia and Maryland in conjunction with TOPOFF II in May, 2003.

Equipping responders is yet another key aspect of preparedness for terrorism. Maryland has allocated over $7,000,000 in Department of Justice funds to local jurisdictions based on the risk and capabilities assessment, which was mandated by Congress. These funds focus on personal protective equipment, detection tools, decontamination means and interoperable communications. Additional funding was provided to the State, Montgomery County and Prince George's County after the September 11, 2001 attack to be used for reimbursement for costs from response to the Pentagon and responder capability enhancement. The State portion focused on interoperable communications, bomb squad enhancements, and equipment necessary to combat weapons of mass destruction terrorist attacks.

Maryland will continue to enhance its preparedness with due attention to the importance of the National Capital Region as it fulfills its commitments from the National Capital Region Summit.

Mrs. MORELLA. I am now pleased to recognize George Foresman, the Deputy Assistant to the Governor for the Commonwealth of Virginia Preparedness.

Also, I know that my colleague, Tom Davis, recognized the former Lieutenant Governor, John Hager, who is presently Assistant to the Governor of Virginia for Community Preparedness. And I know you probably will be leaving to go to Richmond, from what I have heard. But we are honored to have you with us here today, too, sir. Thank you.

Mr. Foresman.

Mr. FORESMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, members of the subcommittee. The opportunity to appear before this committee today I think is extremely important. I am pleased to represent the Commonwealth of Virginia, and to discuss the important issues of emergency preparedness in the Nation's Capital and in this region as a whole.

The Commonwealth of Virginia and its Governor, Mark Warner, take the issue very seriously. In fact, Governor Warner established the Office of Commonwealth Preparedness as a cabinet-level office when he assumed office this year to provide the strategic focus to our preparedness efforts in terms of our coordination activities with communities, the private sector, our partners across the river in Virginia or in Maryland and the District of Columbia, and to ensure that we had a strategic focus to our preparedness efforts.

You noted Lieutenant Governor Hager is with us today.

Much has occurred since this subcommittee held its hearings last October. In the weeks and months following the attack, there were those who sought to be critical of our preparedness and our response and recovery activities in the National Capital Region. This is unfortunate and does a disservice to the many men and women who work every day and were working prior to September 11th to make the National Capital Region safer and more secure.

I have been involved in public safety as both a first responder and at the executive level for nearly 25 years. I have never participated in a major crisis event in which there was a flawless response in recovery. Could we have done better on September 11th and subsequently with the anthrax attacks? Absolutely. Did we fail? Simply stated, we did not.

The structures have been in place for a number of years. What we found on September 11th, what we found on the subsequent days with the emergence of the anthrax crisis was that we needed to do a better job in terms of our execution. I think the good news in all of this is the fact that, as you noted, Madam Chairwoman, you've brought a large group of folks together today. These folks have been working hand in hand, arm in arm over the past 12 months to address the issues.

The recent National Capital Region Summit involving Governors Warner and Glendening, Mayor Williams and Governor Tom Ridge representing the Federal executive branch underscore the importance that leaders are placing toward National Capital Region preparedness. This summit and its eight commitments to action represent another step in the regional continuum for preparedness as they further are galvanizing our forward direction toward a higher level of preparedness.

I would offer, if there is one bright spot in the tragedy of September 11th, it is the critical support that leaders at all levels of government, in our communities, at the State level and across the full breadth of the Federal Government, all three branches of the Federal Government and the private sector are focusing on preparedness. This level of leadership, support, and attention is critical to the role that we have to play.

We cannot escape the simple fact that Washington is unique. Our Founding Fathers envisioned a Nation where no one level or branch of government possessed supremacy over another. The checks and balances that our Founding Fathers provided to us make the whole business of coordinating preparedness, response, and recovery activities among the plethora of government entities in this great region a challenge. This means a structure that provides for effective coordination of activities among local governments, States, and the District, between the three branches of the Federal Government, and in fact between both Houses of the U.S. Congress, as well as our regional partners and our private sector partners.

Our structures recognize that—or must recognize, for instance, that an attack, as demonstrated on September 11th, can occur outside the geographical boundaries of the District of Columbia, but nevertheless cause a significant impact on the Nation's Capital. There are many stakeholders that must be engaged in the decision-making process.

I would offer to you, Madam Chairwoman, that I think that we have made substantial progress during the past 12 months if for no other reason than that we've raised the awareness on the part of officials, citizens, and the media; and we know those areas that we need to address corrective action.

I would like to address one specific issue that you raised. You noted the fact that we have 17 jurisdictions in what we commonly refer to as the National Capital Region. Our experience on September 11th firmly indicated to us that the National Capital Region is much broader than 17 jurisdictions. It's much broader than the District of Columbia, it's much broader than two States, and it's clearly much broader than all of our private sector and our regional partners. So I would offer to you today that, as we move forward with this continuum of preparedness, we are challenged to bring all of the stakeholders to the table to ensure that the plans, procedures, and processes work the next time, because we all know there will be a next time.

Madam Chairman, you have my written testimony. And thank you very much.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Foresman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Foresman follows:]

TESTIMONY OF

GEORGE W. FORESMAN
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE GOVERNOR FOR
COMMONWEALTH PREPAREDNESS
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

SEPTEMBER 20, 2002

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Madam Chairwoman, Madam Ranking Member, other members, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am extremely pleased to represent the Commonwealth of Virginia at this important hearing to discuss emergency preparedness in the nation's capital. The Commonwealth of Virginia and its Governor Mark Warner take this issue very seriously. In fact, Governor Warner established the Office of Commonwealth Preparedness when he assumed office this year to provide a strategic focus to our preparedness efforts and named former Lt. Governor John H. Hager to serve as Assistant to the Governor for Commonwealth Preparedness.

We have recently completed our national observance of the tragedy that occurred one year ago on September 11, 2001. Americans relived the vivid pictures of rescuers searching through the rubble of the World Trade Center, officials racing to a rural Pennsylvania field and first responders unfurling an American flag atop the still burning Pentagon. These images reflect both the tragedy of the moment and at the same time the exceptional commitment of men and women to help their fellow citizens.

Much has occurred since this subcommittee held hearings last October. In the weeks and months following the attack there were those who sought to be critical of our preparedness and response activities in the National Capital Region. This is unfortunate and does a disservice to the many men and women who work every day and were working before September 11th, to make the National Capital Region safer and more secure. I have been involved in public safety as both a first responder and at the executive level for nearly 25 years. I have never participated in a major crisis event in which there was a flawless response and recovery. Could we have done better on September 11th and with the subsequent Anthrax attacks? Absolutely. Did we fail? Simply stated no. Our opportunity and obligation remains to capture the lessons learned and translates them into actions to strengthen our preparedness at all levels of government, within the private sector and with our citizens.

The recent National Capital Region Summit, involving Governors Warner and Glendening, Mayor Williams and Governor Tom Ridge representing the federal Executive Branch, underscores the importance that leaders are placing towards National Capital Region preparedness. This Summit and its eight commitments to action represent another step in the regional continuum for preparedness as they are further galvanizing our forward direction towards better preparedness. In addition, other focused actions such as Governor Warner's Secure Virginia Initiative, the detailed study by Arlington County of the response to the Pentagon attack, ongoing work efforts in the District and in Maryland and a host of regional planning initiatives. The United States Congress has been especially interested and supportive of actions to improve preparedness. I would offer that if there is one bright spot in the tragedy of September 11th it is the critical support that leaders at all levels of government and in the private sector are focusing on preparedness.

We cannot escape the simple fact that Washington is unique. Our founding fathers envisioned a nation where no one level or branch of government possessed supremacy over another. We commonly call these checks and balances. These checks and balances make coordinating preparedness, response and recovery activities among the plethora of government entities in this great region a challenge. Beyond the rhetoric and outside of the friendly inter-jurisdictional rivalries, it is critical that we make sure an effective structure exists for those in positions of leadership to coordinate and make decisions. This means a structure that provides for effective coordination of activities among local governments, states and the District and between the three branches of the federal government and in fact between both houses of the Congress. Any structure must recognize for instance, that an attack, as demonstrated on September 11th, can occur outside the geographical boundaries of Washington D.C. but never the less causes a significant impact on our nation's capital. There are many stakeholders that must be engaged in the decision making process.

This decision role for leaders can take two forms. One is the ability for leaders of fire, law enforcement, emergency medical, emergency management or public health agencies to make response and recovery decisions affecting single or multiple incident sites. I will refer to this as tactical decision making.

The second form is strategic in nature. That is the ability for those elected to positions of authority to make coordinated joint decisions about everything from the opening or closing of offices to implementation of security measures. It is critical to citizens in the National Capital Region and the country as a whole that we are well organized. In the midst of a crisis anything less will not instill a high level of public confidence and will be detrimental to ameliorating the fear associated with a crisis, especially a terrorist event.

I believe we have made significant progress in the decision making area if for no other reason than we have raised the awareness of its importance. Our communities possessed a strong basis for this type of coordination even prior to September 11th as did the two states and the District. Problems at the federal level are being addressed and there appears to be agreement on our ultimate goal of stronger coordination of the decision making process. Efforts on the part of regional entities such as the Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, the Potomac Conference and a host of others are supporting the dialogue needed to identify the issues that local, state and federal government organizations, along with our private sector partners, must address in terms of decision-making. The simple fact remains that the ultimate decision-making responsibility rests with the elected heads of communities, states and the federal Executive Branch as well as those designated as the heads of the federal judiciary and both houses of Congress. There is much to be done but the continuing interest in the issue will provide the catalyst to move our efforts forward while harnessing the existing structures for managing emergencies and disasters and preserving the need for separation of elements of government as envisioned by our founding fathers.

Beyond decision-making we must ensure our ability to share resources. This is more than simply being able to physically move people and equipment across geographical boundaries. This will require integrated planning, training and equipment procurement among the three levels of government and with our private sector partners. You specifically asked about the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) in your invitation. Virginia is a signatory as are Maryland and the District. This provides a basic level of capacity for accomplishing mutual aid in terms of liability, certification and reimbursement issues. There are well-documented operational procedures to guide its implementation. We recognize that this is an important step.

It is clear that there needs to be more. There will be events that will occur daily that are less than the scope envisioned when EMAC was first developed. I believe that with minimal adjustment on the part of state and District statutes we can use the concepts behind EMAC to further strengthen our ability to provide for interstate and District mutual aid. There are currently provisions in place for some mutual aid, in particular within disciplines such as fire and law enforcement that have emerged over time. It is appropriate that we step back and revisit our mutual aid concepts, as a region, and just as we did with EMAC develop an overarching concept that has applicability to all governmental entities. We will be working to make sure that the mutual aid provisions represent agreements between communities, states and federal agencies for the full range of events and not simply limited to specific disciplines. This concept is how EMAC works between the states and it has been very successful. The bottom line is that our mutual aid focus must transcend planning, training, equipment acquisition, including communications, to provide for a true regional capacity. Despite the efforts to enhance preparedness funding no single jurisdiction will be capable of addressing the full spectrum of events that it may face. There must be provisions for neighbors to help neighbors throughout all disciplines of government.

Finally, I would like to briefly address funding issues. Congress and the Administration continue to be supportive of helping our communities and states improve preparedness by providing funding to supplement local and state spending on preparedness. This is welcome and appreciated. I would warn however that we must be very careful not to allow the potential creation of the proposed Department of Homeland Security to unintentionally stall efforts. States and communities are already addressing the ordinary costs of preparedness and the extraordinary operational costs resulting from increased security and response activities since September 11th. Congress and the Administration have both indicated that the appropriate role of the federal government is to provide funding to address the extraordinary cost of preparedness for terrorism. This is reasonable.

Many efforts and initiatives are moving forward at local and state levels to enhance readiness. We run the risk of federal assistance being slowed by delays on passing a federal budget and upheaval associated with the potential merger of agencies into the Department of Homeland Security. This could cause a loss of momentum and that means we will not as quickly develop the extraordinary capabilities needed for the threats we face. Preparedness is a partnership and supportive funding from the federal level must recognize this. We must ensure that funding provides for flexibility in developing an all-hazards capability across government and in concert with the private sector. Emergencies and disasters will happen every day and we should not allow a focus on one threat to blind us to preparedness for other types of events. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that communities, states, federal agencies and the private sector be measured in terms of their preparedness. To do otherwise will mean that we could potentially spend great sums of money without achieving a measurable increase in our preparedness. The stakes are too high and the citizens deserve more than to do otherwise.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today and I will be happy to take your questions.

Mrs. MORELLA. We will now hear from John R. D'Araujo, Jr., Assistant Director of Response and Recovery Directorate of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA.

Did I pronounce your name correctly?

Mr. D'ARAUJO. Yes, ma'am, you did.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you. You are on.

Mr. D'ARAUJO. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman, and members of the subcommittee. It is an honor for me to represent Director Allbaugh at this very important hearing, and he asked that I extend his regrets that he could not be here with you this morning.

For more than 20 years, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has been the Nation's lead Federal agency for preparing, responding, and recovering from emergencies and disasters, no matter what the cause. It is because of these unique capabilities that the President has incorporated FEMA as part of the proposed Department of Homeland Security that will have the principal mission in our government for protecting the American people and the security of our country.

As you heard from my colleagues, even before the events of September 11th, FEMA was actively working with the District of Columbia and the States and local governments in the National Capital Region to help ensure our efforts to respond and manage the potentially devastating consequences of a terrorist event striking the heart of our government.

In September of last year, our staff met with the planner from the D.C. Emergency Management Agency to develop a strategy to encourage involvement in the development of a comprehensive emergency response plan for dealing with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. In the past year, the District of Columbia, FEMA, and the National Capital Region engaged in a comprehensive and coordinated planning process that should serve as a model for the Nation, and I will tell you that there has been progress in a number of areas.

First, the development of comprehensive response plans for terrorist incidents for the District and for the region, the identification of equipment needed to respond effectively including better, more interoperable communication systems, training at all levels for responding to terrorist incidents and operating in contaminated environments, and the establishment of a coordinated exercise program to improve response capabilities, practice mutual aid, and evaluate response operations.

A number of actions were taken over the past year to improve the Federal Government's readiness to support the National Capital Region in the event of another terrorist attack. These include the development of a dedicated Emergency Response Team for the National Capital Region, the development of specialized operating procedures for responding to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and providing technical assistance to the National Capital Region emergency planners, prepositioning critical resources, conducting seminars and workshops, and coordinating with other partners in the Federal response community.

The National Capital Region Emergency Response Team is one of four highly skilled, specialized national teams to respond to the challenge of large, complex, catastrophic disaster. This team is

dedicated to the National Capital Region. Not only are they skilled in the aspects of Federal response, but in the unique challenges that face response to the Nation's Capital.

FEMA's National Emergency Response Team contingency plan for responding to terrorist incidents involving WMD incidents provides the national team with specific operating procedures that are common for the unique contingencies and requirements of these events. I would suggest that these planning efforts might be a model for the rest of the Nation, including the terrorism especially prepared training courses that the District and the other representatives here have participated in.

Madam Chairman, I have my statement abbreviated, but submit it for the record. And in closing, I just want to stress that, as has been mentioned earlier, there has been a great deal of work done even prior to September 11th—accelerated, of course, since then. But I would also add that the process is a continuing one, it never ends, and it requires a lot more work.

Thank you very much. And I stand ready for your questions.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. D'Araujo. And we certainly—we realize how important it is to have FEMA's complete involvement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Araujo follows:]

Statement of John R. D'Araujo, Jr.
Assistant Director
Response and Recovery Directorate
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
House Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives

September 20, 2002

Introduction

Good morning, Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee. I am John D'Araujo, Assistant Director for the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Response and Recovery Directorate. It is an honor for me to represent Director Allbaugh at this important hearing. He regrets that he is unable to be here with you today.

For more than 20 years, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has been the Nation's lead federal agency for preparing for, responding to and recovering from emergencies and disasters, no matter what the cause. FEMA has a core competency in managing the consequences of all disasters, including acts of terrorism. It is because of FEMA's unique capabilities that the President has selected FEMA to become part of the new Department of Homeland Security that will have the principal mission in our Government for protecting the American people and the security of our country.

Even before the events of September 11th FEMA was actively working with the District of Columbia and the State and Local governments in the National Capital Region (NCR) to help ensure our readiness to respond and to manage the potentially devastating

consequence of a terrorist event striking the heart of our government. In September 2001, our staff met with a planner from the DC Emergency Management Agency to develop a strategy to encourage involvement in the development of a comprehensive emergency response plan for dealing with terrorist incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Our efforts were intensified and our responsibilities were greatly expanded in light of the events of September 11 and our nation's new challenges and circumstances. I am pleased to be here today to report on the progress we all have made and the work that remains to be completed.

In the past year, the District of Columbia, FEMA, and the National Capital Region engaged in a comprehensive and coordinated planning process that should serve as a model for the nation. Progress has been made in the following areas:

- The *development of comprehensive response plans* for terrorist incidents for the District AND for the entire Region.
- The identification of *equipment* needed to respond effectively, including better, more interoperable communications systems.
- *Training* at all levels for responding to terrorist incidents and operating in contaminated environments.
- The establishment of a coordinated, regular *exercise program* to improve response capabilities, practice mutual aid and to evaluate response operations.

Federal Support for National Capital Region

FEMA's mission is to lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from disasters, which includes government's emergency response to terrorist attacks and natural

disasters. The agency achieves this mission by supporting state and local governments in their efforts to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect our nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based, all-hazards emergency management program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.

A number of actions were taken over the past year to improve the Federal government's readiness to support the National Capital Region in the event of another terrorist attack. These efforts included the development of a dedicated Emergency Response Team for the National Capital Region, the development of specialized operating procedures for responding to incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, providing technical assistance to National Capital Region emergency planners, pre-positioning critical resources, conducting seminars and workshops, and coordinating with other Federal Response Plan agency's to enhance regional readiness.

The **National Capital Region Federal Response Team (ERT-N NCR)** is one of four highly skilled, specialized national teams organized to respond to the challenges of large, complex, catastrophic disasters. This team is dedicated to the National Capital Region. The team is not only skilled in the key aspects of the Federal response, but in the unique issues and challenges facing the Nation's Capital.

FEMA's *National Emergency Response Team Contingency Plan for Responding to Terrorist Incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction* provides the national teams

with specific operating procedures that account for the unique contingencies and requirements of these types of events.

One of the key benefits of the planning process is the ability to develop relationships and an understanding of programs, capabilities and roles and responsibilities **before** an event. FEMA and representatives of other Federal Response Plan agencies are active participants in the ongoing planning efforts of the District and the Region.

An example of the local, regional, and Federal partnership that has grown over the past year was demonstrated through a Senior Leaders Seminar co-sponsored by FEMA and the US Army Corps of Engineers. The two-day seminar focused on the complicated issues of debris management that would face the region in the event of a terrorist attack using conventional explosives in and around downtown Washington DC. During the seminar, we were able to identify issues and focus efforts to develop systems and strategies for managing what could be a catastrophic situation.

Another example is the development of plans for deployment and distribution of the National Pharmaceutical stockpile, managed by the Department of Health and Human Services, to the National Capital Region.

A Model for the Nation

The planning process used for the National Capital Region over the past year should serve as a model for the nation. The planning efforts are coordinated and inclusive within the

District of Columbia government, within the Region, to include the Federal family. The process also includes important segments of the private sector, especially, the health and medical community that is vital to our nation's readiness to respond to the threats of bio-terrorism.

The planning process is augmented in the National Capital Region through a concentrated training effort for responders, municipal officials and the public. The District, in fact, sent several of their staff to FEMA's pilot of its new *Terrorism Planning Course,* designed to provide state and local governments with the tools to develop terrorism annexes to their Emergency Operations Plan. The reaction from those that attended was very positive.

The National Capital Region is drawing on the experiences both at the Pentagon and at the World Trade Center. The lessons learned from these two events are being incorporated into the new plans.

Another factor that will enhance the readiness for the area is that the plans for the National Capital Region use an All-hazard approach that mirrors the Federal Response Plan. The compatibility of these plans will further enhance the readiness and response capabilities of the region.

Close

In closing, I want to stress that a lot of work has been done, but there is still work ahead to help protect the Nation's Capital and help ensure the nation's readiness to respond to a terrorist incident on the region. FEMA is ready to do its part.

Madam Chairman, this concludes my formal remarks and I look forward to any questions the Subcommittee may have.

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Mrs. MORELLA. I now recognize the Honorable Bruce Williams, who chairs the board of the Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments. He is also a council member in Takoma Park, Maryland. Thank you.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you. Good morning, Madam Chair, and members of the subcommittee.

As you know, COG is the 501(c)(3) not-for-profit association of, now, 18 local governments in the metropolitan Washington region, serving Northern Virginia, suburban Maryland, and the District of Columbia. COG's served this region since 1957.

First, I want to acknowledge the support of this committee in ensuring this region received funds from the Federal budget to improve the preparedness of the entire region after the terrorist attacks last year. Thank you.

I am pleased to report that COG and its many partners around the region have now completed work on what's likely the first-in-the-Nation regional coordination plan. It's, in printed form, 450 pages.

We focused on one paramount goal, ensuring that the National Capital Region is prepared and equipped to respond to future emergencies or incidents, whether natural or man-made, domestic or foreign. The Regional Emergency Coordination Plan and its heart, the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System, are new regional tools that enable local, State, and Federal Government agencies and community and private sector organizations to better understand the challenges that we now face and to remain vigilant.

What makes this plan different, and why are we better off today than we were last year?

First, the plan is a product of extensive and sustained engagement by key local, State, and Federal Government stakeholders, plus valued representatives of the private and community sectors.

The plan addresses a broad spectrum of potential hazards and builds upon and recognizes the essential roles of local governments as first responders.

The plan also recognizes the roles accorded the States for emergency management and the unique responsibilities of the Federal Government in our region.

The task force has organized the plan around emergency support functions, the key resources that will be needed in the event of an emergency or incident. In this regard, the plan reflects the approach of this Federal response plan and many State and local plans in the region.

Central to the entire plan is the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System [RICCS].

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Williams, just move your mic a little closer. I can hear you, but I can see people back there straining. Thank you. But I could hear you.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Central to the entire plan is the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System [RICCS]. Today, an emergency or incident would trigger a RICCS conference call among key regional decisionmakers, not some 10 hours after as was the case on September 11th following the attack on the Pentagon, but likely within 30 minutes, in time to make a difference.

RICCS provides the technology and the procedures governing a notification system to alert local, State, and Federal officials and important community and private sector representatives just minutes after an emergency or an incident. Notice will go out via telephone, pager, e-mail, and other methods. COG and its partners have already begun to test the RICCS, making sure that players know their roles and can perform them quickly and effectively in an emergency or an incident.

We have made significant progress in other major areas, including plans for the region's health and transportation systems during emergencies. As a result, the plan includes a draft operational plan for responding to a bioterrorism event. And we've worked with the region's major transportation authorities to develop a Regional Emergency Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex and a communications process for the region's transportation agencies. Last week, the board adopted the plan, fulfilling a commitment made 11 months ago. We also capped our effort with a proposed MOU, which each of our member jurisdictions and partners is expected to sign to provide a mechanism to advance the plan.

Further, partner agencies and organizations are asked to incorporate the plan concepts and agreements into their own plans, providing a seamless layer of preparedness and coordination for the National Capital Region. The plan will be subject to frequent and rigorous testing and evaluation.

Testing of the RICCS notification system began in June. This isn't the end of our work, but the beginning of a new phase guided by the preparedness and response blueprint we have developed for all of our uses. We have provided plan summaries to the committee and we also have available the plan on C D-Rom, and it's also available on our Web site, MWCOG.org.

That concludes my remarks. Thank you.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. Williams. It is kind of heavy lifting there. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]

METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS

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THE REGIONAL EMERGENCY COORDINATION PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

Testimony of
Bruce Williams, Chairman
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

For the
House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
Rep. Constance A. Morella, Chairwoman

September 20, 2002

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Good Morning, Madame Chair and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Bruce Williams, Chairman of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG). As you know, COG is the 501©3 not-for-profit association of 18 governments in the metropolitan Washington region serving Northern Virginia, suburban Maryland and the District of Columbia. This region is also known as the National Capital Region.

COG has served this region since 1957 providing a venue for regional collaboration and coordination on a multitude of public policy issues that have shaped this region, including transportation, planning and development, the environment, public safety and emergency management, housing and a host of other issues for which regional collaboration was essential.

First, I want to acknowledge the support of this committee in ensuring that this region received funds from the federal budget to improve the preparedness of the entire region after the terrorist attacks of last year. You recognized that the jurisdictions within the region are significant to the federal interest because federal facilities and workers are disbursed all around the area. Your support and that of the entire federal government has been a key element in the successful completion of the plan I will discuss with you today.

Madame Chair, I'm pleased to report that COG and its partners around the region have completed work on the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).

The past year has challenged our nation and region perhaps like no other in the memory of the post World War II generation. However, great challenge is not new to America.

Two hundred and twenty five years ago in 1777, Thomas Paine observed the challenges facing the newly independent United States of America and declared, "These are the times that try men's souls."

Paine continued, "The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country; but he that stands it now deserves the love and thanks of man and woman."

The events of the past year have most certainly tried our souls. The loss of lives, the economic hardships, the turn to active duty by thousands of American armed forces, and the changes in our treasured way of life --- large and small --- have tried our souls.

But the summer soldiers have been few and their voices overwhelmed by the many Americans who have chosen to stand the challenge.

I am very proud that COG has withstood this challenge. From the early hours after the attack on the Pentagon to the milestone achievement of developing this regional plan, COG and a growing network of partners have all chosen to meet our challenges and overcome them.

All the while, we have focused on one paramount goal --- ensuring that the National Capital Region is prepared and equipped to respond to future emergencies or incidents, whether natural or man-made, domestic or foreign.

What has been the fruit of all this labor? COG has produced a document that is likely the first in the nation --- a Regional Emergency Coordination Plan.

Our Plan again builds on COG's institutional strengths of planning and coordination. We have not tried to usurp the jobs of first responders and operating agencies, but help them do their jobs better.

If we were unsure before, we now know that COG's work is far from being over. Thomas Jefferson said, "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." The attacks on September 11 last year put the National Capital Region, our country and the entire world on notice that henceforth, eternal vigilance would be demanded of all of us.

The Regional Emergency Coordination Plan and its heart, the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System, are new regional tools that enable local, state and federal government agencies and community and private sector organizations to better stand the challenges we now face, and remain forever vigilant.

What makes this plan different and why are we better off today than we were last year?

First, the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan is the product of extensive and sustained engagement by key local, state and federal government stakeholders, plus valued representatives of the private and community sectors.

I suppose it might have been possible for a small number of experts to go off in a room and come out with a plan. Perhaps they would have completed their work sooner than the Task Force. But then, it would have been the experts' plan and unlikely to include the breadth of the region and not attract the broad acceptance marshaled by the Task Force.

Around the COG table, we focused on the difficult issues of transportation, public safety, communications, health, solid waste and debris management, and energy and water.

To ensure COG Board investment, each of these functional areas was headed up by a COG elected or appointed official. The Board formed a Task Force on Homeland Security and its members devoted many hours of their time to guarantee its success.

Providing a forum is important, but the COG Board made it clear that our regional effort will be judged on outcomes, not process. Using this standard, I am confident our work can be judged a clear success.

The Regional Emergency Coordination Plan addresses a broad spectrum of potential hazards and builds upon and recognizes the essential roles of local governments as first responders.

The Plan also recognizes the roles accorded the states for emergency management and the unique responsibilities of the federal government in the National Capital Region.

The Task Force has organized the Plan around emergency support functions, the key resources that will be needed in the event of an emergency or incident. In this regard, the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan reflects the approach of the Federal Response Plan and many state and local plans in the National Capital Region.

The plan defines a regional incident as any situation with the potential to disrupt essential services or mobility, or jeopardize public health and safety on a regional basis. Stepping up the risk, a regional emergency is a situation that has disrupted essential services, mobility, health or safety, and has region wide impacts or consequences.

Central to the entire Plan is the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System or RICCS.

Today, an emergency or incident would trigger a RICCS conference call among key regional decision-makers. Not some ten hours after, as was the case on September 11 following the attack on the Pentagon, but within 30 minutes, time in which to make a difference.

RICCS provides the technology and the procedures governing a notification system to alert local, state and federal officials, and important community and private sector representatives, just minutes after an emergency or incident. Notice will go out via telephone, pager, and email.

COG and its partners have already begun to test the RICCS, making sure that players know their roles and can perform them quickly and effectively in an emergency or incident.

We also made significant progress in other major areas, including plans for the region's health and transportation systems during emergencies.

As a result, the RECP includes a draft operational plan for responding to a bioterrorism event, and our work achieved especially good communication between the DC Hospital Association and the Office of Emergency Preparedness of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

We have worked with the region's major transportation authorities to develop a Regional Emergency Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex and developed a communications process for the region's transportation agencies.

The Plan doesn't make decisions for governments or the private sector. But --- and this is important --- decisions will be better for having been made in a regional context that provides real-time, critical information. The Task Force has often characterized this approach as, "One Message – Many Voices."

Last week, the COG Board adopted the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan, fulfilling a commitment made eleven months ago. We also capped our effort with a proposed Memorandum of Understanding, which each of our member jurisdictions and partners are expected to sign, to provide a mechanism to advance the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan.

Further, partner agencies and organizations are asked to incorporate the plan concepts and agreements into their own plans --- providing a seamless layer of preparedness and coordination for the National Capital Region.

The plan will be subject to frequent and rigorous testing and evaluation. Testing of the RICCS notification system has already begun.

This is not the end of our work, but the beginning of a new phase, guided by the preparedness and response blueprint we have developed for our use --- the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan.

Last week, as we remembered the terrorist attacks of a year ago, we paused and were humbled by the sacrifice and loss that took place in New York City, in Arlington County at the Pentagon and a field in rural Pennsylvania. We must ask again, for all the discussion and meetings, have we made a difference?

Because we are prepared, we <u>have</u> made a difference, and will continue to do so, remaining vigilant.

That concludes my remarks, Madame Chairman. I have attached, for your information and the record, a set of frequently asked questions about the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan.

METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS REGIONAL EMERGENCY COORDINATION PLAN℠

Frequently Asked Questions

1. ***What is the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan℠?***
   Developed under the auspices of COG, along with its federal, state, and private sector partners, the RECP℠ is an all hazards emergency response plan that facilitates coordination and communications for major emergencies and disasters affecting the National Capital Region.

2. ***How will it make a difference in the future?***
   Through collaborative planning, communication, information sharing and coordination activities, regional officials have developed new policies, procedures and protocols that will allow them to assess emergencies, confer quickly and craft common messages for the public.

3. ***How was the development of the RECP℠ funded?***
   The Washington Regional Association of Grant Makers (WRAG) awarded COG a $75,000 grant to begin the planning process. Later, COG received a $5 million appropriation from the federal government to address regional emergency preparedness, including communications, vulnerability threat assessment, regional training and community outreach.

4. ***Who participated in crafting the RECP℠?***
   Both public and private entities helped to develop the RECP℠, including the Office of Homeland Security; Executive Office of the President; Federal Emergency Management Agency; State of Maryland Emergency Management Agency; Virginia Department of Emergency Management; District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency; Greater Washington Board of Trade and the Potomac Conference; the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; water and wastewater, electric and other public utilities; schools and universities; medical institutions; community associations; and volunteer organizations.

5. ***How does the RECP℠ work?***
   The RECP℠ is based on the Federal Response Plan used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The RECP℠ identifies 15 regional emergency support functional areas that may be needed during a regional emergency. These 15 Regional Emergency Support Functions (R-ESFs) allow for organizing information during a regional emergency into definable areas using common terminology.

   The RECP℠ will be implemented only by its participants and can be used in conjunction with other local, state, and federal plans. The RECP℠ does not usurp or infringe on the authority of any participating jurisdiction or organization.

Local, state, or federal officials will continue to make all necessary decisions affecting response, recovery, protective actions, and public health and safety advisories, etc., using their existing authority, policies, plans, and procedures.

6. ***What is the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System℠ (RICCS)?***

The RICCS℠ is a 24-hour, seven-day-a week communications capability that allows local, state and federal officials to share information within 30 minutes or less of an emergency. Participating organizations will use multiple means of communication, including conference calling, secure websites, and wireless communications systems.

7. ***How does the RICCS℠ work?***

When an incident takes place in a member jurisdiction, the local Emergency Communication Center (ECC) will assess the event to decide whether to request regional notification through the RICCS℠. The RICCS℠ will reach key decision makers and representatives of the corresponding emergency support functions via telephone, cell phone, two-way radios, pages, e-mail, or other means as necessary.

8. ***What are the next steps?***

The RECP℠ is designed to be a flexible document that will be tested and updated regularly. In order to be effective, the Plan must be tested through real world operations and simulation exercises. Activities will include exercises and forums to ensure that key decision makers are kept up to date with changes to the RECP℠.

9. ***What does this Plan do for the general public?***

The RECP℠ helps local governments work together for a more coordinated response to regional emergencies. The first responders to any emergency always will be local police, firefighters, or other emergency personnel. This Plan addresses *regional* coordination for preparedness.

10. ***How can I obtain more information?***

Copies of the full RECP℠ and a summary document are available for downloading in PDF format on COG's website at www.mwcog.org/homeland_plan/index.htm. A CD-ROM version of the Plan may be obtained for $15 from COG's Information Center at 202-962-3256 or mail to: infocntr@mwcog.org.

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Mrs. MORELLA. And now I would like to recognize George Vradenburg, Cochair of the Emergency Preparedness Task Force of the Potomac Conference of the Greater Washington Board of Trade. And I think Bob Peck is probably around. I didn't see him, but I thought he might be you. OK. He is not here. In absentia.

Thank you, Mr. Vradenburg. I look forward to hearing from you, sir.

Mr. VRADENBURG. Thank you, Madam Chair, and members of the committee.

The Board of Trade is the only regional Chamber of Commerce in the National Capital Area, and represents more than 1,300 of the largest businesses and nonprofit organizations in the area, employing 40 percent of the area's private sector employees. We appreciate your invitation to represent the private sector in front of this distinguished committee.

I have written the testimony and submit it, and I will try and be brief in summarizing it.

The National Capital Region in the District of Columbia is perhaps the politically, institutionally most complex region in the country, perhaps in the world. As the Nation's Capital, we have not only three branches of government, two States, a Federal district, 17 local jurisdictions, hundreds of Federal and local agencies, 338,000 Federal workers, but there are over 2.7 million private sector employees in the region who work in 235,000 businesses. 34,000 of those businesses are based in the District itself, but the private sector's responsible for owning and operating over 80 percent of the infrastructure in the region.

The Capital also draws 18 million visitors annually. The region is home to more than 60 colleges and universities with close to a quarter of a million students. The region also has more than 20 separate and distinct uniformed police and Federal protective service forces representing not only the Federal Government, but each of the branches of the Federal Government, and various constituent elements of the Federal Government, the local 17 jurisdictions.

I'd like to focus this morning on three specific areas of concern about the state of planning in the region. First, I would like to focus on whether or not we have adequately coordinated the effort on behalf of the whole region.

All of the emergency management directors testifying here today applauded—should be applauded for their efforts to make our community safer, but it is our experience that when a lot of planning is going on within individual agencies and local jurisdictions it is not as well-coordinated across institutional boundaries and political jurisdictions as it should be. We need not just to make the dots stronger but the links stronger. We need not just make the nodes stronger but the networks stronger. We have to find some simplifying mechanisms for planning in this region to deal with the regional institutional complexity.

We have been participants now for almost a year with the Council of Governments' Task Force on Homeland Security. It is under the excellent leadership of Carol Schwartz and staffed by an extraordinary individual by the name of Michael Rogers and an extraordinary staff working for him. It has been broad, comprehen-

sive, open and inclusive, but it is by nature limited to what the constituent elements of its constitutional force will permit it to do.

It is made up of the representatives of 17 local jurisdictions in the States, but in fact it is limited in terms of what it can do by what it is delegated by its constituent elements to do. They have said up separate functional committees. They've invited the private sector into every one of those functional committees and were represented and deeply integrated into the planning effort there.

Having said that, we recently had a regional summit at which the two Governors and the mayor of D.C. attended; and there wasn't reference by any of the three of those to the COG process.

They have now established a separate process working under a steering committee at the regional level. To date, it is not at all clear how that separate process established by the Governors and by the mayor is going to work with the extraordinary efforts of the last year of the Council of Governments; and I think that is something that this committee should focus on and should press for in terms of simplifying the regional planning effort and to assure that the table at the regional level is as simple but as comprehensive, open and inclusive as possible.

Second, we are concerned that, after a year since the attacks, the overwhelming majority of the region's population simply does not know what to do in the case of a similar emergency. The public is asking—the private sector is asking, what's the plan? What's our role in it? What should I do to protect my family or business to add strength to the regional plan or to protect my kids and my work force?

Clearly, we have established a color-coded system at the national level, but there's no systematic guidance to any of the constituent elements within the region, whether they be the public sector or the private sector or the public generally as to what to do at various levels of that color-coding scheme.

This question was recently raised on September 10 when the Federal Government issued a Code Orange. The Board of Trade received several calls from members asking what they should do and what we should tell our employees. To answer members' questions, we turned to Federal and local agencies for guidance. None was received.

It is our understanding that congressional staffers have not been briefed on evacuation or shelter-in-place plans. This is also true for the remaining 3.6 million people living in this region.

Individual jurisdictions have taken, I think, pretty significant steps in trying to educate their citizenry within their particular jurisdictions. I'd particularly cite the efforts that Peter LaPorte reported on and what he is doing inside the District. But there's no systematic regional engagement of the public through the media and exactly what their role is and what their responsibilities are and what steps they should be taking to protect themselves.

Our task force at the Board of Trade actually has media representatives, and they have offered their assistance to the public agencies in that effort.

Last and finally, we need leadership. We need action. We must act as if our lives depended on effective collaborative action. In fact, our lives do depend on effective collaborative action in this region.

We need to be confident enough to test our regional plans to assess where they are weak and to communicate to the public exactly how to make them stronger.

Second, we need your support for Senator Sarbanes' amendment to create an office for the national capitol region under the Secretary of Homeland Security. This amendment has broad bipartisan support. We encourage your leadership in keeping it in the final legislation as it goes through Congress. It is at least an effort to simplify the Federal family's participation in regional efforts.

On the regional side, as I said, we need your leadership to assure that the consolidation of both the regional summit process established by the Governors and the mayor and the COG process occurs and that the table include the public and the private sector as well.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to share our concerns with you today on behalf of the private sector and the 4 million residents of this region. We have made some progress in the last year. We have a long way to go.

This committee should be forceful and aggressive and constantly asking the questions, what's the plan, is the public aware of what the plan is, are the private sector employers in this region aware of what the plan is and what their role is in it and how they can make it stronger. This committee is one of those simplifying catalytic agents that can force us to do a better job on behalf of our work force, our citizenry and on behalf of the citizens broadly of this region.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Vradenberg. Appreciate your testimony and the fact that you gave us an abbreviated version, posed some good questions.

But just as you started talking and I mentioned that Mr. Peck was not here, he showed up. So I do want to recognize that Bob Peck, the President of the Greater Washington Board of Trade, is also here with us.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vradenberg follows:]

THE HON. CONSTANCE MORELLA, CHAIR
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HEARING ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2002
10:00 AM
ROOM 2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE VRADENBURG
CO-CHAIR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TASK FORCE
THE POTOMAC CONFERENCE

Good morning, Chairman Morella, members of the DC Subcommittee. I am George Vradenburg, Strategic Advisor to AOL Time Warner, and Co-Chair of the Regional Emergency Preparedness and Recovery Task Force of the Potomac Conference. I am here today on behalf of the Greater Washington Board of Trade. The Board of Trade is the only regional chamber of commerce in the National Capital area and represents more than 1300 of the largest businesses and non-profit organizations that employ 40 % of the areas private sector employees.

We appreciate your leadership on building a strong Department of Homeland Security for the National Capital Region and the country. We also appreciate your invitation to represent the private sector in front of your distinguished committee.

The National Capital Region and the District of Columbia is faced with significant logistical challenges when it comes to homeland security. As our Nation's Capital, the District is home to 338,000 federal workers and hundreds of lawmakers. There are 2.7 million private sector employees that work in 235,000 businesses in the region, 34,000 of those businesses are based in the District of Columbia. The Capital also draws 18 million visitors annually.

The area is unique in that there are dozens of federal agencies all of which have been mandated to have their own emergency preparedness plans. From our experience, many of these agencies have not coordinated their plans with local governments or private sector that own and operate critical infrastructure like power, telecommunications and transportation, on which the agencies depend. The region also has more than a dozen separate and distinct police forces representing seventeen jurisdictions and more than a dozen federal protective forces that need coordination.

Unfortunately on September 11, 2001, we saw what can happen if the region fails to coordinate a response. On the afternoon of the attack the federal government sent home its entire workforce without notifying anyone at the local level. At the same time the federal government was releasing hundreds of thousands of federal employees and contractors, other federal agencies were erecting security blockages, shutting down bridges, and blocking streets making evacuation even more difficult for their employees and private sector

employees. While federal, state and local governments have plans to evacuate the District of Columbia and the surrounding regions, these plans have not been effectively shared with their employees or the public.

At last November's Potomac Conference, we posed questions that are still relevant: How can public be assured that a comprehensive coordinated plan is being developed? Do we know what business should do in case of a similar emergency? What do we tell our employees in order to ensure their safety? Where do we get this information?

Through the Potomac Conference Emergency Preparedness and Recovery Task Force we have tried to integrate business into the emergency planning process. We have been actively engaged in the preparedness efforts underway at the federal level, at the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, at the Governors' Summit, in Maryland's State Security Council, through Governor Warner's "Secure Virginia," and DC's Emergency Management Agency.

Board of Trade members who represent critical infrastructure participate in COG's Ad Hoc Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness and with regional emergency management agencies including DCEMA. This coordination is vital as federal, state and local governments are dependent on the critical infrastructure – like power, telecommunications and transportation – of which 82% is owned by the private sector.

Recently we have partnered with DCEMA to publicize business preparedness and continuity seminars that are being offered this September.

And we were the only private sector group invited to Governor Ridge's National Capital Region Summit on Homeland Security.

I enumerate our efforts only to demonstrate that much is going on and we have worked hard to represent and involve the private sector into the many planning process, however after a year of efforts we are discouraged by the lack of pace and coordination.

It is one thing for the players on the federal, state and local level to express their interest in involving the private sector but quite different in making it happen. A year after 9/11, we still do not know what we should do in case of an emergency. Gordon Peterson, local anchor from WUSA Channel 9 (their parent company is a member of the Board of Trade), recently peppered Governor Ridge for answers to these questions for the citizens of the National Capital Region, and few were forthcoming.

While protecting our citizens and the Nation's Capital is and should be our first and foremost concern -- an incident or lack of a coordinated response, even without direct physical damage to business locations has a dramatic impact on the entire region. An example of this was the closure of national airport that resulted in a loss of $132 million in direct costs and millions in loss jobs, reduced tourism, closed business and countless impacts on local communities that have yet to be measured.

Our commitment is to impress upon the various government agencies just how important and vital the private sector is to this effort. We do not want to second-guess the professionals

who are on the front line – our objective is to have the region's 2.4 million employees and the public prepared to better serve first responders, keep employees as safe as possible, and to move resources into play as quickly as possible.

While we want to raise serious concerns we also want to provide models of how better coordination can work.

Montgomery County, in your own state is a great example of how emergency planners and the business community are working together. Montgomery County has identified business partners that are regular members of their emergency operations center. Bringing business into the process at an early stage helps them leverage business relationships to access resources during an emergency – like hotel rooms or meeting space for triage, food, water and blankets. The available "rolodexes" open doors often before other disaster agencies are engaged. The business representatives also serve as a conduit of two–way information to other businesses in the region and back into the operations center, often easing the burden of responders. A similar partnership was created spontaneously on September 11th last year in Arlington and has since been institutionalized.

However, these are only two instances where these relationships are operational and it does not exist on the federal level. We learned just last week that FEMA has created a task force called "National Capital Region 2002" to coordinate emergency preparedness, but the business community has not been notified, much less asked to be included.

We strongly support an amendment offered by Senator Sarbanes and supported by Senators Mikulski, Warner and Allen to create an office for National Capital Region Coordination within the Department of Homeland Security. The purpose of the amendment is not to supercede any planning or action currently being undertaken, but only to serve as a federal coordinator of information, and point of contact for planning with the regional public and private sectors. It is our hope that by making the Secretary of Homeland Security accountable for the National Capital Region he or she will encourage the required coordination.

The private sector and citizens need to be educated about contingency plans. This question was recently raised on September 10, when the federal government issued a CODE ORANGE. The Board of Trade received several calls from members asking what they should do and tell their employees. To answer members questions the Board turned to federal and local agencies for answers. None were offered.

The most important ingredient of a recovery and continuity plan is a good emergency plan. The better prepared a community is, the faster it is likely to recover from a catastrophic event. We have ample opportunity to learn from business's role in the recovery from natural disasters such as San Francisco's earthquake and communities that have suffered devastation from floods, hurricanes and tornadoes.

A considerable amount of information can be found on certain websites, including that of DCEMA, but all require a level of computer literacy and internet access that a large number of our region's population do not have.

Our testimony about the regions preparation for facing and recovering from an emergency event would not be complete without addressing an important component of our recovery from last year's attack on the Pentagon. We urge the federal and local governments to use caution and restraint in the design and placement of security measures around the region, and especially in the District.

Such measures have a negative impact on the image of our city and the nation's Capital; they frighten visitors, discourage tourism, and limit citizens' access to the symbols of our nation's history and heritage, often without a showing that they add much to our safety and security. In our rush to be secure, it is our understanding that Jersey barriers impeded District fire fighters ability to quickly reach a House Office Building that had a fire in it this spring.

Other actions, such as street closures, traffic realignment should not be made unilaterally by the federal government in the absence of an identified threat. Such actions have a tendency to become permanent before determination of actual need or benefit is made, but the short- and long-term impact on mobility in the city (including emergency evacuation options) as well as the economic impact on businesses in the vicinity of federal buildings is significant.

I would like to conclude by asking for your help to move the process more quickly and to help facilitate the coordination of the federal, state and local efforts. We would applaud and support your efforts to have the federal government, with the state and local authorities start communicating with the public.

We stand ready to provide models of how emergency planners and the private sector can better coordinate.

And we ask your support for the Sarbanes Amendment.

The National Capital Region and its planning and preparation should serve as a model for the country and we appreciate your efforts in making this happen.

Mrs. MORELLA. Now it's my privilege to turn the microphone over to Dick White, who's the general manager of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.

Mr. WHITE. Good morning, Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I want to extend my appreciation to you for holding this hearing.

As the transit provider for the Nation's capital, Metro takes its responsibility in homeland security with the seriousness it demands. WMATA has been hailed by some as a "national security asset" both for its efficient performance on that fateful day of September 11, 2001, and for its potential future role in moving people following a regional incident or emergency that requires evacuation.

Because our service area is the National Capital Region, we recognize our special role in serving the Federal Government and the Federal city. According to recent statistics, nearly half of our passengers, 47 percent, during the morning and afternoon rush hours on our Metrorail system are Federal employees. Of the 83 Metrorail stations, 35 are in close proximity to Federal facilities. It is the reality that, given our location, we are a potential target in this high-risk area; and we must be concerned with protecting Federal employees and others that use our system, as well as supporting the Federal Government's continuity of operations.

We are pleased that an independent review of our security readiness has suggested that we are at least 3 years ahead of most transit systems in terms of security readiness.

Immediately after September 11th, the Federal Transit Administration conducted security readiness assessments for the 35 largest transit systems. Its key findings for the WMATA assessment, which are not information protected under confidentiality provisions, included the following: WMATA is critical to evacuation of Federal employees and city residents; coordination between WMATA and the Federal Government is critical during emergency operations; and redundancy and flexibility of WMATA operations are critical to handling emergencies.

In your examination of the progress this region has made in developing emergency preparedness programs and in coordinating intergovernmental activities I'll quickly touch on two areas as it pertains to our organization. The first is enhanced security and emergency response capability. In this regard we have been focusing in three areas: target hardening, equipment and training, communications and information sharing.

The Federal Government has made available $49.1 million to help support our efforts in this area. Of that amount, 40 percent is now currently obligated and more than 90 percent will be obligated by the end of this calendar year; and my testimony gives great detail on what has been funded and the status of their investments in that regard.

Turning to the second topic, WMATA's intergovernmental focus has been oriented toward full participation in the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments' Homeland Security Task Force. As described by Mr. Williams in his testimony, the COG has led this very complex region through and extensive collaboration planning process that covers communication, information sharing,

and coordination activities before, during and after a regional emergency.

With respect to the transportation component of the regional plan, we have worked closely with COG to ensure that the many scenarios being analyzed—such as an incident in a Metro station—accurately reflect the short- and long-term mobility implications for this region. We are particularly concerned if there is an incident the results in shutting down all or part of the Metrorail system for an extended period of time. We are satisfied that COG has made a serious and substantial commitment of the resources to the important issues of evacuation planning and that it will continue to complete the real difficult work that is now just beginning on really putting the—on defining the detailed aspects of an evacuation plan in order that we can better understand exactly how regional mobility will be impacted under the various scenarios.

We are also continuing our efforts to make sure that any Federal agencies or others who are relying on Metro for service in an emergency let us know of their special needs. This is the only way we can properly assess our service capacity and meet our commitment to support the early release or evacuation of employees, as well as the continuity of operations of the Federal Government. In this regard, there is indeed an urgent need to provide financial assistance to support critical infrastructure protection and transportation capacity, as was suggested by Mr. Davis in his opening remarks.

While we have had many discussions with the Office of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies which have indeed been involved in the COG planning process, we remain very concerned that there is no central point of contact within the Federal Government for this region. Given the unique and dominant Federal presence in this region, coordination with the vast myriad of Federal Government agencies and entities in this region is absolutely critical to success of any emergency preparedness efforts. In the National Capital Region, the many branches and agencies of the Federal Government necessitate a single voice to aid and encourage the significant efforts already being undertaken by State, local governments, and regional authorities.

The other area of concern is the highly decentralized nature of the executive budget—branch budgeting process with respect to homeland security activities. Simply put, there is not a clear process or point of contact for making Federal funding requests, even when those requests are designed to implement the national strategy for combating terrorism in the National Capital Region.

I was very pleased to see in your remarks, Madam Chairman, that you are supporting the legislation, Senator Sarbanes' legislation. That amendment has passed the Senate. WMATA has issued a formal letter of support for this very important concept. I certainly hope the rest of your colleagues on this committee and the entire host of representatives would see their way to supporting this amendment to the legislation. I believe it is essential.

In conclusion, we look forward to continued discussions with the region, the administration and the Congress on ways to continue to enhance our emergency preparedness response and recovery capabilities. We appreciate your leadership in this area and look forward to answering your questions.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. White.

[The prepared statement of Mr. White follows:]

STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. WHITE

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 20, 2002

Good morning, Madam Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the important subject of "Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital." I am Richard White, the Chief Executive Officer of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA).

I want to extend my appreciation to you for holding this hearing. As the transit provider for the nation's capital, Metro takes its responsibility in homeland security with the seriousness it demands. WMATA has been hailed as a "national security asset" both for its efficient performance on that fateful day of September 11, 2001, and for its potential future role in moving people following a regional incident or emergency that requires evacuation.

Because our service area is the National Capital Region, we recognize our special role in serving the federal government and the federal city. According to recent statistics, nearly half of our Metrorail passengers (47 percent) during the morning and afternoon rush hour periods are federal employees. Of the 83 Metrorail stations, 35 serve federal facilities. It is a reality that given our location, we are a potential target in this high-risk area, and we must be concerned with protecting federal employees and others that use our system, as well supporting the federal government's continuity of operations.

We are pleased that an independent review of our security readiness has suggested that we are at least three years ahead of most other transit systems in

terms of security readiness. Even before September 11th , WMATA had spent considerable time and resources on emergency preparedness. In the aftermath of the 1995 nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway, we began a working partnership with the Departments of Energy, Transportation and Justice and the National Laboratories, to develop a chemical sensor system for use in a transit environment, the first of its kind in the world. In addition, we have implemented a number of other initiatives designed to strengthen Metro's safety and security for our customers and employees.

Immediately after September 11th, the Federal Transit Administration conducted Security Readiness Assessments for the 35 largest transit systems. Its key findings for the WMATA Assessment which are not information protected under confidentiality provisions included the following:

- WMATA is critical to evacuation of federal employees and city residents;
- Coordination between WMATA and the federal government is critical during emergency operations; and
- Redundancy and flexibility of WMATA operations are critical to handling emergencies.

On the basis of this report, WMATA has given top priority to constructing a back-up Operations Control Center, which is absolutely essential to the continuation of underground rail service, should our current Control Center become incapacitated for any reason. In the event of a wide-scale emergency evacuation of the federal city, continued Metrorail service would be critical to the safety of the federal

workforce and to the continued operations of the federal government. We were disappointed that Congress' approval of Fiscal Year 2002 supplemental funding to begin deployment of a back-up Operations Control Center was later rejected by the Administration.

In your examination of the progress this region has made in developing emergency preparedness programs and in coordinating intergovernmental activities, I would like to cover two areas as it pertains to our organization:

- WMATA's enhanced security and emergency response capability; and
- WMATA's participation in intergovernmental security related activities.

I. WMATA's Enhanced Security and Emergency Response Capability

We have been focusing on three categories of enhanced transit system safety and response capability:

A. Target Hardening

B. Equipment and Training

C. Communications and Information Sharing

A. Target Hardening

In the area of target hardening, we have taken several initiatives:

1.) Metro will expand its chemical-detection system program to additional underground Metrorail stations by the end of December, and further continue to other underground stations by next summer. In addition, we are currently using several other detection technologies provided by our federal partners.

2.) We will begin installing perimeter surveillance systems in rail yards before the end of December 2002.

3.) We are designing a system of intrusion detection alarms to pinpoint unauthorized entries into the Metrorail system. We have initiated an ID-entry system at Metro headquarters and at several field locations.

4.) We are installing digital cameras on 100 Metrobuses, beginning this month.

5.) We have removed trash cans and recycling bins from station platforms and are installing explosion-containment trash cans in all 83 Metrorail stations. We have installed 330 of the 400 trash cans ordered. The installation of redesigned recycling bins has begun as well.

6.) 1,400 video recording devices are being installed for the cameras which used in our Metrorail stations.

7.) Our Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) added eight additional explosives-detection K-9 teams. Two of the new teams are already on board, and six more began training this month, and will finish by early October. Our police department has also created an Explosive Ordinance team for quicker resolution of suspicious package incidents.

8.) We have installed universal emergency telephone signage in Metrorail stations. We began installing the signage, which is easier to see, this month to help customers quickly find emergency telephones, which connect directly to the station manager's kiosk.

B. Equipment and Training

We have taken several steps to augment our emergency response capability in the area of training and equipment:

1.) Personal protective gear (similar to what local jurisdictions and the Congress have distributed), has been purchased for MTPD police officers, those who most likely would be among the first responders in a chemical event. Hand-held portable chemical detectors have been issued to MTPD officers.

2.) Metro opened the nation's first transit Emergency Training Facility in Landover, Maryland. Metro operational personnel, MTPD staff, first responders, fire and police departments around the region will come to this facility for training, and we are encouraging others from across the nation as well.

3.) WMATA continues to lead drills and participate in regional drills with local fire, police and emergency management departments, as well as local and federal agencies which have a role to play in combating terrorism. Scheduled safety drills take into account the dimensions of terrorism.

4.) All operational employees have attended training in handling "unknown substances" and using personal protective gear in the event contaminants are released into the subway system.

5.) Metro employees - including those in administrative positions - have been

instructed in how to assist in emergency situations should they be on the scene.

6.) We have instituted spot readiness checks of our operational employees' knowledge of emergency policies and procedures.

C. Communications and Information Sharing

We learned on September 11th the criticality of good communications and information sharing and we have attempted to incorporate this lesson into our protocols:

1.) MTPD participates in regular intelligence briefings with the FBI; MTPD personnel is assigned regular duty at various area joint operation centers as needed; and an MTPD detective is assigned permanent duty on the FBI's local Joint Terrorism Task Force field office.

2.) Metro's Chief of Police participates in weekly area police chiefs' conference calls with the FBI.

3.) MTPD and operational employees make frequent safety and security checks of the whole Metro system, and these employees wear orange high-visibility vests.

4.) We have issued regular *Dear Fellow Rider* brochures since September 11 on the safety and security steps Metro initiated post-September 11 to make a safe system safer, and on procedures for evacuating customers from trains and stations. Metro continually encourages customers to extend our "eyes and ears" by relaying information about suspicious packages or behavior to Metro Transit Police on its 24-hour communications line at 202-962-2121 or by

calling 911.

5.) We issue weekly communications to employees about the steps they can take to help Metro customers in an emergency and other safety and security instructions.

6.) Our Safety in Numbers poster program, featuring Metro employees discussing how they are dedicated to keeping the system safe, has been initiated to encourage customers to relay information of a suspicious activity or package to Metro employees and MTPD police officers. This award-winning program also gives our employees a sense of ownership about protecting our system and our customers.

Most of these improvements are being funded with Fiscal Year 2002 federal appropriations made to WMATA to enhance security and emergency preparedness. Attached is a copy of our most recent report to the Congress on our progress in expending these funds.

II. WMATA Participation in Intergovernmental Security-Related Activities

WMATA's intergovernmental focus has been oriented towards full participation in the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) Homeland Security Task Force, chaired by District of Columbia Councilmember Carol Schwartz, and coordination with our federal partners. Let me first speak to the MWCOG process.

The Council of Governments (COG) has led this very complex region through an extensive collaborative planning process that covers communication, information

sharing and coordination activities before, during, and after a regional emergency. The scope of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) recently approved by the COG Board of Directors is very broad and provides a framework for responding to major threats or hazards in the region.

With respect to the transportation component of the RECP, we have worked closely with COG to ensure that the many scenarios being analyzed - such as an incident at a Metro station - accurately reflect the short- and long-term mobility implications for this region. We are particularly concerned if there is an incident that results in shutting down all or part of the Metrorail system for an extended period of time. We are satisfied that COG has made a serious and substantial commitment of resources to the important issues of evacuation planning, and that it will continue to complete the more detailed aspects of the evacuation plan that are necessary to more accurately understand how regional mobility will be impacted under various scenarios.

Importantly, the COG process has also resulted in the establishment of the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS). The RICCS provides a region-wide system of planning, communication and information sharing before, during and after an emergency. We learned on September 11th the critical importance of a coordinated, clear and continuous flow of information to the public.

We are also continuing our efforts to make sure that any federal agencies or others that are relying upon Metro for service in an emergency have let us know of their special needs. This is the only way that we can properly assess our service capacity and meet our commitment to support the early release or evacuation of

employees, as well as continuity of operations of the federal government. There is an urgent need to provide financial assistance to support critical infrastructure protection and capacity enhancement.

While we have had many discussions with the Office of Homeland Security and they have been involved in the COG planning process, we remain concerned that there is no central point of contact within the federal government for this region. The federal government must be at the table consistently and actively in the regional planning process. Given the wide array of federal agencies in this region (including the Congress, the judicial branch, the Military District of Washington and various executive branch agencies), coordination within the federal government in this region is absolutely critical to success of any emergency preparedness efforts. This coordination is especially important given the fact that the federal government is the largest employer in the region, with more than 370,000 locally based workers. The recent Regional Summit on Security, convened by Governor Ridge, also pointed out the continuing need for coordination among all levels of government in the National Capital Region.

The other area of concern is the highly decentralized nature of the executive branch budgeting process with respect to homeland security activities. Simply put, there is not a clear process or point of contact for making federal funding requests, even when those requests are designed to implement the national strategy for combating terrorism in the National Capital Region.

Conclusion

We are continuing to evaluate our current strategies and plan future efforts that we may need to implement for the increased safety and security of our customers and employees. We are ever mindful of our unique role as the regional rail and bus system for the nation's capital. We believe that given our location and importance to the operations of the federal government, we have a unique obligation to provide the highest level of security. We are currently in the process of reviewing the Administration's National Homeland Security Strategy, which includes many principles that directly relate to WMATA and the entire region, such as protection of the nation's critical infrastructure and preparing for chemical, biological and radiological contamination.

I urge the Subcommittee to consider the notion that here in the National Capital Region, Metro should be considered part of the homeland security defense system. WMATA has a unique ability to efficiently transport large volumes of people out of harm's way, and reduce traffic volume on streets and highways to allow emergency vehicles to travel. The many federal facilities directly served by Metro and the federal government's continuity of operations are dependant in part on our ability to safely transport the region's federal workforce and its residents during and after an emergency.

We look forward to continued discussions with the region, the Administration and the Congress on ways to continue to enhance our emergency preparedness, response and recovery capabilities. We appreciate your leadership in this area and look forward to answering your questions.

September 13, 2002

The Honorable Joe Knollenberg
Chairman
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Knollenberg:

The Federal Government has made available to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) $49.1 million to meet region-wide security requirements. Public Law 107-117, Section 402 of Chapter 4, requires the Chief Financial Officer of WMATA to report on a quarterly bases to the President and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the use of these funds.

WMATA received these funds in January of this year, and has already obligated $19.7 million, or approximately 40% of the amounts available. The program is on schedule, and it is expected that $45 million, more than 90% of the total funding, will be obligated by the end of this calendar year.

The enclosed report is the third installment on our progress in implementing security measures. In addition to the financial report, enclosed is a program summary, project schedules, and a status report on the program.

Sincerely,

Peter Benjamin
Chief Financial Officer

Enclosure

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

600 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
202/962-1234

By Metrorail:
Judiciary Square—Red Line
Gallery Place-Chinatown—
Red, Green and
Yellow Lines
By Metrobus:
Routes D1, D3, D6, P6,
70, 71, 80, X2

A District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia Transit Partnership

Congressional Appropriations (PL 107-117, Chapter 4)

Program	Funds Appropriated	Funds Made Available Through Prior Quarters	Funds Made Available This Quarter	Total Funds Available	Funds Obligated by WMATA
Protective Equipment	$ 5,000,000	$ 4,031,000	969,000	$ 5,000,000	$ 2,059,691
Fiber Optics Infrastructure	2,200,000	1,774,000	426,000	2,200,000	2,053,937
Emergency Chemical Sensors	15,000,000	12,092,000	2,908,000	15,000,000	4,908,032
Employee & Facility Security	16,900,000	13,623,000	3,277,000	16,900,000	2,270,000
Total	$ 39,100,000	$ 31,520,000	$ 7,580,000	$ 39,100,000	$ 11,291,660

Federal Transit Administration Grant (DC-40-X001-00)

Program	Funds Appropriated	Funds Made Available Through Prior Quarters	Funds Made Available This Quarter	Total Funds Available	Funds Obligated by WMATA
Additional K9 Teams	$ 500,000	$ 500,000	$ -	$ 500,000	$ 465,532
Alternative Command Center	1,700,000	1,700,000	-	1,700,000	1,097,764
ID Entry System	1,800,000	1,800,000	-	1,800,000	1,621,936
Bomb-Resistant Trash Containers	1,000,000	1,000,000	-	1,000,000	774,200
Automatic Vehicle Locators (AVL)	4,000,000	4,000,000	-	4,000,000	3,500,000
Digital Camera Pilot Program	1,000,000	1,000,000	-	1,000,000	947,376
Total	$ 10,000,000	$ 10,000,000	$ -	$ 10,000,000	$ 8,406,808
Grand Total	$ 49,100,000	$ 41,520,000	$ 7,580,000	$ 49,100,000	$ 19,698,468

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Safety and Security Program
Project Implementation Status: September 6, 2002

PL 107-117	Appropriation	Remarks
Protective Equipment - procure protective masks, suits and emergency kits.	$5.0m	Most equipment has been ordered. Programming for training and maintenance is underway. Inventory and distribution facilities are being prepared.
Fiber Optics Infrastructure - provide initial redundant communications capability to assure emergency control.	$2.2m	Phase 1 installation completed. Phase 2 awarded with preparation work starting weekend of 9/6. Material being delivered.
Chemical Emergency Sensor Project - provide detection capability in several subway stations.	$15.0m	The prototype has been installed and has proven to be successful. Design coordination for an additional twelve underground stations continues. Start of work for removal and replacement of prototype and the installation at remaining Phase I stations is scheduled for Sept 02. Fabrication of all Phase I sensor units is complete.
Employee & Facility Security - provide intrusion detection capability at all entrances.	$16.9m	Design for perimeter detection system pilot project complete. Pilot project construction is underway. RFP issued for design and construction of remaining 7 yards. Contract to install programable devices in underground stations to be awarded on September 20, 2002.

FTA Grant
DC-40-X001-00

Additional K-9 Teams - provide eight additional dogs, equipment, support vehicles and training for explosives detection.	$0.5m	All dog teams purchased as of March 2002. All eight vehicles have been delivered. All support equipment has been ordered. Training has begun.
Alternative Command Center - provides a backup emergency management command center at an alternative location.	$1.7m	Command Center is in operation. Space renovation is in progress. Audio/Visual equipment procurement is complete. Furniture and computer procurements initiated.
ID Entry System - provide electronic employee ID targets and entry gates at all unguarded Metro facilities.	$1.8m	ID entry systems completed and operational for JGB, Stonestraw, Telegraph Road and MSF on September 3, 2002.
Bomb-Resistant Trash Containers - replace trash receptacles in the entrance areas of 83 stations.	$1.0m	250 units delivered and installed. Work continues on schedule.
Automatic Vehicle Locators (AVL) - equip the entire bus fleet to provide central tracking of all vehicles and improved response time in emergencies.	$4.0m	The Comprehensive Radio System contract has been modified to accommodate this work. 75% design review completed 6/11/02. AVL equipment installation is scheduled to parallel bus radio equipment installation.
Digital Security Cameras - equip 100 Metrobuses with digital cameras and recording capability.	$1.0m	Testing of pilot installations is completed. Contracts have been awarded for 100 units. Installation has begun.

Security Improvements

Project: Protective Equipment

Budget: $5,000,000 PL 107-117

Scope:

Procure disposable protective masks for 5,000 employees who work underground. Procure Level C disposable protective equipment and emergency kits for 300 WMATA Transit Police officers.

Activity:

Most equipment has been ordered. Programming for training and maintenance is underway. Inventory and distribution facilities are being prepared.



Security Improvements

Project: Fiber Optic Infrastructure

Budget: **$2,200,000** PL 107-117

Scope:

Provides an initial level of redundant communications feed.

Activity:

Phase 1 installation completed. Phase 2 awarded with preparation work starting weekend of 9/6. Material being delivered.



Security Improvements

PROJECT: Chemical Emergency Sensor Program

Budget: $15,000,000 PL 107-117

Scope:

Design, procure, and install chemical sensors in underground stations to read particulate in the air. Technology is classified and public safety sensitive. This project will expand the installation to additional stations.

Activity:

Prototype has been installed and has proven to be successful. Design coordination for an additional twelve underground stations continues. Start of work for Removal and Replacement and construction at remaining Phase I stations scheduled to begin in September 2002. Fabrication of all Phase I sensor units is complete.



Security Improvements

Project: Employee and Facility Security

Budget: $16,900,000 PL 107-117

Scope:

Design, procure, and install intrusion detection devices at all secured yards and stations. Monitoring cameras will be installed as well as programmable intrusion devices.

Activity:

Design for perimeter detection system pilot project complete. Pilot project construction is underway. RFP issued for design and construction of remaining 7 yards. Contract to install programable devices in underground stations to be awarded on September 20, 2002.





Security Improvements

Project: Additional K-9 Teams

Budget: $500,000 FTA Grant DC-40-X001-00

Scope:

This initiative will add eight additional dogs trained for explosives detection, including training and support vehicles. Implementing this initiative will significantly decrease response time for explosive detection.

Activity:

All dog teams purchased as of March 2002. The vehicle contract was awarded February 27, 2002. All support equipment has been delivered.



Security Improvements

Project: Alternative Command Center

Budget: $1,700,000 FTA Grant DC-40-X001-00

Scope:

This system provides for continuity of operations in the event of a catastrophic failure of the primary Command Center. It provides locations for portions of redundant vital computer and communications equipment at remote site and outfits existing space to serve as a backup operations center.

Activity:

Alternate Operations Command Center space renovation in progress. Audio/Visual equipment procurement is complete. Furniture and computer procurements initiated.



Security Improvements

Project: ID Entry System

Budget: $1,800,000 PL 107-117

Scope:

Provide electronic employee ID targets and/or turnstile gates at all unguarded Metro facilities.

Activity:

ID entry systems completed and operational for JGB, Stonestraw, Telegraph Road and MSF on September 3, 2002.



Security Improvements

Project: Bomb - Resistant Trash Containers

Budget: $1,000,000 FTA Grant DC-40-X001-00

Scope:

400 bomb-resistant containers will replace trash receptacles in the entrances of 83 stations.

Activity:

First 250 containers delivered and installed.



Security Improvements

Project: Automatic Vehicle Locators (AVL)

Budget: $4,000,000 FTA Grant DC-40-X001-00

Scope:

Design, furnish, and install an AVL system for the entire bus fleet to provide central tracking of all vehicles and faster response time in emergencies.

Activity:

The Comprehensive Radio System contract has been modified to accommodate this work. 75% design review completed 6/11/02. AVL equipment installation is scheduled to parallel bus radio equipment installation.



Security Improvements

Project: Digital Security Cameras

Budget: $1,000,000 FTA Grant DC-40-X001-00

Scope:

Introduce pilot program providing digital cameras mounted on 100 Metrobuses, placed in strategic locations to view passenger activities. Buses will be equipped with cameras which will serve as a deterrent for criminal behavior and provide information for accident investigation and response to claims.

Activity:

Testing of pilot installations is completed. Engineering evaluation of results is being conducted. Contracts have been awarded for 100 units. Installation has begun.



Mrs. MORELLA. Now pleased to have the chairman of the National Capital Planning Commission testify, the Honorable John V. Cogbill, III. Thank you for being here.

Mr. COGBILL. Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to report to you on the Commission's security design work and our own contributions to the emergency planning efforts in the region.

NCPC has been pleased to participate on the Regional Task Force on Homeland Security. We have welcomed the opportunity to assist the Metropolitan Council of Governments in applying Geographic Information Systems technology to regional security issues. In March, we cohosted with COG a forum on GIS security applications and have worked with the Council of Governments and Fort Belvoir personnel to evaluate GIS applications to advanced military tracking, communications and mapping technology for civilian emergency response application. In this joint effort we have been particularly interested in the effect of street closures on emergency operations. It is apparent to all that blocked streets seriously impair evacuation procedures and circulation of emergency vehicles. As part of the Commission's extensive security design work during the past 2 years, we have consistently called for the reopening of closed streets whenever possible.

Our participation on the Homeland Security Task Force has been undertaken in conjunction with the Commission's comprehensive urban design and security planning initiative. When I last appeared before you in November, the Commission had just released its recommendations concerning the impact of temporary security measures on the historic urban design of Washington's Monumental Core. At that time I conveyed to you the Commission's serious concerns about the effect of closed streets, hastily erected jersey barriers, concrete planters and guard huts on the National Mall. The Commission believes that such installations communicate fear and retrenchment and undermine the basic premises of a democratic society. Among its other recommendations, the NCPC Security Task Force report, under the leadership of Dick Friedman, called for the preparation of a comprehensive urban design and security plan to provide permanent security and streetscape improvements for Washington's Federal buildings and historic public spaces. Based on these recommendations, the Congress appropriated $758,000 as part of the first anti-terrorism supplemental measure passed earlier this year for NCPC to prepare such a plan. Today I am pleased to report to you that the Commission has all but completed our work on this plan.

The National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan proposes a variety of solutions to seamlessly integrate building perimeter security while creating a more welcoming and beautiful public realm. The Plan demonstrates that good security and good urban design can go hand in hand. It is built upon the urban design framework that defines prominent districts and streets and recognizes that "one size does not fit all" in security design. It suggests instead design solutions tailored to particular precincts and provides much-needed enhancements to our downtown streets.

The Urban Design and Security Plan provides perimeter security against the threat of bomb-laden vehicles, and offers a program of

security and urban beautification, and expands the palette of attractive street furnishings and landscape treatments that can provide curbside security. It presents a variety of security designs and solutions, such as "hardened" street furniture, landscaped planting walls, and sidewalk planters.

The result is far less intrusive, far more hospitable streetscapes that provide security while not shouting "fortified streets."

The future use of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House has been an issue of intense debate among Washington residents since its closure in 1995. The Commission examined closely state-of-the-art security technologies before concluding that legitimate security concerns require this portion of the Avenue to remain closed to nominal city traffic for the foreseeable future. We have studied the traffic impacts of the closure, analyzed potential tunnel alternatives, assessed a variety of transportation management strategies, and are now working with our planning partners to examine the feasibility of a Downtown Circulator transit system to ease cross-town traffic congestion. We have worked hard to ensure that security in the Nation's capital is achieved in a way that enhances the economic and cultural vitality of our city.

The Urban Design and Security Plan offers solutions not only for Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House but for the entire Monumental Core. The National Mall, Independence and Constitution Avenues, the Federal Triangle, and Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and the Capitol are all historic precincts that today are marred by a jumble of makeshift security barriers and forces. Washington is one of the most admired capital cities in the world and as good stewards, it is our responsibility to preserve its historic beauty for future generations of Americans.

Since its release in July, the draft plan has been distributed to each Member of Congress and has been available for public comment. The Commission has evaluated the comments provided by the Members of Congress, various organizations and interested individuals and will move forward hopefully with the final adoption of the Plan in October.

In conclusion, I would like to convey the Commission's deep commitment to this urgently needed security design work. Our effort has been collaborative in every sense. The Plan is the result of all of the stakeholders—Members of Congress, Federal and city officials, historic preservationists, business and community groups, the professional planning and design community, and security agencies—finally coming together to make the difficult decisions and find the right balance between security and urban design that is worthy of the capital city of a great Nation. I know you share our passion for the work that lies before us.

Thank you, Madam Chair. This concludes my formal remarks. I'd be happy to answer any questions.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Cogbill.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cogbill follows:]

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TESTIMONY
Of
JOHN V. COGBILL, III
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION
Before the
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
September 20, 2002

Good afternoon Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee. My name is John Cogbill and I am Chairman of the National Capital Planning Commission. I appreciate this opportunity to report to you on the Commission's security design work and emergency planning efforts in the region.

NCPC has been pleased to participate on the Regional Task Force on Homeland Security. We have welcomed the opportunity to assist the Metropolitan Council of Governments in applying Geographic Information Systems technology to regional security issues. In March we co-hosted with COG a forum on GIS security applications and have worked with the Council of Governments and Ft. Belvoir personnel to evaluate GIS applications to high-end military tracking, communications, and mapping technology for civilian emergency response. In this joint effort, we have been particularly interested in the effect of street closures on emergency operations. It is apparent to all that blocked streets seriously impair evacuation procedures and circulation of emergency vehicles. As part of the Commission's extensive security design work during the past two years, we have consistently called for the reopening of closed streets whenever possible.

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The Urban Design and Security Plan provides perimeter security against the threat of bomb-laden vehicles, offers a program of security and urban beautification, and expands the palette of attractive street furnishings and landscape treatments that can provide curbside security. It presents a variety of security design solutions, such as "hardened" street furniture, landscaped planting walls, and sidewalk planters. The result is far less intrusive, far more hospitable streetscapes that provide security while not shouting "fortified streets."

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We are gratified by the support we have received from Congress, including this subcommittee, and the Administration. Earlier this week, the Administration amended its F.Y. 2003 budget submission to request $6.1 million to move forward on our recommendation to establish a pedestrian-friendly, tree-lined promenade in front of the White House. Moreover, in keeping with the Task Force recommendations, any such improvements would be reversible in the event that the Avenue can be reopened in the future. The President's budget proposal also includes funding for traffic systems management (TSM) initiatives, a study of tunnel alternatives underneath Pennsylvania Avenue or E Street, and for the design and testing of prototype security installations.

The Urban Design and Security Plan offers solutions not only for Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House, but for the entire Monumental Core. The National Mall, Independence and Constitution Avenues, the Federal Triangle, and Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and the Capitol are all historic precincts that today are marred by a jumble of makeshift barriers and fences. Washington is one of the most admired capital cities in the world and as good stewards, it is our responsibility to preserve its historic beauty for future generations of Americans.

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members of Congress, organizations, and interested individuals, and will move forward with final adoption of the Plan in October.

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Madame Chair, that concludes my formal remarks and I will be happy to answer any questions.

Mrs. MORELLA. Now last coming up dealing with our Federal employees, Scott Hatch, who is the Director of Communications for the Office of Personnel Management.

Mr. Hatch.

Mr. HATCH. Thank you Madam Chair, members the subcommittee. On behalf of OPM Director Kay Coles James, it is on honor to be before you today.

September 11th demonstrated that, while the people of this region responded with tireless commitment and compassion, the processes, technology, and protocols necessary to respond to a sudden emergency or terrorist activity are fundamentally different than those plans required for a weather-related incident. Until that day, regional communication and cooperation occurred in a timely fashion. For example, we could all track the snowstorms headed to our area. We knew when the protesters were going to be on D.C. streets. Officials had the luxury of time, in some instances days, to make a decision.

September 11th changed that. On that day, critical decisions had to be made in minutes, not hours, let alone days.

OPM, FEMA and the General Services Administration have developed what is known as the Federal Emergency Decision and Notification Protocol. That ultimately leads to Director James making the decision on the operating status of the Federal Government, GSA administrator Stephen Perry determining the status of Federal facilities and the FEMA Director Joe Allbaugh's decision on the initial Federal emergency relief response.

These three individuals are charged with making some of the very first Federal decisions in a national emergency and this protocol puts them in immediate contact. And I might add that the process and technology are tested on a regular basis at the staff level and as recently as last week by the three directors.

Once a decision is made, simultaneous calls will go out to the White House, the Office of Homeland Security, Metro, Mayor Williams' office, Federal agencies, the Capitol Police the Council of Governments and their excellent regional incident communications network, as well as to authorities in Maryland and Virginia.

Director James' intent and desire, I might add, is to provide as much lead time as possible to regional and city authorities in advance of an official decision. OPM fully understands that the influx of 180,000 Federal employees would put a strain on any transportation system, but, at the same time, we must have a dose of reality. No protocol, no matter how well thought out, can completely control everyone's actions. If the September 11th scenario played out again tomorrow in exactly the same fashion, there is no guarantee that people would not again flood the streets of their own volition. But if the same scenario does occur tomorrow, OPM, city, and Federal officials would be in a much better position to communicate, coordinate and provide protection for our citizens. Over 2 million people live and work in this region, and we owe it to them to get it right. And I thank you.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Hatch.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hatch follows:]

STATEMENT BY
SCOTT HATCH

DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS,
U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
TO THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2002

STATEMENT OF
SCOTT HATCH
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

on

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

SEPTEMBER 20, 2002

MADAM CHAIR AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

I AM SCOTT HATCH, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, KAY COLES JAMES, AND THE DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR OPM. IT IS MY HONOR TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY, AND I THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS OPM'S ROLE IN THIS CRITICAL ISSUE.

PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11TH OF LAST YEAR, SOME IN GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA BELIEVED OPM'S MAIN ROLE WAS MAKING THE CALL AS TO THE GOVERNMENT'S STATUS IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION. BUT WE ALL KNOW NOW THAT THIS IS HARDLY THE CASE. WHILE MY TOPIC TODAY IS A SOMEWHAT NARROW ONE, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT IN THE MIDST OF HOMELAND SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES, OPM HAS

ACCELERATED OPERATIONS OVER THE PAST YEAR AND TAKEN A LEAD ROLE IN A NUMBER OF ISSUES INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT AGENDA, THE PROVISION OF LONG TERM CARE FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND INITIAL DISCUSSIONS ON COMPENSATION REFORM. OVER THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS, THIS AGENCY HAS HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE LEADERSHIP AND PERFORM A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FOR OUR NATION'S CAPITAL AND IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WHAT WILL BECOME THE NEW DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

SEPTEMBER 11TH DEMONSTRATED THAT WHILE THE PEOPLE OF THIS REGION RESPONDED WITH TIRELESS COMMITMENT AND COMPASSION, THE PROCESSES, TECHNOLOGY AND PROTOCOLS NECESSARY TO RESPOND TO SUDDEN EMERGENCY OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT THAN THOSE REQUIRED FOR A WEATHER RELATED INCIDENT. UNTIL THAT DAY, REGIONAL COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION FOR WEATHER RELATED EMERGENCIES OCCURRED IN A TIMELY FASHION. FOR EXAMPLE, WE COULD ALL TRACK THE SNOWSTORM HEADING TOWARD OUR AREA. OFFICIALS HAD THE LUXURY OF TIME, IN SOME INSTANCES DAYS, TO MAKE A DECISION. 9/11 CHANGED THAT. ON THAT DAY, CRITICAL DECISIONS HAD TO BE MADE IN MINUTES, NOT HOURS...LET ALONE DAYS. WE AT OPM HAVE WORKED LONG HOURS, AS HAVE THOSE AT THIS TABLE AND MANY

THROUGHOUT OUR REGION, TO ENSURE THAT THE LESSONS OF 9/11 ARE FIRMLY INCORPORATED INTO NEW STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS UNIMAGINABLE AND EMERGING THREATS.

COORDINATION WITH LOCAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES

WITHIN DAYS FOLLOWING THE ATTACK LAST YEAR, DIRECTOR JAMES INVITED SENIOR EMERGENCY OFFICIALS FROM DC, MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA TO OPM, IN ORDER TO DISCUSS LESSONS AND NEEDS. SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT MET WITH MEMBERS OF WASHINGTON, D.C MAYOR ANTHONY WILLIAMS' STAFF TO EXCHANGE EMERGENCY CONTACT INFORMATION AND COORDINATE EFFORTS. DEPUTY MAYOR MARGARET KELLEMS, ON THIS PANEL TODAY, WAS PRESENT AT THAT MEETING. THIS WAS THE START OF A COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT FEDERAL AND CITY OFFICIALS COULD BE REACHED AT ANY PLACE...AT ANY HOUR. THAT CONTACT INFORMATION IS WITH US 24 HOURS A DAY. WE KNOW EVERY CONCEIVABLE WAY TO REACH THEIR KEY STAFF. AND VICE VERSA. IN MY OFFICE AND CARRIED WITH ME EACH DAY IS A HANDHELD RADIO TIED INTO THE D.C. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY IN CASE ALL OTHER FORMS OF COMMUNICATION GO DOWN. AND I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MAYOR AND HIS OFFICE HAS BEEN SUPERB.

BUT THERE IS MUCH MORE TO THIS THAN SIMPLY CARRYING A LIST OF PHONE NUMBERS. LAST SEPTEMBER, THE DIRECTOR ASKED FOR A BRIDGING EFFORT...A TEMPORARY EMERGENCY ALERT PLAN, TO BE QUICKLY ESTABLISHED BY OPM, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PROVIDING LOCAL AND REGIONAL OFFICIALS WITH THE DECISION OF THE DIRECTOR OF OPM AS TO THE OFFICIAL OPERATING STATUS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY. THIS STEP WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND LED TO THE CREATION OF NETWORKS AND LINKAGES TO 24-HOUR SITUATION ROOMS, OPERATIONS CENTERS AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING FACILITIES FROM OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES. INFORMATION IS EXCHANGED CONSTANTLY THUS PROVIDING OUR DIRECTOR, AS WELL AS THE LEADERS AT GSA AND FEMA, WITH THE BEST POSSIBLE INFORMATION TO MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION AS TO THE GOVERNMENT'S STATUS. WITHIN OPM, THROUGH OUR NEW ZERO BASED BUDGETING PROCESS, FUNDS WERE IDENTIFIED TO ADD ADDITIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND RESOURCES TOWARD OUR ROLE IN COMMUNICATING WITH OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES, COMMUNITIES LOCALLY AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND TOWARD PROTECTING OUR EMPLOYEES.

OPM, FEMA AND THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION HAVE WORKED CLOSELY TO DEVELOP THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY DECISION

AND NOTIFICATION PROTOCOL, WHICH ULTIMATELY LEADS TO DIRECTOR JAMES MAKING THE DECISION ON THE OPERATING STATUS OF THE GOVERNMENT, GSA ADMINISTRATOR STEPHEN PERRY DETERMINING THE STATUS OF FEDERAL FACILITIES AND FEMA DIRECTOR JOE ALLBAUGH'S DECISION ON THE INITIAL FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF RESPONSE TO AN INCIDENT. THESE THREE PRINCIPALS ARE CHARGED WITH MAKING SOME OF THE VERY FIRST FEDERAL DECISIONS IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY, AND THIS PROTOCOL PUTS THEM IN IMMEDIATE CONTACT. THE PROCESS AND TECHNOLOGY ARE TESTED ON A REGULAR BASIS AT THE STAFF LEVEL AND AS RECENTLY AS LAST WEEK BY THE THREE DIRECTORS.

INITIAL WORK IS NOW BEING COORDINATED WITH THE OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY TO CONSIDER EXPANSION OF THIS NOTIFICATION PROTOCOL TO ALL BRANCHES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND EVEN TO PROVIDE A TEMPLATE FOR STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES NATIONWIDE IN THEIR EMERGENCY PREPARATION.

IN ADDITION, THIS PROTOCOL INCLUDES THE NOTIFICATION PROCESS WHEREBY FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BOARDS, REGIONAL AUTHORITIES, THE MEDIA AND THUS THE GENERAL PUBLIC ARE INFORMED. ONCE A DECISION ON THE STATUS OF THE GOVERNMENT IS MADE, SIMULTANEOUS CALLS GO OUT TO THE WHITE HOUSE, THE OFFICE OF

HOMELAND SECURITY, METRO, MAYOR WILLIAMS' OFFICE, FEDERAL AGENCIES, THE CAPITOL POLICE, THE COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR EXCELLENT REGIONAL INCIDENT COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, AS WELL AS TO AUTHORITIES IN MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA.

AS A FORMER JOURNALIST AND TELEVISION PRODUCER, IT IS NO SURPRISE TO ME THE INTEGRAL ROLE THE DIRECTOR ENVISIONS THE MEDIA PLAYING IN PROVIDING TIMELY OFFICIAL INFORMATION. IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION, TIME WILL SIMPLY NOT ALLOW INDIVIDUAL CALLS TO EVERY REGIONAL ENTITY INFORMING THEM OF THE SITUATION...THE MEDIA CAN DO THAT AND AS SEPTEMBER 11TH DEMONSTRATED, CAN DO IT VERY WELL. BUT THE IMMEDIACY OF THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA IS A TWO-EDGED SWORD. THE POWER OF THEIR IMAGES FORCES A RESPONSE. ON SEPTEMBER 11TH LAST YEAR, WASHINGTON, D.C. STREETS WERE CLOGGED LONG BEFORE THE NOTIFICATION WAS MADE AT 10:08 AM TO CLOSE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. MANY WORKERS IN DC INCLUDING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN THE DOWNTOWN AREA HAD SIMPLY DECIDED TO GET OUT OF TOWN ON THEIR OWN. THE SCENES ON TELEVISION OF THE WHITE HOUSE BEING EVACUATED AND RUMORS THAT THERE WERE STILL PLANES IN THE AIR HEADING TOWARD UNKNOWN LOCATIONS WERE SIMPLY TOO MUCH.

DIRECTOR JAMES' INTENT AND DESIRE IS TO PROVIDE AS MUCH LEAD TIME AS POSSIBLE TO CITY AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES IN ADVANCE OF AN OFFICIAL DECISION. OPM FULLY UNDERSTANDS THAT THE INFLUX OF 180,000 FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WOULD PUT A STRAIN ON ANY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST HAVE A DOSE OF REALITY. NO PROTOCOL, NO MATTER HOW WELL THOUGHT OUT, CAN COMPLETELY CONTROL EVERYONE'S ACTIONS. IF THE SEPTEMBER 11TH SCENARIO PLAYED OUT AGAIN TOMORROW, IN EXACTLY THE SAME FASHION...THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT PEOPLE WOULD NOT AGAIN FLOOD THE STREETS OF THEIR OWN VOLITION. BUT IF THE SAME SCENARIO DID OCCUR TOMORROW, OPM, CITY AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS WOULD BE IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO COMMUNICATE, COORDINATE AND PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR OUR CITIZENS. OVER A MILLION PEOPLE LIVE AND WORK IN THIS REGION AND MAKE IT A GREAT PLACE TO CONDUCT THE NATION'S BUSINESS, WE OWE IT TO THEM TO GET IT RIGHT.

THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HERE TODAY. I AM HAPPY TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

Mrs. MORELLA. I do have your Federal Emergency Decision and Notification Protocol before me, as do other members of the committee. What I'm going to do and ask my colleagues to do is to confine our questioning to 5 minutes, and then we can maybe have about three rounds. The recorder will be on there in terms of timing.

So I'm going to ask each of you if you could briefly give me the status of preparedness in the National Capital Region on a scale of 1 to 10. How prepared is the region as a whole as well as each locality? So if you give me that number from 1 to 10. If it is pretty low, I'd like you to tell me briefly what it is that you need.

Let's start off with you, Mr. LaPorte.

Mr. LAPORTE. If I was going to give it a number, I'd give it an 8. And it's a pretty high 8, but I think we've come such a long way in our connectability. If there's a concern to get to 10, part of it is to continue the investment in technology, the investment in sustainability of the effort that's been going on.

Mrs. MORELLA. OK. Very good. Lets continue on. You did very well, Mr. LaPorte.

Mr. KELDSEN. I guess I would probably give it a 7 for the region. I think there's a lot of investment that's been made. I think the basis for real preparedness is the emergency management functions funding which has been level for 10 years without any increase in the emergency management performance grant which is the infrastructure upon which preparedness is based.

Mrs. MORELLA. Do you have something like this in Maryland? Are localities doing that?

Mr. KELDSEN. Yes. Montgomery County, for example, has an extensive document for the public.

Mrs. MORELLA. Very good. OK. Moving on. Mr. Foresman.

Mr. FORESMAN. Madam Chairwoman, the danger is, if I give you the wrong number, how does that affect our Federal funding?

Mrs. MORELLA. One track mind.

Mr. FORESMAN. I think the simple fact is I would give it a 7 as well. The two areas where clearly we need to do a much better job on the integration piece of it is citizen awareness and education. Because, ultimately, government and the private sector and all levels of government can make decisions, but until the citizens play their roles out we're not going to be fully prepared. I fundamentally think we're going to have to grasp the whole issue of critical infrastructure protection and fully engaging our private sector partners. Because we do—the response side of it we can do. The critical infrastructure protection is going to be a challenge.

Mrs. MORELLA. Sounds a little bit like the refrain from Mr. Vradenberg, too, as a matter of fact.

Mr. D'Araujo.

Mr. D'ARAUJO. I would tend to concur with——

Mrs. MORELLA. A little closer to the microphone.

Mr. D'ARAUJO. I would tend to concur with something between a 6 or a 7 at this point. I think, although there have been great strides, as I mentioned in my comments, the whole notion of planning is a never-ending requirement. I mean, as you exercise, you adjust; as threat changes, you adjust. We're in the process of assessments to determine needed equipment to accommodate the re-

sponsive recovery business. So I would say somewhere between a 6 and a 7.

Lots of work has been done, no question, but there still remains a great deal of work to be done.

Mrs. MORELLA. I would be interested if you could give us more specificity later in writing to make sure that we continue to work together as we begin to update. Great.

Council member, Chair Williams.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I'd go along with the 7. It's been my experience as we've gone through our long process that, as in many things, the more questions you ask the more questions arise. We've had any number of areas where we feel very proud of what we've done, but there are whole areas, whole annexes in the plan that are noted where we basically say this area remains for extensive work.

One of them that we call out in there is debris management, where we just haven't had the area of specificity that we do with some of the other.

I would, also, in response to Mr. Vradenberg's comment earlier about getting word out to the public and making sure that they understand this whole process, that we now feel like we have something to present to the public; and we're ready to do that. We've started taping shows to go out to the various public access channels to make sure we share this plan with the public. But there's still a lot that remains to be done, and our ability to fund that is limited by what we can get from other levels of government.

Mrs. MORELLA. You also made a good point earlier about the Council of Governments. I mean, where is the Council of Governments when you have the memorandum of understanding with the two Governors and the mayor. That's something, at some point we can try to address.

Mr. WILLIAMS. We have worked with that. We met with the chief of staff of the Governor in Annapolis on Monday, and we're going to meet with folks in Richmond, and we'll continue to make sure we coordinate.

Mrs. MORELLA. So you're moving along in that regard.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes.

Mrs. MORELLA. Very good. Because that was a concern that we had.

Mr. Vradenberg. My time is almost running out.

Mr. VRADENBERG. I would rate it between 4 and 5, and I would say one of your problems is that don't have a single person to ask that question. You don't have a single person who you can say, how does it balance security versus openness, which was Congresswoman Norton's question at the outset. You don't have a single person to do it. You don't have any metrics, you don't know what it means to be ready, and you don't have any improvements or standards by which you're going to be measuring this. And we haven't tested. We haven't tested whatever plan we have. So we don't have a metric. We don't have a test. We don't have a single place to look. I would say from the public's point of view they have no clue. I don't know that they would even know how to answer that question.

Mrs. MORELLA. Is it good for a first step, that Sarbanes' amendment?

Mr. VRADENBERG. It does simplify or at least seeks to simplify the Federal family conversation, the COG process simplifies the regional conversation, and if the two were married you would think there's a single table that was open to all.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. White.

Mr. WHITE. Madam Chairman, I would rate it about a 6. I think there's a tremendous amount of coordination work that has been done.

I would associate myself with the comments that we don't have a good regional and public understanding of the work that has been done, and that's certainly the next part of the effort that needs to be done. Critical infrastructure is a real consideration, proper communications, transportation. I'm, of course, very concerned about the limitations of our transportation network and the limitations of our road and transit capacity. It's awful on a good day.

The third one is I would associate myself with Mr. Vradenberg's comments about complete and full Federal participation with a single point of contact.

Mrs. MORELLA. Great. Good.

Mr. Cogbill.

Mr. COGBILL. Yes, ma'am.

From a fairly rarified planning environment here in the District, in the region, I would say before a 7. But the problems I continue to see are really on the technical levels, GIS, the using of that technology in some of the communications. But certainly from our perspective the planning is something we've done regularly and we've had good working relationships with all of our colleagues and we see this as coming along but obviously not there yet.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

Mr. Hatch.

Mr. HATCH. I'll restrict my view to what OPM is primarily concerned about, and that is the decision of the status of the Federal Government in the coordination of the communications. In that area, I would have to give it an 8. I would probably give it higher, but there's always more room to improve. The coordination of the communication effort of all the Federal, State and local municipalities and administrators has been exceptional over the last year. In our books we have the phone number, every conceivable way to reach any key decisionmaker in this region. And from that standpoint I feel that we are fairly well prepared in the area of communication and notification.

Mrs. MORELLA. And do Federal employees know what you've been doing?

Mr. HATCH. Yes, ma'am. We've been working, in addition, with the Office of Homeland Security, developing a protocol to take the notification and decision process to the chiefs of staff of all the Federal agencies and then to begin the training within each of the agencies with the security personnel.

Mrs. MORELLA. OK. I want to thank you all very much.

I now defer to Ms. Norton for her questioning.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Madam Chair. If I may say so, first of all, it's interesting to see you all giving yourselves such high marks. You know, I'm still a tenured professor of law at George-

town, and I do mark on the curve. And marking on the curve, considering from whence you have come, I can understand your marks.

Let me just say for the record that the size of this panel I think is the best evidence of the need for the new office. We considered, staff tells me, dividing this panel up; and we said we can't, because they have to be able to respond to one another. In the 12 years on this committee, I've never sat with a panel this large where it was absolutely necessary to get the kind of information we need.

If one wants to talk bureaucracy, one has to talk about what you all have to do to find a single point of contact. That's bureaucracy. The kind of office that is being proposed in the Sarbanes' and the Senate amendment, of course, gives you that point—it's not a bureaucracy, it's a person there with, of course, maybe a few people to help him.

But when you consider what we have with traffic in this town, when we try to figure out what to do to relieve what happens on the roads coming in and out, with three independent jurisdictions running around trying to figure it out, I should think that the experience now of decades of doing that would be its own comment on what's needed here.

I'm going to try to—I hope we can get from the hearing what maybe the average citizen would want to know and hasn't had an opportunity to find out. So I'm going to ask questions that I think might occur to some of them. And let me start with Mr. D'Araujo.

If someone came up to you on the street—and anyone else who may have an opinion here I'd invite to respond—and, Mr. D'Araujo, I live in Montgomery County and work in D.C. or I live in D.C., what's the best way for me to know if an attack has occurred? How would you respond, sir?

Mr. D'ARAUJO. Well, first of all, I would say that typically an attack occurring would certainly be something that would be broadcast through emergency channels in the national and local news media. I'm sorry. As I was saying, something of that nature would, of course, be broadcast through emergency channels immediately.

Ms. NORTON. Let me stop you there. I think it's very important for people to know there's nothing fancy happening here. That the first thing to know is this, that we are all wired up in this country and probably in the rest of the world. So to relieve people from believing—and I do think you're right, Mr. Vradenberg. People don't have a clue. They think really something very special has to happen, you have to be somebody special, that the way in which this country almost everybody finds out anything is through the usual media.

Because I don't have so much time I want to go on to Metro, what to do when it comes to an attack, whether to move at all.

I hear everybody talking about evacuation. Somebody better tell people, stop, look and listen before you run. I have had people in D.C. say, hey, look, they're getting everybody else out of town. How do we get out of town? Perhaps they may be in the safest place in the region.

Because so many of your answers have had to be abstract and I'm used to the case method, let me give you a case. Let me give you a case you had, September 11th.

Now, given September 11th, had you been prepared, should you have told people, OPM, whoever thinks they can answer this, to get in your cars, if you had—should you have told everybody to get on the subway? Could Mr. White have handled that? If everybody had left their cars and gotten on the subway—on September 11th, knowing now what you know, what should OPM have told Federal employees, workers, Federal and nonFederal, to do, those in the District of Columbia?

Mr. HATCH. Delegate, I'll be happy to at least start the discussion.

May I first say you have been gracious through the years by appearing on television programs on C–SPAN that I have produced and you've allowed to come on the program many times at the last minute, so I'm very happy to be here today.

September 11th, of course, very unusual in our lifetime. Hopefully, it will never happen again. By the time——

Ms. NORTON. By the way, I wish people would stop saying—because the public thinks, and everyone says it, from the President on down, "and I'm here to tell you it will happen again." Thank you very much. I don't think you have to keep reminding people of that. And people believe it's kind of a "cover your butt" statement of officials so that when it happens nobody will say we didn't tell you so.

Meanwhile, what do you think you do to visitors coming to the District of Columbia, visitors getting on airplanes? The last thing they heard was that somebody told them that it was going to happen again. I wonder if they mean it's going to happen today when I get on this plane to go to Houston. So could we stipulate for the record that it will happen again and nobody needs to tell us all and remind us all that it will happen again?

Now, sir.

Mr. HATCH. You mentioned earlier that the best place to be might be remaining where you are, and that was on our minds at OPM. OPM Director James——

Ms. NORTON. Should that have happened—I'm trying to see if there is a problem-solving approach to an incident. Should that have been what people were told on September 11th?

Mr. HATCH. In my view, yes. By 9:45, streets in Washington, DC, were clogged. That was well in advance of a notification at 10:08 a.m., that Federal employees may leave their buildings. They were never instructed that they had to leave, because, as you rightly mentioned a moment ago, many times the safest place might be or the most convenient place might be where you are. In retrospect, the decision would have been called the same way today.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. White, people really didn't know whether to take their cars if they had ridden them or to crowd your trains.

Mr. WHITE. I think there's a very strong relationship between the decision of what people do with the school system and the decision of what employers do with employees; and what we saw on the 11th was, you know, a major disconnect between those two. Human nature being what it is, no matter what OPM tells an employee to do, if their schools are releasing, if they have school-age children, they're going to go take care of them. And that was a major disconnect that drove a lot of chaos in the region.

I think everybody went home the way they came in. So if they drove, they drove. If they took Metro, they took Metro.

But, Ms. Norton, if the strategy is to tell everybody who drove in don't—leave your car behind and get on Metro, we can't handle it. We absolutely fundamentally cannot handle that.

Ms. NORTON. But you heard what Mr. Hatch said. He said maybe the thing to say is stay where you are until you hear more from us.

Mr. WHITE. The experts who talk about the issue of evacuation always caution the people who talk about it don't call it evacuation because this an issue of what do we do with the movement of people based upon the conditions that are in front of us. In many instances, "protect in place," I think is the terminology that is used, is the best strategy; and that can only be done if everybody gets instant access to the best information they possibly can about what they should do and what their choices are. I think that is a fundamental part of this evacuation plan. At least the COG is still calling it the evacuation plan. That's an important part of it. It's called a part of the demand management strategy. It's not always about moving people. It's about managing demand, including protect employees.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. LaPorte, you wanted to respond.

Mr. LAPORTE. I want to compliment Metro as well as OPM, but what we really want to do is to get accurate information to those people that are leaving the city. If we could make sure if the 14th Street Bridge is closed or if Constitution between 15th and 17th is closed, that those people who are leaving their buildings are empowered with that knowledge so they can seek that alternative route. And that's the key, is education as we continue to work with our—the Federal employees to expedite their commute.

You really want to be careful, as you said, the evacuation word. Because when you talk about evacuation there's 580,000 people who live in town, evacuation is moving those people who commute here in an expedited way home to their respective homes in Maryland and Virginia. But for those folks who live in town it really is a challenge as where do we go.

So the idea of sheltering in place is key to understanding what protective actions are best to take and in really emphasizing that is all part of our personal preparedness, the community-based approach, the schools, universities, business, industry to educate on a simple collective level of protective actions, Maryland, Virginia and the District, accepting some common language collectively so when we give out those protective action guidelines there's consistentcy among all three jurisdictions.

Ms. NORTON. Anyone else have a response?

Mr. VRADENBERG. I'll just make a quick comment, Congresswoman Norton, because you have asked a question that probably should have been asked, you know, 6 months ago, 9 months ago and the like; and I'm not sure that your question to this panel doesn't reflect one of the problems here is that these—all of us still have not exercised the scenario of what we would have done differently on September 11th and whether we've got the systems in place to have done something differently on September 11th.

You have asked what seems to be a simple, straightforward, citizen-oriented question; and I'm not sure that you're getting a better answer today. You're getting different answers, but is the whole system going to respond in a way that people, if they hear from their employer and from the media that they should stay in place, will they trust it. Will they, in fact, respond in the way you want them to respond?

The only way we're going to know that is if we in fact go through some scenarios and in fact have a trusted system so the public knows what the plan is, they trust that somebody is on top of the best information they can have, they're getting the best communications, their kids are protected in schools, their employers know exactly what's going on, and therefore they will take the behavior that we would want them to take in order to protect the large body of citizenry and work force in this region.

You've asked a critical question. I'm not sure you're getting a real good answer from us.

Ms. NORTON. I recognize, you know, we're all involved in our own learning curve, but, if I may say so, I believe we already have a problem, given the answers. There seems to be a consensus that to run may be the worst thing to do. If you run out into the bioterrorism, you run out into danger. Or even if there's no danger all run out at the same time and you create your own danger.

There seems to be a consensus as we take a case in point, yes, a scenario, that the best thing to do is not to evacuate. Yet the only thing residents hear is about evacuation plans. I can assure you that in this building everybody is going to jump up and run.

Now, so since language is everything, let me suggest—God knows I'm not sure what the right words are—that we need to wipe the words evacuation plan from the dictionary as far as response to terrorism concern. I mean, here's a try, and it's not good enough: attack response plan. We've got to now begin educating people—we've got to unlearn the evacuation notion. Everybody's got that, you all. Boy have they got that. First they got it by instinct, and now they've gotten it from all of us.

How do we now tell them that we don't mean for them to run until they listen? We need a stop, look and listen plan.

If I could just ask from this moment on—and this is why we need this new office. Because everybody obviously is in his own bailiwick trying to figure out what to do, to begin the process, to educate the public that the worst thing to do may be to evacuate where they happen to be. Stop, look and listen; and you will learn what to do.

From the point of view of Mr. White, it may be that the last thing you should do is to have a car out—we may be able to sequence people out of here if, in fact, people know all right—I mean, literally, it is possible even in a mass society to say everybody below D Street can now go home. Everybody above that, it would be dangerous to go out.

People will follow instructions but only if they understand they're not in danger if they don't evacuate now.

Madam Chair, I'm over my time.

Mrs. MORELLA. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Madam Chair, for having this hearing. And I want to thank the presenters, too. We are learning a lot from you.

I was particularly intrigued by the comments from Mr. George Vradenberg, and I think he gave his process the lower score.

In listening to your comments, I saw in front of me what is called the Regional Emergency Coordinated Plan, and I also have a copy of a Family Preparedness Guide. Can I hear comment not only from you, Mr. Vradenberg, but from the other members of the panel as to whether these two guides will serve people at a time of emergency? I thought they looked pretty good.

The only thing that I have not heard from anyone on the panel, and D.C. is a district that has many waterways, what do we do about the waterways, and would they be an escape hatch? Maybe somebody can address that.

Also—and I'm just throwing these thoughts out. And there are a couple of people that I wanted to address them.

The other person was John Cogbill. I am looking at these two manuals and I'm saying they look pretty complete but not complete enough. I wanted to know if the Homeland Security Department that's being proposed is the giant umbrella that will coordinate all that you're doing. I heard very clearly Mr. Vradenberg said there's no one person you call, no one department and so on. Right now, I don't think Homeland Security agency is the answer.

What I would do if anyone cared about my single opinion is I would have put another Secretary-level person in the White House that would coordinate each one of your departments, agencies, or whatever and answer to the President and Congress, one person you could call that could tell you what's happening here, here, here and here. I don't think coordination is adequate.

I can tell you on September 11th we were right in the Capitol. No one knew anything. Not even the media. They were asking us. We knew the least. They were yelling to us get out, get out, get out. Run, run, run. Run across the grass, run across the barrier. I didn't know where to go. I was concerned about my staff. I had my chief of staff with me, and I couldn't get any information. So as we were walking the streets people standing out in front called us in. Come in, Congresswoman. There's a phone and a television. I didn't even know what had happened. I had not seen it.

So I started calling around. I called my office in Los Angeles to tell them that we were OK, but I don't know where the staff is. And they said, well, why don't you call the national police; and that's what we did. And they said, we'll pick you up right now. When they came to pick me up, it was in a K–9 unit. And my chief of staff couldn't even go with me. He had to walk.

So I'm just saying it was chaotic and everybody was emotional and there was a lot of shouting and yelling, and we said what we need is an evacuation plan. So I say that to say how are you coordinated with the Hill and with us? I haven't heard that yet.

So I'd like to hear first back from Mr. Vradenberg and then with Mr. Cogbill, because you're heading up this national planning commission, on how do we bring the Capitol Hill together with the region and the people.

Mr. VRADENBERG. I am a great believer, Ms. Watson, in simple communications. And Ms. Norton's notion of a stop, look, listen plan is something that will stick in people's head and cause them to pause and then to listen before they take action. So as good as these are—and I'm not saying they're not high quality, well written, and to the extent that they're actually read, integrated into people's lives, terrific—my own sense is that we need some very simple, convenient, easy-to-use mechanisms for the public to understand what to do.

Stop, look and listen; turn on your TV set. If for some reason the broadcast stations aren't operating, turn on your radio and listen. And you will hear within 15 minutes of an attack the most recent information known to public officials in the region and the steps to take and when they can receive another update. So the public—excuse me.

Ms. WATSON. Let me intervene here. You're absolutely correct. We didn't know. We went into the national police headquarters and we heard from the CIA, the FBI, the Capitol Police and they didn't tell us any more than we could get on CNN.

Mr. VRADENBERG. Well, that is why we have offered—because the Private Sector Task Force of the Greater Washington Board of Trade does have the local and national media on it, we have offered to work with public affairs officials or public information officers to develop the kind of very simple set of communications steps that we ought to be taking. Clearly, we need a clear authoritative voice for the region, not just perhaps the President or a Cabinet official on what's happening to the Nation, but for the region.

These are the steps. What's happening to your schools? What's happened? What's happening? Are we closing or opening the schools? What steps should you take in perhaps different sections of the city? What do you do about different languages to assure that all non-native English language speakers also get a communication? When is your next update?

If you don't have authoritative information at 9:45, you wait until 10:08, the streets are clogged, you're too late already. You've got to be out there almost immediately saying precisely what Ms. Norton said which I thought was really intriguing: Stop, look, listen. Turn on the TV set. The TV for some reason is down because the towers are out in the town, turn on your radio. If those are out, do some other mechanism. But in fact have an authoritative voice very quickly establishing what's happening, what steps to take and when the next update is. So people will wait 15 minutes or half an hour for the next update.

Ms. WATSON. Do we need a 911 for a September 11th type event?

Mr. VRADENBERG. I'm afraid the communications system may be clogged because it's built for only a certain percentage of people using it at a point in time. But we do have a wide variety now of communications mechanisms. We have, obviously, TV, cable and broadcast. We have radio. We also have the Internet. We have wireless.

Ms. WATSON. They can't speak back to you. They can't speak back to you.

Mr. VRADENBERG. Some can; some can't. So if we integrate our communications to the public so that you can go on your local TV

set to stop, look and listen for more details, go to Internet site A or call a particular number—but you'd have to, I think, begin to think through how you could have different communications at a point in time so that, in fact, you didn't clog your system. Because then no one would hear it. But if in fact it was just stop, look and listen, update in one-half hour, do not move for one-half hour, then you would have some mechanism by which the public could understand and not take the most immediate intuitive reaction, which is to run.

Ms. WATSON. I don't know if the Internet will serve all people, particularly, Ms. Norton, in your district. There are too few people that have access to computers and all.

What I am latching onto, something you said, a very simple way—and, as I said, if we could get two-way communication with a human being, you know, on the other end—I hate these numbers that you call, you keep getting a recording and you got to go through a list of 10 things and you're not sure if you push a button you're going to get the right area you want; and I don't know if we have that kind of time.

So I wasn't just being flippant when I said a 911 number for a September 11th situation. I was thinking, because I've heard several of you say if we had one point that we could communicate with, maybe we could get a clear message, I could ask you a question. I have 10 people, and I have one car. Can I call a taxi or is there a van that can pick us up and move to us a safer ground. This is something—the coordination is what really bothers me. Because we've experienced an uncoordinated kind of response.

So, you know, you might not have the answers but think about the question.

Mr. VRADENBERG. Ms. Watson, you do highlight the value of a lot of pre-event thinking about the subject so that we don't think about this on the moment of the attack. We think about this well in advance of this and perhaps organize ourselves by blocks, by other organizational elements within this community so that everyone is not calling one number but one knows precisely what number to call and so that we can get a response system that is responsive to people in giving them comfort that they know what is happening, what they should do to protect themselves and their families.

But this is a lot of planning beforehand. It requires deep engagement, I think, of all aspects of the media up front in a planning sense so that we know almost intuitively and reactively what to do when an attack hits. We know there are two things we should do: We should turn on our radio or TV and we should call our local block captain. So that you only have a couple of things to do. So at that point you can distribute the information through those mechanisms.

Ms. WATSON. Something that we have done as politicians that has been very effective, we sent out these little stick-ums—you can stick them on your telephone or refrigerator or television—giving emergency numbers.

I'm sitting here thinking that we need to have a way for the people to get questions and not have to sit in front of a television set. Because I was on foot, I didn't see a television set until I went into

someone's home. But I knew something was going on. Could we have a line, could we have telephone lines dedicated with people, you know, rushing to a center getting on those lines, giving the most current information? Where do you go?

We on the freeways in California have these boxes, emergency boxes, and you can—if your car stops—and they're like every quarter of a mile—you go, you pick it up and there's someone on the other side of that line that can answer your questions or get you the kind of help you need. You know, what do we need?

You don't need to answer. I'm throwing these questions out. Let me go now to Mr. Cogbill.

Mrs. MORELLA. The gentlelady's time is expiring.

Ms. WATSON. Can I have one-half a second?

Mr. Cogbill, about the blockades. I have listened to Ms. Norton over the year about the way the city looks. And I know I get frustrated coming into the Capitol in the morning, you know, with all these barricades. We, too, have to stop, flip the hood, all of that, and it's very unseemly. And I know there are many, many people that look at the District today and really don't want to visit because it looks like an armed camp. And I was very compelled by your testimony, Mr. Cogbill, and maybe you want to comment on it.

Mr. COGBILL. Yes, ma'am. I'll try to be very brief.

First, we do serve a very limited role in the planning within the District and the Capitol region. But certainly our emphasis has been on reducing the appearance of Washington as a fortified city.

I would take this opportunity, though, to mention a couple of other things and some of the positive things that I think that I personally experienced on September 11th here in Washington. One of those was coming out of the building onto the street and finding that every person I encountered made eye contact. For the first time in a long time in a large metropolitan area I found that people were looking at each other, they were communicating with each other, and that was something I hadn't experienced for a long time.

Also, as I was leaving the city with my son, we found people on the side of the road who were standing there and people stopped to pick them up and take them with them. So the people reached out and helped each other during that time. We came together better as a Nation on that day than any day than I can remember in recent history.

What has the National Planning Commission done? Well, we have looked to the future as much as we can to our Legacy Plan. One of the things you mentioned was using our waterways to get people around the city, and one of the things that we have proposed are water taxies. Now this is not something that will happen today or tomorrow, but we need to believe that the waterfront needs to be better utilized. We need to know that people can move around through this area, using this wonderful facility that once was an artery and did move people around; and so this is what we have proposed.

As you may know, the Kennedy Center renovations that they're now proposing, having just been funded, are in fact part of the same legacy plan. What we're trying to do is look ahead. We're looking at improving the transportation links in and out of the city.

As you know, with the water bodies we have, there are limited means to get in and out of the city across the bridges. These are points that you cannot expand in a crisis. These are facilities that are limited in what they can carry. But we also believe that by proper planning, by proper transportation planning, by improving the ways across the Anacostia, by improving the network of transportation facilities and improving the public transportation system in the district that we can make our contribution to the National Capital Planning Commission to the objectives that you have just described.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you. We've extended the time, as you can see, because you all had such great answers and the whole issue is so very important.

I do want to reiterate what I said at the beginning and that is that I know I have a number of questions I want to ask, I know Ms. Norton does and Ms. Watson. So if we may also submit some questions to you, too.

Mr. LaPorte, I know you were very frustrated there because, when the discussion was about call WTOP or 911, you already had some of that in your pamphlet here. I notice that.

But, Mr. Vradenberg, you testified in terms of the cooperation between business entities in Montgomery County as partners in the early stages of emergency planning and its effectiveness. How can we institutionalize this business partnership in our region?

I would also like to ask FEMA, Mr. D'Araujo, to report back to this subcommittee—if you could do that by October 10th—on how this approach is being incorporated in the regional Federal contingency plans.

Mr. D'ARAUJO. Be happy to do that.

Ms. MORELLA. Anybody want to comment on the question on business entities and—yes, Mr. LaPorte.

Mr. LAPORTE. As the District received quite a bit of funds from this committee last year, one of the investments was with business and industry.

Because it is a key component of getting those folks empowered with the knowledge of our plans but also to develop their own plans and how they work. And we've been working with the Board of Trade and the Chamber of Commerce to get the word out to these trainees and we are sharing that, the curriculum, with Maryland and Virginia to make sure it's disseminated even further.

What we're finding is that there's a great deal of interest in our plans; but even more importantly, though, is their own plans, their own plans for their own employees, the responsibilities that businesses want to take upon themselves. We're finding a great deal of interest in that. But not just the business community; there's a unique interest in the churches in the religious community here in town in taking advantage of that; there's additional curricula of investing in those civic associations who really have roots in our neighborhoods, because in many many ways, disasters happen locally and response happens locally.

And in the District, as we get out to the voting community, or if we get out to different wards, and we're doing community training throughout the wards about our plans and their own plans, it's about personal preparedness. And it really does start at home, and

driving in that important fundamental foundation of taking the responsibility on themselves to become empowered with the knowledge, but also to share that with—throughout their civic association.

With the business community, we found it—an appetite that we can't match. They're sold out. They're filling up. We have got waiting lists of hundreds of businesses. So as we go forward, sustaining this level of preparedness in the National Capital region is going to take those additional funds, because the commitment to really reach the special communities that we have is quite challenging.

Mrs. MORELLA. Do you believe that the typical business owner knows what to do in the event of a code orange?

Mr. LAPORTE. We're finding that the larger companies have made that investment. The real challenge is the small and medium businesses who really are—their profit levels are such that they're working. And until you can put it in a profit-type argument and explain to them it's a worthwhile investment—the levels of color-codedness have caused some degree of confusion because of the change; what did it mean? Here in the National Capital region, it certainly took on a heightened alert when the Department of Defense took additional action. It certainly—everyone asked a lot of questions about the level of coordination and what we were looking at. We're continuing to work on that. The public education of that is critically important. And there are some really good examples of how the color-codedness of the preparedness match up with what businesses can do, what schools can do, what universities can do. And we're working on that throughout our training.

Mrs. MORELLA. So we still have a way to go. And I have a little bit of time left, so I'm wondering about how the level of preparedness is being assessed and does this assessment differ on a regional and local basis? So looking at also at what standards do you use, national standards, local, I would ask anyone who would like to respond to that.

Mr. Williams, I'd like to give you a chance to make a brief comment that you have been trying to make, if you'd like to. If it doesn't disrupt the continuity of standards and assessment, you may make it.

Mr. WILSON. If I can do that now, I'd appreciate it. I have just been a little frustrated. I think that the conversation that we had, starting with the response to Ms. Norton's question and continuing with Ms. Watson's question, lost point—lost sight of the most important thing that I think is an answer to that, that we just didn't get to; that in terms of what's different today than on September 11th, what would we do differently and how would people get the information that they need, how would we react?

The thing that we have today that we didn't have then is the regional incident and communication and coordination system. We have a way for the important people who have the information for the decisionmakers to get together quickly and confer and come out with proper information that is accurate that people will need, so that you're always going to have to go to a diversity of sources to get the information. There is no one simple answer for everybody and there is no one place where everybody can go and get their questions answered, because it would be overwhelmed immediately.

So that system is going to put out to the media, to local governments, to whoever, it's going to put out the best information possible. And I think if we get tied up in thinking that we haven't come up with a new mechanism and a way to get that information so that people know what to do that's different from September 11th, we'll have lost sight of a lot of progress.

Mr. FORSEMAN. Madam Chairman, I'd like to address the whole issue of performance management and performance measurement. I think—and it's incumbently clear, or abundantly clear to me today that we need to do a better job of education, because some of the issues that we just spent time talking about—dialog about, in fact—you know, it really boils down to just what Mr. Williams said. Should we have been able to do that collaboration? Absolutely. Should we have implemented the emergency alert system which is fundamentally the system to get the word out to the public? We should have. Did we not use it on the 11th? No, we didn't. So that was clearly a failure on the part to use existing systems.

But with regard to the standards issues, I think if you look at the national standards for what does an accredited emergency management capability look like in a local jurisdiction, what does it look like at the State level, what should it look like at the regional level, there are national standards and we should be seeking to achieve those national standards because that is——

Mrs. MORELLA. That's the E-map, is that it?

Mr. FORSEMAN. No, ma'am. Oh, the E-map, yes, ma'am. And it seeks to take into account everything from command and control to effective utilization of the emergency alert system to decision processes for expedited—since we're not going to use the term "evacuation," expedited movement of people out of the area, to protective acts, to recommendation to stay in place. And I think the simple fact is we're going to spend millions, if not hundreds of millions of dollars, in this region in the next 10 years. And unless we're seeking to obtain a measurable end product—and I agree with what George Vradenburg said. We've got to make sure that we know what the target is, and E-map will provide us the target in terms of the local jurisdictions and the State governments. And I think we're going to have to build a little bit of a unique E-map model from a regional perspective, but that's not in the too-hard-to-do list.

Mrs. MORELLA. Would anyone else want to make any comments about the assessment or standards? Yes, Mr. White.

Mr. WHITE. Madam Chair, I just note that, you know, I guess we've talked quite a bit today about the Sarbanes amendment, but there is a provision in that does require that the assessment be made on an annual basis and report back to the Congress. So I think that's a good mechanism.

I think we can talk about what are the standards that are used for assessment. I think the fact is that we need an assessment. We all need an assessment. You need an assessment. The region needs its own assessment, and there's got to be some place for it to be done and some mechanism and some way for it to be done, and here's an opportunity that can be done.

Mrs. MORELLA. And some standards. I just want a yes or no answer. Mr. Keldsen, do you think the Sarbanes amendment is good? And Mr. Forseman.

Mr. KELDSEN. I support his comments in reference to standards. I think the focus for the National Capital region needs to be there. I think the Sarbanes amendment is one way of doing that.

Mr. FORSEMAN. The attributes that the Sarbanes amendment would provide in terms of the National Capital region focus I think is needed.

Mrs. MORELLA. OK, very good. I think there seems to be unanimity on that. Thank you. Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Madam Chair, I know you're trying to hasten the end of the hearing. I'm going to ask one more case-method question and then I'm going to ask a series of questions of specific members and ask for short answers of those questions.

All right. Mr. White here is the case-method question, and I ask it in part because everybody—Metro, if you're talking about—remember, the scenario I'm using is the average person who lives in this region. OK. Let's say the average person uses Metro. And in a real sense, one might be more frightened if one were in Metro than if one were in an office building. You will recall that this committee had a couple of hearings a couple of years ago when people were caught underground in Metro, when nobody even thought of September 11th, and communication between Metro and those underground was very much flawed. We since had hearings, learned that had, of course, been straightened out as to that particular situation.

Nevertheless, let me ask you, if one—if I am in a subway, if I am in Metro, what should I know? Who is going to tell me? And what instructions have you given to whoever it is that is going to tell me if I'm in a train underground when some event takes place in the region?

Mr. WHITE. Well, the issue of how we communicate with our customers when they're in the system is certainly something that we have worked very hard at trying to enhance our capabilities on. You make reference to, you know, some issues that we had a couple of summers ago, and we've certainly learned from some of those things. We have put all of our training operators through a very rigorous program of making sure that if our trains are stopped for any unusual amount of time, that the train operator gets on the PA system inside, in the rail cars, and provides that information to our customers. And although I can't sit here today and tell you——

Ms. NORTON. Will the train operator know?

Mr. WHITE. Yes. The train operator is going to get their information from our central control system.

Ms. NORTON. And you have communication state-of-the-art technology that'll let them know exactly——

Mr. WHITE. That's not the problem. Getting the information from our control center to our train operator is not the problem. It's making sure that human intervention takes place where that train operator proactively provides that information in a way that's not too nondescript or too generic to have some meaning to the customers.

In addition, we have some other tools that are being put in our system. We do have passenger information systems where it tells people when the next train's going to arrive. Those signs in the system have the capability of being overridden to provide emergency information, so if you're on a platform, not in a train, but on a platform, waiting for a train to come in, there's two techniques. It's the sign in the station and the PA system in the station itself. So we have multiple ways of communicating to our people when they're in the system what is going on and what they should be doing.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. White.

Mr. Cogbill, thank you for the work that the NCPC has done to try to get this ugly set of barriers that say don't come to that region and certainly don't come to this city, thank you for your help in getting the White House to send over an amendment to begin the process of funding the plan.

Let me ask you about the circulator. You have proposed that a circulator be able to maneuver downtown, including going across Pennsylvania Avenue. How would—how would we be—how would you make sure that circulator which goes across Pennsylvania Avenue, which you have indicated should not be opened, would in fact be secure? Would it be able to pick up everybody? How would security be done?

Mr. COGBILL. That is still in the planning stages. We have allowed for that with, if you remember from the Van Valkenburgh renderings that were done as part of our plan, one of the criteria that we established was for access for a circulator. We are currently in the midst of working this out with the city, with the BID, with the other business elements within the city, to determine what the needs are, how much capacity we're going to need, and we're also looking at costing the elements of that. This is part also of this appropriation that you just mentioned. Some of that money will be allocated to studying this particular aspect of it, to go from this very abstract theoretical idea of the circulator not just in front of the White House but through about four or five other areas within the monumental core, and we'll look at that and then come back with a clear understanding of what we need to do, and then a recommendation for how to fund it.

Ms. NORTON. Is the Secret Service involved in your work?

Mr. COGBILL. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. NORTON. And the Secret Service was involved in your work when you recommended that E street be reopened as well, was it not?

Mr. COGBILL. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. D'Araujo, I was very disappointed when FEMA apparently expressed some concern about going into a specific location in the District of Columbia, sending, I think quite insensitively, a message out—you know, watch out; you 180,000 or so employees may be in a dangerous situation because even FEMA doesn't want to go to where FEMA had already signed off ongoing. It was not very pleasant. It was not in my judgment professional, and I made the head of FEMA understand just how we felt about the way in which that got out to the public.

My question for you, since you were clear—since FEMA was clear it wanted to be in the District of Columbia: Wouldn't that be

something, FEMA looks like it's too scared to be in the District of Columbia, but the rest of you all better stay here. My question to you is, have you found a building yet? Have you found a site yet that is safe enough for you?

Mr. D'ARAUJO. Are you talking about the FEMA headquarters situation?

Ms. NORTON. Yes.

Mr. D'ARAUJO. As you know, that's been held in abeyance for a couple of reasons. One, the site that was being proposed was determined not to be suitable from a security standpoint based on the current environment that we're in. And No. 2, until the homeland security issue is finally settled and how we integrate into that, we suspended the—looking at the alternate site.

Ms. NORTON. OK. Mr. D'Araujo, be careful about how you communicate. People look to you first and foremost, other employees look to you first and foremost for courage.

Let me ask a couple of questions of Mr. Laporte, finally. And these will be my last two questions, Madam Chair. An OPM spokesman, perhaps one too far down in the bureaucracy, allowed as how D.C. hasn't spent the money that you had been allocated by the Congress of the United States. In fact, has the District spent the money allocated to it in the 2002 appropriation?

Mr. LAPORTE. I can assure you that we have spent—and we will account for every dime—have spent the $12.6 million that came to the District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency, and we are well on meeting all spending targets in the other funds that came that have a 2-year life cycle. We're well beyond halfway points of expending those funds; in fact, are finding plenty of areas where additional needs are becoming quite clear, especially of the $12.6 million that ended this coming September 30th. And it will be challenging, going forward, for the community preparedness business, industries, schools, universities, to keep continuing to meet the need that the citizens are just clamoring for.

Ms. NORTON. Well, I mean since OPM put this on the record, it does seem to me that on the record we ought to clear up, that OPM—OMB I am sorry. OPM. Do forgive me. OMB and the Congress allocated this money and funds to the District and you have in fact met that.

Finally, I've just got to ask you, Mr. Laporte, and I suppose there's a soft spot here for the fire department for me, since Lieutenant Richard Holmes entered the D.C. Fire Department in 2002, but I tell you when I read in the newspaper that pending the renovation of the firehouse at Tenley Circle, that the firemen have been put in a place where there's no water, no showers, no cooking, no trash pickup, I really have to wonder not about whether the District is prepared for terrorism, but whether they're prepared to treat people who we depend upon in a terrorist attack and on a daily basis, whether we are in fact treating those employees as we should. Have you got anything to report on that matter which was in the Post just this week?

Mr. LAPORTE. I read that piece and was a bit dismayed, and I know Deputy Mayor Kellems has been addressing that issue and at least 20 percent of the funds that came into DCEMA were turned around and forwarded to the fire department, especially the

hazardous material needs. We found after September 11th the amount of runs we went through anthrax, the amount of training we've given to the fire department but, I think it continues to show that it is an area of great need and challenge, but there are no braver men and women than the fire and EMS folks in the District of Columbia.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Laporte, you are not of course in charge of the fire department. Would you, within 1 week, will you let this committee know whether the conditions I've just outlined for those firefighters has been improved? Would you carry back to the D.C.—to the District, whoever is in charge, so that we will know what has been done to erase that situation?

One question for Mr. Hatch. Mr. Hatch, I was very pleased at the kind of simultaneous communication that is going on between OPM, GSA, and FEMA on just what to do with employees. But there's a lot of confusion here because apparently, on their own, agencies can close down their agencies. And I still don't know who is in charge. I think it's very good that all three of you are communicating before anybody moves; but, OK, after you all have communicated, who is in charge of saying whether or not the government will close down? And where does that leave the agency head who apparently has authority on her own to close down or stay open?

Mr. HATCH. You're absolutely correct that each agency, the director of each agency, is autonomous within their own building and with their own employees. Of course the government wouldn't close down because there was a fire at Commerce. But the director of OPM in this instance, now Kay Coles James, is the individual that will make the call as to the overall operating status of the Federal Government. And that will be the recommendation.

Ms. NORTON. Does that mean an individual agency could not keep open and could not close—I mean, they have to do what she says.

Mr. HATCH. It is very much like the field commander. If there is a director that feels that if there were, for instance as you brought up earlier, if there were a radiological device right outside, or if they had information that the worst thing that could happen would be their employees running out the door, then, yes, they of course would take the responsibility to do what is necessary to protect their citizens and employees.

Ms. NORTON. But only in case of emergency can she act independently; she, the agency head?

Mr. HATCH. Only in the case of a specific emergency, and the recommendation will come from OPM; yes, ma'am.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. And thank you, Madam Chair.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Ms. Norton. We still have some questions. We want to thank you very much for your 7 ranking; we want to bring it up to 10 as soon as we can.

And what I thought was particularly important is bringing you all to the table together, and I know you do communicate with each other, but I hope this will enhance that communication. And I hope that we will be meeting with you again soon to get the assessment, the standards, the plan for the business community, for the citizenry, for the technology, that may be needed. And I hope you will

feel free to get any information to us that we may not have mentioned and may not get to you in questions.

And so I am going to consider this Subcommittee of the District of Columbia now adjourned, and thank each and every one of you. You have been great to be here. And thank you for the progress that's been made in our emergency preparedness.

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

COLONEL EGON F. HAWRYLAK

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, SECURITY, AND PLANS

U.S. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SECOND SESSION, 107TH CONGRESS

SEPTEMBER 20, 2002

PROGRESS ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL

RELEASED BY THE GOVERNMENT

REFORM COMMITTEE

Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of Major General James T. Jackson, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Military District of Washington, or MDW, I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify concerning MDW's role in joint service and interagency emergency preparedness.

As a very brief overview, the U.S. Army Military District of Washington has a variety of significant missions in the National Capital Region, including responding to crises, natural disasters and security requirements, and conducting official ceremonies and public events on behalf of the Nation's civilian and military leaders. We also currently provide base operations support for Army and Department of Defense organizations in the National Capital Region and New York City on our six subordinate installations from Fort Hamilton in Brooklyn, New York, to Fort A.P. Hill in Caroline County, Virginia. MDW also provides a variety of specialized support including personal property shipping and storage services for the region, rotary-wing airlift, and operation of the Arlington National Cemetery.

Military Support to Civil Authorities

The Secretary of the Army is the Department of Defense (DoD) Executive Agent for providing military support to civil authorities. The Secretary of the Army has appointed the Director of Military Support to perform these duties and serve as the Action Agent. The Director of Military Support tasks DoD components to plan and commit military resources in response to requests from civil authorities.

The Secretary of the Army is responsible for nine standing missions, which include domestic disaster relief (e.g., wildfires, hurricanes, floods), eradication of animal disease, support to the postal service, Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST), mass immigration, and military assistance for civil disturbance. The Secretary of the Army executes other "directed" domestic support missions for DoD to include special events like the Olympic Games, Presidential Inaugurations, and the National Boy Scout Jamboree held every four years at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia.

All emergencies are considered local until they overwhelm local authorities and additional assistance is needed. While there are many mutual aid agreements between various state and local entities, when state, or in our case District, and federal assets cannot provide adequate capabilities, DoD may receive a formal request for assistance. The Secretary of the Army is the designated approval authority for such requests, with the exception of certain missions such as Military Assistance to Civil Disturbance (MACDIS), which the Secretary of Defense retains. If approved, the Director for Military Support coordinates and publishes an order to provide resources. Subordinate commands, such as the Military District of Washington, then execute those orders in cooperation with federal, state and local authorities.

This formal process does not prevent a military commander from reacting immediately to emergency situations that pose imminent threats to human life or vast property destruction and exceed the capability of the local authorities to

respond. The objective in these "Immediate Response" cases is to save lives, prevent human suffering, and to mitigate great property damage.

Military assistance to civil authority is significant to our National Security and necessary for the protection of the homeland. The Department of Defense is a key player in the Federal Response Plan capable of providing support in all domestic emergencies with its unique capabilities including transportation, medical, logistical, explosive ordnance disposal, and aviation assets to name a few. Since 1998, DoD has completed 430 missions in support of civil authorities.

MDW Contributions to Emergency Readiness

The Military District of Washington, like all military units, maintains the ability to rapidly assemble and respond to a crisis. Through deliberate and crisis action planning capabilities, standard operating procedures, scheduled exercises and other training activities, this command maintains the ability to formulate and implement an effective response to carry out an assigned task or mission based on the time frame permitted by the incident. Locally, the Military District of Washington, in concert with other military assets, has responded or assisted with the September 2001 International Monetary Fund/World Bank meeting, the 2001 Presidential Inaugural, and the 2002 State of the Union Address, and last year's 9/11 terrorist attack at the Pentagon.

Within MDW, I serve as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Security. In that capacity, I oversee MDW's planning and training to respond to contingencies and the execution of our response to emergencies or security

requirements in the National Capital Region. As discussed above, specific contingencies in which we have a role can range from urban search and rescue to state funerals to assisting civil authorities' response to a civil disturbance. My staff coordinates with other military service counterparts and with federal and local agency officials in the conduct of this mission.

The World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks and the emergency response offer lessons for future emergency planning within the National Capital Region. Within moments of the Pentagon crash, multiple rescue crews, emergency vehicles and citizens entered the site to help. It took considerable effort to marshal these resources, and while the scene was chaotic at first, all in all, the response across the spectrum of agencies was remarkable, especially considering that the attack on the Pentagon challenged rescue personnel with a three-pronged disaster: it was an airplane crash, a collapsed structure and a building on fire, all at the same location being managed by a county fire department, a federal law enforcement agency, and this headquarters.

The co-location of our command and control assets, daily meetings and, most importantly, an already established close working relationship ensured the crisis was collectively and efficiently managed. The fact that this headquarters resides within the District and works so closely with NCR-based federal, state, and local law enforcement and disaster relief agencies on a day-to-day basis is clearly an operational strength.

We believe we're making great progress in several programs that will enhance our joint service and multi-agency interoperability. I'd like to talk to several specific topics.

1. Fostering Communications.

One of the keys to our success following the horrific attack on the Pentagon last September, was the day-to-day working relationship we share with federal, state and local agencies. Those relationships will be critical in any future emergencies as well. Just two days ago we co-hosted a tabletop civil disturbance exercise with the DC Emergency Management Agency at Fort Myer. An Executive Level meeting hosted by the DC Metropolitan Police Department preceded it. The recent exercise included over 50 Army, federal, state, county, and local law enforcement and disaster relief agencies discussing issues of mutual interest involving the District, Virginia and Maryland.

We also conduct exercises with county urban search and rescue organizations, share threat information among law enforcement agencies, attend the Council of Governments, have established mutual support memorandums of agreement, and coordinate regularly on contingency-related issues.

To improve this command's capability to respond rapidly to any crisis, disaster, or security requirements, we are in the process of acquiring an automated mass notification system to improve our ability to rapidly and accurately notify large numbers of personnel and organizations. Scenarios and

options for system use are widely varied and will involve notifying the multitude of military and civilian agencies this headquarters works with on a continual basis.

Since 9/11 we host biweekly video teleconferences among all our installations to discuss force protection and preparedness issues. On a monthly basis, we also host a Joint Terrorism Working Group, which includes federal, state and local agencies in addition to DoD. These meetings cover anything from frequency of biohazard inspections at mailrooms to waterway security information.

2. Interservice Coordination

Major General Jackson has quarterly meetings with his service counterparts of the Navy, Air Force, Marines and Coast Guard to discuss matters of mutual concern and interest at the executive level. These meetings are invaluable in planning for, and in working jointly on, the many missions we undertake in the nation's capital region. We reinforced very clearly last year that our ability to coordinate vertically and horizontally, across sister services and with federal, state and local emergency management agencies will always be a critical factor in the success of any emergency response mission. We also learned this lesson anew last year: our tactical radio systems are not always compatible across the uniformed services or with local emergency management and public safety agencies. We are working jointly with our Service counterparts to ensure the procurement of a compatible communication system, which will not only provide a seamless interconnection between military organizations but also

with federal, state and local public safety radio systems. We have also worked tirelessly to develop a service-focused Mutual Support Assistance plan outlining unique military capabilities that may be made available in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

3. Emergency Operations Center Upgrade

The attack on the Pentagon highlighted the need for the MDW to have an enhanced centralized, command and control center from which to conduct operations. A new facility is under construction that when completed, will house a variety of communication systems which the emergency operations center will use to maximize interoperability with multiple agencies. A combination of standard off-the-shelf items and existing military equipment will provide a full range of communications, information processing, briefing and display capabilities, and facilities to support assigned missions. Coordination is currently ongoing, for example, with the DC Metropolitan Police Department Emergency Operations Center to ensure interoperability of communication and command & control systems.

4. MACOM Installation Evacuation Plan

This command is finalizing a functional plan to prepare installations to establish the framework and decision-making process to coordinate the orderly evacuation, shelter, reception, and response efforts required to achieve the common goal of protecting the workforce and families on MDW installations.

Procedures in this plan may be used to coordinate the broad spectrum of hazards including but not limited to fire, severe weather, hazardous materials, and acts of terrorism. The evacuation plan is intended to move personnel, in an orderly manner using all available resources, from an affected to a lower-risk area. When complete, installations will coordinate with local jurisdictions.

Conclusion

September 11th was a defining moment in all of our lives. For the Military District of Washington it clearly brought a heightened sense of realism to everything we do and underscored our critical role in emergency response scenarios. The requirement to have Army forces in the NCR able to work effectively with federal and local agencies and our sister services, to protect our way of life, and respond to disasters, man-made or otherwise, is vital to the health and security of everyone who lives in the region.

The attack last year is evidence of a new world, with new dangers. The threats to our country are going to be much different than they were in the past, and, to meet those threats, our solutions must be different, imaginative, and ever more effective.

Future strategies will be about building the best team, leveraging joint and interagency relationships, and developing and deploying state-of-the-art technology to our greatest advantage to tear down walls between groups that must work together in a crisis.

From our perspective, emergency preparedness here in the District of Columbia and within the Military District of Washington has truly never been better. But the Army evolves because of the lessons it learns and we will continue to make improvements for the future.

Subject to your questions, that concludes my statement. Thank you for the opportunity to present these remarks here today.

MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
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5401 Rue Saint Lo Drive
REISTERSTOWN, MARYLAND 21136

QUESTIONS FOR HEARING ON NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS

How is the level of preparedness being assessed? To what extent does this assessment differ (ing) on a regional and local basis?

Maryland assesses its readiness by using FEMA's Capabilities Assessment for Readiness or CAR. There is no difference regionally although all states will transition into EMAP. Local jurisdictions are not required to do either CAR or EMAP and use exercises to assess their preparedness.

What are the goals of your emergency preparedness plans and what primary risks and vulnerabilities do the respond to.

Maryland's Emergency Operations Plan is intended to minimize the consequences of any disaster or emergency situation in which there is a need for state assistance. The plan is written in the context of an "All-Hazards" response. While flooding, regardless of cause, is our primary natural hazard, weapons of mass destruction is a primary man-made or technological risk.

What standards are applicable for an assessment of readiness?

NFPA 1600, the CAR and EMAP are the standards with 13 specific Emergency Management Functions. The CAR process is a self assessment from which weaknesses are identified, corrective actions are prioritized and work plans prepared. The work plans are the basis for the federal Emergency Management Performance Grant Program. The EMAP is an external assessment and has evolved into a more objective tool than the CAR.

Does your organization endorse and participate either in EMAP or some other form of assessment exercise?

We endorse the concept of EMAP. Currently, there are no accredited states under that program. Maryland intends to participate in the EMAP in 2003 as a baseline.

What is the feasibility of national standards as a benchmark for preparedness and to be used as a guide for assessing preparedness, purchasing equipment, and evaluating training and exercises?

There are already plenty of national standards for preparedness to include FEMA exercises and evaluation standards that are used to evaluate Maryland's readiness for CSEPP and REP (Calvert Cliffs and Peach Bottom nuclear power stations). Maryland was recognized by GAO in August 2001 as one of three states fully prepared to respond to an incident involving the chemical weapons stockpile. The NFPA 1600 and corresponding CAR and EMAP provide preparedness assessments. A national standard for purchasing equipment is much harder to define given the diverse make-up of communities, regions and states in our nation.

MEMA SEOC PIO

Would you please explain the scope of the task force (FEMA National Capital Region 2002) and how it differs from other entities set up for the area? When was the task force created? Where did it receive its mandate? Is the business community part of its membership? If not, why not? Why wasn't the business community given notification to alert them of this endeavor or asked to participate?

I am not aware of such a FEMA task force. If this question refers to the Emergency Response Team for the National Capital Region, the team is comprised of those federal organizations identified in the Federal Response Plan to support the region. It is wholly inappropriate for the business community to be involved.

Do you believe that the typical business owner knows what to do in the event or an emergency or what actions to take when a color (we are now at code condition orange) code alert activity level under the Homeland Security Advisory System is announced?

The District Emergency Preparedness Guide outlines procedures. It is an oversimplification to think that an alert change requires a specific business response.

Has the business community been adequately involved in the development and implementation of the various emergency preparedness and communications plans?

In Maryland, the business community has been involved in emergency planning, especially the utilities. Representatives from the Maryland Department of Business and Economic development and the utilities also have seats in the SEOC, and are involved in ESF#5(Information and Planning). Maryland EM officials have met with MD Chamber of Commerce leadership to devise templates for emergency plans for their 60 member chapters. There is a need for closer cooperation with the private sector.

At the Subcommittee's November 2001 hearing on emergency preparedness, FEMA indicated that it is preparing a federal contingency plan and response team devoted to the National Capital Region. What is the status of those two efforts?

The question should be referred to FEMA.

Is there a network of hospitals in the National Capital region that is prepared to handle an outbreak of an infectious disease? Is there a plan how patients would be quarantined?

Yes. Quarantines depend upon statutory authority, which are enacted by the Maryland legislature.

Have there been any tests of your emergency plans? Have those tests been primarily tabletop exercises?

Yes. Maryland conducted a full exercise of its emergency plans involving the Chemical Stockpile at Aberdeen Proving Ground on August 7, 2002, the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant on September 8, 2002 and will conduct a full exercise in conjunction with Pennsylvania of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station on November 19, 2002. Maryland has coordinated several full exercises in its local jurisdictions including the Mass Casualty Exercise in Baltimore on July 13, 2002, the Montgomery

County Bio-terrorism exercise on September 25 and another full scale mass-casualty exercise is scheduled in the Baltimore Metropolitan Area on October 19, 2002. We have conducted several table top exercises, including a nuclear weapon of mass destruction scenario in December 2001, a hurricane exercise in July, 2002 and a severe winter storm exercise is scheduled in December 2002. National Capital Region exercises have been primarily tabletop, but need to expand to functional and full-scale across jurisdictional lines

COORDINATION

Do you support Senator Sarbanes' amendment to the Home Defense Bill to establish in the Department of Homeland Defense an office devoted to the intergovernmental coordination of emergency preparedness activities in the National Capital region?

We support the concept of a focused means of intergovernmental coordination of emergency preparedness activities in the NCR, particularly the Federal piece. The amendment identified one option for doing so. However coordination is achieved, it must recognize local and state command structures.

Maryland, Virginia and DC are signatories to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). What is the status of efforts to implement EMAC and what are the impediments to its implementation? How is it contemplated that counties will function under EMAC? Will the counties in your state develop a memorandum of agreement with the state to implement EMAC? What is COG's role under EMAC?

Maryland has never had to request assistance, but has provided resources to other states under EMAC on five occasions since becoming a signatory in 1996. There is no need for a separate agreement with Maryland's counties under EMAC. The way it works is that a needing states identifies the resources it needs, the sending state canvasses its counties to determine if the resources are available. Counties within the sending state know that they will be reimbursed by the needing state under the terms of the compact. Maryland passed legislation in the last session of its General Assembly to establish intrastate mutual aid better known as Maryland Emergency Management Assistance Compact (MEMAC). This enabling legislation became law on June 1, 2002. Counties desiring membership in this intrastate compact need only pass a local resolution by their elected body. The MEMAC at the state level mirrors the EMAC at the national level. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments has no role in EMAC as they are not a government entity, have no organic resources, and are not a signatory, nor would they be eligible.

How are various emergency plans, particularly at the different governmental levels, aligned to ensure continuity and seamlessness to the public?

In Maryland, the State Emergency Management Agency, which prepares the State Emergency Operations Plan, receives and reviews plans from all 25 of its local emergency management jurisdictions (23 counties, Baltimore City and Ocean City). The state and local jurisdiction plans follow the Federal Response Plan. The lower the level of government, the more specific those plans are in detail regarding the response and recovery. Maryland, Virginia and DC coordinate their plans.

MEMA SEOC PIO

How are transportation and land-use plans being affected by the security and evacuation considerations? Are we designing roads and street transportation systems with the end of moving great numbers of people in an emergency?

No knowledge of this area.

MEMA SEOC PIO

September 20, 2002 – Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital
Hearing Question Submitted by Tom Davis

As Northern Virginia Transportation Alliance noted on Wednesday in Testimony before the National Capital region Transportation Planning Board,"...in technology, COG's plan is devoid of substantial recommendations regarding the fundamental issue of lack of system capacity and reliability." The question for today's panel is: why is there not yet a list of key infrastructure improvements necessary to respond to future disasters?

Recommendations to address the lack of transportation system capacity are beyond the scope of a regional coordination plan. There is a need to address these infrastructure improvement issues, probably through the NCR Transportation Planning Board with participation by the Northern Virginia Transportation Alliance and other key partners.

Questions for the Record – FEMA
House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
Hearing on Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital
September 20, 2002

Preparedness

1. What are the goals of your emergency preparedness plans and what primary risks and vulnerabilities do they respond to?

Answer: The goal of the "National Capital Region Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Contingency Plan" is to provide a baseline for the Federal consequence management response. This plan supplements the Federal Response Plan and identifies federal resources to support the combined efforts of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland to respond to a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) event in the National Capital Region (NCR). FEMA is already participating in exercises within the NCR area that utilize different scenarios designed to assess risk and identify vulnerabilities—part of an effort to ensure joint coordinated actions and procedures between Federal and State partners.

2. What standards are applicable for an assessment of readiness?

Answer: Within an emergency management context, three principal standards exist against which emergency management capability can be assessed. Those three standards are: the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs 2000 Edition; the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Standard, which is based and expands upon the NFPA 1600; and the family of Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR) self-assessment instruments. All of these standards are voluntary and, to some extent, complimentary.

3. The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is a voluntary review process for state and local emergency management programs. Under EMAP, emergency organizations are evaluated against national standards. Does your organization endorse and participate either in EMAP or some other form of assessment exercise of your emergency plan?

Answer: FEMA is one of three organizational partners on, and contributing funding toward, the EMAP Commission; the other two are the National Emergency Management Association (an organization representing state-level emergency management) and the International Association of Emergency Managers (an organization representing local-level emergency management). Within the context of a National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assessment Program, FEMA is exploring the feasibility

of using the EMAP Standard and assessment process to obtain a credible capability profile of all state emergency management programs.

4. What is the feasibility of national standards as a benchmark for preparedness and to be used as a guide for assessing preparedness, purchasing equipment, and evaluating training and exercises?

Answer: FEMA is exploring the feasibility of using the EMAP Standard and assessment process to obtain a credible capability profile of all state emergency management programs. In addition, FEMA is currently conducting an inventory of emergency management standards and guidelines that will be analyzed to determine if they are appropriate for responding to all hazards, to include acts of terrorism. It is envisioned that once this analysis is completed, there will be a set of national guidelines that will be used as a guide for planning, training, exercises, and equipment elements of the first responder initiative.

5. Would you support an independent peer assessment of the region's readiness to respond to a terrorist attack?

Answer: We would support any assessment activity that is qualified, comprehensive, and which produces an accurate and complete analysis of readiness capability. FEMA recognizes the value of peer assessments, and is currently planning to use the peer-based Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) process to initiate baseline assessments of all states and territories, as well as the District of Columbia.

6. Mr. Vradenburg testified to the cooperation between business entities and Montgomery County as partners in the early stages of emergency planning, and its effectiveness. How can we institutionalize this business partnership in our region? I would like FEMA to report back to the Subcommittee by October 10th on how this approach is being incorporated in the regional federal contingency plans.

Answer: FEMA encourages the proactive involvement of State and local emergency preparedness efforts within the business community. Preparedness and response at the State and local level requires partnering and joint planning with the business community and their continuity of business planning efforts. The "National Capital Region Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Contingency Plan" supports the combined planning efforts of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland.

Within the National Capital Region (NCR), plans are designed to address all aspects of community preparedness. Direct interface with the business community in the NCR is a State and local responsibility. The community planning effort within the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland includes direct involvement of representatives of the businesses and university communities. They are partners in developing planning for response to WMD events in the NCR. Within the District of Columbia alone, over 200 businesses, 11 colleges and universities, numerous school officials and community leaders have been involved in outreach and training

efforts in support of a business, industry and government partnership to enhance preparedness.

7. It has been brought to the attention of the Subcommittee that FEMA has created the "National Capital Region 2002," a task force to coordinate emergency preparedness. Would you please explain the scope of the task force and how it differs from other entities set up for this area? When was the task force created? Where did it receive its mandate? Is the business community part of its membership? If not, why not? Why wasn't the business community given notification to alert them of this endeavor or asked to participate?

Answer: The Washington Metropolitan Area Council of Governments (MWCOG) established a Homeland Security Task Force in September 2001 (in which the business community is involved) to improve coordination in preparing for and responding to a WMD event. Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, many threats were viewed as localized with reduced emphasis on inter-jurisdiction coordination. MWCOG is working on a Regional Emergency Coordination Plan for coordination of regional response to WMD events and developed a Regional Incident Communications and Coordination System (RICCS) to fill a gap in interagency communications exposed on September 11, 2001. RICCS facilitates communication about regional incidents/events so decision makers can respond in a coordinated manner. The task force has also initiated development of a "Regional Emergency Support Emergency Evacuation Annex – DRAFT" for inclusion in the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP). FEMA created the National Capital Response Team, an interagency team under the auspices of the Federal Response Plan, to support the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the State of Maryland for response to any type of Weapons of Mass Destruction event. The Greater Washington Board of Trade, Potomac Business Council is a member of the Task Force. The Potomac Business Council represents the regional business community as a member of the MWCOG Homeland Security Task Force on emergency management and homeland security issues.

8. n/a

9. n/a

10. At the Subcommittee's November 2001 hearing on emergency preparedness, FEMA indicated that it was preparing a federal contingency plan and response team devoted to the National Capital Region. What is the status of those two efforts?

Answer: Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, FEMA established a specific emergency response team for the National Capital Region (NCR). In order to shorten response time, FEMA put together a specially constituted team comprised of FEMA and other key agency personnel who live and work primarily within the D.C. Metropolitan area. The NCR team developed the "National Capital Region Weapons of Mass

Destruction Incident Contingency Plan," that supplements the Federal Response Plan if an emergency, major or catastrophic disaster occurs within the National Capital Region. The plan coordinates federal efforts to support the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the State of Maryland in their combined response to any type of WMD event.

The plan builds on the existing plans of the local jurisdictions by filling in the blanks on operational details that are often situation dependent. For example, the plan identifies initial and surge staffing, an initial operating facility, and pre-positioned resources in the area, including communications equipment. We are continually updating and refining the plan to make certain it interfaces with and supports State and local planning efforts. Consequently, we are meeting with our Federal agency partners, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland in mid-October to review and refine our planning efforts.

11. n/a

12. Has there been any tests of your emergency plans? Have those tests been primarily tabletop exercises?

Answer: FEMA's emergency plans have been tested on a number of occasions, including using tabletop exercises with the joint involvement of our federal partners, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland. For example, on March 12-13, 2002, FEMA, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers hosted a terrorism exercise that tested the effectiveness of responding to a terrorist threat. In May 2002, a biological terrorism exercise included medical personnel from hospitals within the District and surrounding areas, and representatives from the Centers for Disease Control and FEMA. In September, an exercise involving a chemical attack scenario was conducted to focus on the coordinated response of the District of Columbia, Federal and regional resources to such an event within the nation's capital. Participants included representatives from the District of Columbia, Virginia, Maryland and several federal agencies including FEMA, FBI, and the Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force.

Coordination

13. n/a

14. How are the various emergency plans, particularly at the different government levels, aligned to ensure continuity and seamlessness to the public?

Answer: The operations of the Federal, State and local government in disaster response are mutually supportive and the result of coordinated teamwork. FEMA works with the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland to encourage development of comprehensive disaster preparedness and assistance plans, programs, capabilities, and organizations. We recognize that the first level of preparedness and response efforts is at the local level—community efforts to protect

citizens, business and local government. The second level of preparedness and response efforts is at the State level under the leadership of the Governor. State and local preparedness and response planning is mutually supportive and synergistic.

The Federal Response Plan (FRP) establishes the basis for the provision of Federal Assistance and support to a State and its affected local governments for events that exceed their combined capabilities. The FRP supports State and local efforts to conduct the emergency operations necessary to save lives and protect property. State and local officials maintain control, while federal resources support their response efforts.

FEMA has been involved with numerous tabletop exercises (that included WMD events) with the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the State of Maryland for the purpose of training and exercising staff, and evaluating existing plans and procedures. FEMA's Region III staff supported the District and the States in these efforts. Changes were incorporated into existing plans and procedures based upon the lessons learned from the exercises and actual disaster events.

15. How are our transportation and land-use plans being affected by the security and evacuation considerations? Are we designing our road and street and transportation systems with the end of moving great numbers of people in an emergency?

Answer: FEMA and other federal partners are working with the Metropolitan Washington Area Council of Governments in developing the Regional Emergency Support Evacuation Annex. The Annex addresses emergency transportation issues such as the movement of people out of the regional area, and the movement of required resources into an affected area (in anticipation of, and following an incident requiring large-scale evacuation). FEMA defers to the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the State of Maryland for discussions that involve transportation and land-use planning issues, as they are responsible for road and street transportation system design and land-use planning decisions.

Funding the Fight Against Terrorism

16. n/a

17. n/a

18. n/a

19. n/a

20. n/a

21. n/a

22. n/a

23. n/a

24. n/a

25. n/a

26. Does your organization plan to be a signatory to a memorandum of understanding with the Council of Governments for the maintenance and utilization for its Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) and Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS)?

Answer: FEMA is reviewing the regional emergency coordination plan and the accompanying memorandum of understanding to determine the applicability of the plan in relation to existing plans. At this time, no decision has been made regarding the memorandum of understanding.

FEMA does, however, participate in the RICCS.

27. n/a

Communications

28. n/a

29. n/a

30. n/a

31. n/a

32. When you visit the Outer Banks or the Maryland Eastern Shore, you will notice that there are signs posted on various routes that they are emergency evacuation routes in the event of a hurricane. Does this National Capital Region have an evacuation plan that informs employees, workers, and visitors what routes should be used in the event of an announced evacuation, where they should go, what they should do, and how they should get there?

Answer: Evacuation planning is a State and local responsibility including the marking of evacuation routes. Therefore, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland are responsible for designating and marking emergency evacuation routes. These entities have conducted numerous planning meetings, identified appropriate routes, and developed signage for evacuation routes. These efforts are reflected in the Washington Area Emergency Evacuation Annex developed by the Metropolitan Washington Area Council of Governments (MWCOG) to coordinate

evacuation, shelter and response efforts across functional and jurisdictional lines. This is a continuing effort that will require continual education of the total community.

Additionally, FEMA, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the General Services Administration (GSA) developed procedures for the release of federal employees, in conjunction with the affected State and local jurisdictions. This provides coordination to the greatest extent possible with those federal agencies that may have transportation contingency plans and national security plans.

33. On 9-11, the emergency broadcast system was never activated. Is there a plan that identifies what officer of the local, State, or federal governments will activate the system and under what circumstances?

Answer: The Federal Communications Commission replaced the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) with the Emergency Alert System (EAS) in 1994. The EAS allows the President to address the American people in the event of a national emergency and the system was operable on September 11, 2001. However, the President's ability to address the American people that morning through normal media channels negated the need to activate the EAS.

EAS alerts and messages originate from (1) the President or (2) State and local governments, in concert with the broadcast industry. The activation of the EAS system for non-Presidential emergencies is, however, strictly voluntary on the part of broadcasters. FEMA provides guidance to emergency planning officials on the procedures for activating the system (including who can activate the system) in the following two guidance documents: "Emergency Alert System," CPG 1-40, FEMA, and "Emergency Alert System: A Program Guide for State and Local Governments," CPG 1-41, FEMA.

34. n/a

35. n/a

36. n/a

37. n/a

Public Health

38. n/a

39. Is surge capacity a problem in local hospitals within the National Capital Region? Are regions developing partnerships with other entities for assistance in case of such an occurrence (such as VA hospitals, universities, public schools, private sector, etc...)? What is being done to solve this problem?

Answer: The issue of surge capacity in local hospitals in the National Capital Region is being addressed aggressively in a number of forums. The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), headed by the Department of Health and Human Services, maintains an inventory of hospital surge capacity incorporating resources of the private sector as well as Federal facilities. NDMS also supports a Federal Coordinating Center system for coordination of hospital facilities. In the National Capital Region, the issue of surge capacity has been addressed through the Metropolitan Washington Area Council of Governments (MWCOG) Bioterrorism Task Force and Health Working Group. The Bioterrorism Task Force brings together a broad-based coalition including leaders in public health, hospitals, the medical community, public safety and emergency management to address all of the issues relating to detecting and responding to a bioterrorism attack on the National Capital Region. Similar partnerships between emergency management and public health and the private medical community are being forged at the local and regional levels in other parts of the country. FEMA is working very closely with HHS to assist State and local governments in meeting health and medical needs which result from an emergency or major disaster by participating as a member of the HHS Senior Policy Group, which is working to determine the policy and goals for the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).

40. What is the federal government doing to effectively integrate public health officials in the regional fight against bioterrorism?

Answer: Public Health is an important component of the Federal Response Plan and also of state and local emergency operations planning. Emergency Support Function #8 is designed to address issues of public health. During the past year a number of efforts have been started to strengthen the role and participation of Public Health professionals and the private medical community in the planning progress. The bioterrorism planning efforts in the National Capital Region provide an excellent example of the integration of the public health sector in the emergency planning process. This planning includes addressing issues of medical surveillance, deployment and reception of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, communications and other vital issues. The Department of Health and Human Services, which includes the Centers for Diseases Control, is providing leadership in this area and is best positioned to describe the details of the federal efforts.

41. n/a

Congressman Tom Davis's Question, n/a

METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS

Local governments working together for a better metropolitan region

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College Park
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Falls Church
Loudoun County
Prince William County

October 11, 2002

Ms. Shalley Kim
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
B 349C Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Ms. Kim,

In your letter of September 30, 2002, you forwarded a question submitted by Congressman Tom Davis:

> As the Northern Virginia Transportation Alliance noted on Wednesday in Testimony before the National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board, "...in focusing almost exclusively on chains of command, procedures, playbooks and technology, COG's plan is devoid of substantial recommendations regarding the fundamental issue of lack of system capacity and reliability." The question for today's panel is: why is there not yet a list of key infrastructure improvements necessary to respond to future disasters?

The plan referred to in the question is the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP), developed under the auspices of the ad hoc Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Task Force of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG), and approved by the COG Board of Directors on September 11, 2002. The full text of the RECP is available at www.mwcog.org on the Internet. The RECP is designed to assist COG's member jurisdictions by providing a framework and organizational system for coordination and communication. The plan establishes the means with which to communicate, as well as procedures and common terminologies to allow the fullest and most productive level of coordination among local jurisdictions, state agencies, and the federal government.

Transportation issues were addressed in the RECP's Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF #1), as well as in an Emergency Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex (appendix). In developing these transportation components, as was the case for the overall RECP, the focus was on the operations and procedures undertaken by the region's transportation agencies in response to emergencies which might occur in the near future, and ways those operations and procedures could be better coordinated. Long-term issues, such as transportation system capacity increases, were not in the purview or discussions of the stakeholders convened for those discussions. The focus remained on actions that could be achieved within time frames and budgets significantly less than would be required for transportation system capacity increases.

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Ms. Shalley Kim
October 11, 2002

Thank you for the opportunity to respond.

Sincerely yours,

Bruce R. Williams
Chairman
Board of Directors
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Questions for Hearing on National Capital Region Terrorism Preparedness

Responses by the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
November 2002

Preparedness

What are the goals of your emergency preparedness plans and what primary risks and vulnerabilities do they respond to?

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) is the regional association of local governments in the National Capital Region. COG has a long history of coordination and planning activities on public safety, health and human services, transportation and environmental issues. Immediately following the attacks of September 2001, COG established a Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for the National Capital Region. In September 2002, the COG Board adopted the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP), which was developed by the Task Force with input from a wide range of public and private sector stakeholders. The purpose of the RECP is to provide a structure through which the National Capital Region can collaborate on planning, communication, information sharing and coordination activities before, during and after a regional emergency. The scope of the Plan is deliberately broad, intended to include the activities and capabilities of all organizations, government and business that might have a role in anticipating or responding to major threats or hazards in the National Capital Region.

What standards are applicable for an assessment of readiness?

COG's completed a Capability Assessment for Readiness survey and report in July 2002. The purpose of the survey and study was to assess jurisdiction-level emergency management capabilities. The report analyzes the results of recently completed assessments by cities and counties of their capabilities and readiness. The report also identifies areas needing improvement based on what jurisdictions indicated in their self-assessments.

The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is a voluntary review process for state and local emergency management programs. Under EMAP, emergency organizations are evaluated against national standards. Does your organization endorse and participate either in EMAP or some other form of assessment exercise of your emergency plan?

COG is not an emergency management organization, but rather an affiliation of organizations among which public safety and emergency management agencies and departments of federal, state and local government meet to coordinate existing plans, training and exercising. Each entity affiliated with COG may or may not be utilizing EMAP, NFIP or other existing accreditation standards.

What is the feasibility of national standards as a benchmark for preparedness and to be used as a guide for assessing preparedness, purchasing equipment, and evaluating training and exercises?

Extremely feasible if the standards are clearly outcome based and measurable and are developed by peer as well as non-peer groups within the same function and regional area.

Would you support an independent peer assessment of the region's readiness to respond to a terrorist attack?

Yes, COG would welcome the opportunity to sponsor and/or participate in an independent assessment of readiness in the National Capital Region.

Do you believe that the typical business owner knows what to do in the event of an emergency or what actions to take when a color (we are now at code condition orange) code alert activity level under the Homeland Security Advisory system is announced?

COG has partnered with the Greater Washington Board of Trade to begin to address business and community preparation and business continuity and economic recovery issues. As part of COG Regional Emergency Coordination Plan effort, COG proposes to develop a business continuity annex and economic recovery annex.

Has the business community been adequately involved in the development and implementation of the various emergency preparedness and communication plans?

The Greater Washington Board of Trade/Potomac Conference is a member of COG's Homeland Security Task Force and has been very active in all planning and coordination activities. COG is working with the Board of Trade to include it as well as other critical businesses in COG's Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS), which were developed by COG as part of the RECP to facilitate real-time communication among decision-makers to improve communication, coordination and response in the event of a regional emergency or incident. In addition, the Board of Trade/Potomac Conference and other business interests, e.g. utilities, educational institutions, communications firms, etc. have been involved in COG's planning activities, as well as testing and table-top exercises of the RECP and RICCS.

At the Subcommittee's November 2001 hearing on emergency preparedness, FEMA indicated that it was preparing a federal contingency plan and response team devoted to the National Capital Region. What is the status of those two efforts?

COG and FEMA have worked very closely to ensure collaboration on their respective planning efforts. FEMA and other key federal agencies, such as the Office of Homeland Security, have been active members of COG's Homeland Security Task Force. COG's Regional Emergency Coordination Plan was developed to complement the Federal Response Plan. COG hosted a workshop in June 2002 to familiarize key federal agency stakeholders with the concepts and elements of the RECP to foster collaboration. Also, COG's RECP follows the federal approach using Emergency Support Functions, to organize areas of assistance and support.

On October 16-18, 2002, FEMA convened the National Capital Region response team to discuss the status of team efforts, review the Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Contingency Plan, and receive a status briefing from COG and the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia emergency management agencies.

Is there a network of hospital in the National Capital Region that is prepared to handle an outbreak of an infectious disease? Is there a plan how patients would be quarantined?

Prior to the events of September 2001, COG established a regional Task Force on Bio-Terrorism and developed Planning Guidance for the Health System Response to a Bioevent in the National Capital Region. The Task Force is chaired by Robert Malson, executive director of the DC Hospital Association and includes public and private sector health agency representatives. Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #8, Health, Mental Health and Medical Services also identifies key health stakeholders and concepts of coordination in the event of a bio-event or outbreak of infection disease. Further, COG prepared a study, Regional Surveillance in the Washington Metropolitan Area: A Feasibility Study, in collaboration with Rand Corp. to examine issues and recommendations associated with establishing a disease surveillance effort in the National Capital Region.

Has there been any tests of the your emergency plans? Have those tests been primarily tabletop exercises?

COG sponsored the first regional tabletop exercise of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan on October 29 and 30, 2002. More than 400 local, state and federal government stakeholders and representatives of the private and non-profit sectors participated in the two-day exercise, which used an escalating series of emergencies and incident scenarios to test the communication, collaboration and response elements of the RECP.

Coordination

The State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the District of Columbia are signatories to Emergency Assistance Compact (EMAC). What is the status of efforts to implement EMAC and what are the impediments to its implementation? How is it contemplated that counties will function under EMAC? Will the counties in your state develop a memorandum of agreement with the state to implement EMAC? What is COG's role under EMAC?

EMAC, as designed, will serve as an excellent State-to-State tool, in the National Capital Region in the event of a disaster occurring having the magnitude and nature as described under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121-5204c however many critical potential incidents within the NCR that could effect life, safety or national security would not qualify under the definition of the Stafford Act or would not have enough time to wait a State-to-State request in-order to effectively coordinate a regional response of intra and inter-state jurisdictions comprising the NCR. COG is currently evaluating the feasibility of a regional version of EMAC. This initiative will require input from the attorneys of the 18 inter-state jurisdictions that represent of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Government membership as well as the federal, state and local governments and emergency management agencies. Under this initiative COG would play the same role that states did in facilitating the formation of EMAC for the National Emergency Management Association.

How are the various emergency plans, particularly at the different governmental levels, aligned to ensure continuity and seamlessness to the public?

COG's Regional Emergency Coordination Plan was developed to be consistent with the Federal Response Plan and the state and local government response plans in the National Capital Region. By mirroring the Federal and District of Columbia plans in its use of Emergency Support Functions as an organizing principle for the Plan, COG helped to ensure that the regional coordination plan was consistent with federal, state and local operational or response plans. COG's June 6 and 7, 2002 familiarization workshop provided a forum where federal, state and local emergency response plans were discussed and shared.

How are our transportation and land-use plans being affected by the security and evacuation considerations? Are we designing our road and street and transportation systems with the end of moving great numbers of people in an emergency?

Historically, a number of the region's roadways, including the Interstate Highways, the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, and the Suitland Parkway, were constructed in part to serve potential military and civil defense purposes. In recent years, due in large part to severe budget limitations and sometime strong local opposition, little new highway capacity has been added. Therefore, the emphasis has been on improving the management and operations of the region's transportation systems, often through the use of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) technologies. Such management technologies or activities useful in emergency situations include sophisticated, adjustable traffic signal systems; cameras and other surveillance equipment; deployment of specialized transportation management field personnel; improved personnel communications systems; and satellite-tracked automated vehicle location systems for transit buses or other public vehicles. Additionally, major transportation agencies, such as the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Montgomery and Prince George's Counties, and the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia Departments of Transportation, are improving their management control centers, with the latest equipment and training. The goal for these improvements is to improve abilities to provide up-to-the-minute information to emergency management personnel, the media, and the public, ensuring that accurate transportation information will be a part of the messages regional leaders publicize in emergencies.

Funding the Fight Against Terrorism

How much funding has the Washington region received from the federal government for the fight against terrorism?

COG, collaboration with its member local governments, compiled an estimate of new federal funding targeted to local and state governments and other regional entities, such as the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, as well as COG, in January 2002, in conjunction with the FY 2002 supplemental appropriations legislation. COG estimated the region received in excess of $300 million for a wide range of emergency preparedness and response efforts, as well as new equipment purchases.

What is the governing regional strategy, if one exists, for use of those funds? If a regional strategy for the use of funds in the war against terrorism does not exist, why? And, are there plans to develop such a strategy?

COG sought to target its resources to tasks that were primarily regional in focused and therefore would not ordinarily have been sponsored or supported by federal, state or local government agencies. COG was responsible for developing a regional coordination plan that did not usurp the roles and responsibilities of operating agencies or first responders, but instead ensured that all stakeholder decisions were made in a regional context in which operating agencies and/or responders had real time access to information and an enhanced decision-making process. The Regional Emergency Coordination Plan and the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System are the key outcomes of COG's regional efforts.

How were the federal funds allocated and used by local entities?

COG received $5.0 million in federal funds. Tasks included: 1) REGIONAL EMERGENCY PLAN - develop, review and adopt a comprehensive regional emergency coordination plan; 2) INFRASTRUCTURE THREAT ASSESSMENT – develop a GIS-based critical infrastructure threat assessment tool; 3) COMMUNCATIONS – develop and implement a regional emergency communications plan to coordinate the response and public information during emergencies; and 4) TRAINING AND OUTREACH – conduct training and exercise the regional emergency plan and conduct outreach program to ensure broad understanding of regional preparedness and response plans. COG's work to date has addressed each of four task areas.

COG has not compiled a comprehensive assessment of the use of federal funds by local and state governments and other organizations in the National Capital Region.

What were the principal differences in the use of these funds by local entities?

Based on information provided by COG's member local governments, many local governments used federal funds to enhance and upgrade emergency response equipment, especially communications equipment.

To what extent have federal funds for terrorism prevention and response been used for routine purchases and activities, such as purchase of fire trucks and overtime costs for first responders?

COG is not able to respond to this question, which is more properly directed to individual state and local governments.

How can we ensure that federal funds do not supplant state and local funds?

Federal funds to COG certainly did not supplant state or local funds, as the funds were specifically targeted to perform new roles and functions arising from an inclusive planning and needs analysis process. COG anticipates that ongoing federal or other funding sources will be needed to maintain and periodically test, evaluate and update the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan and the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System.

What are the outstanding funding needs for the region in the fight against terrorism?

COG requires dedicated funding or a sub-allocation of federal funds to state emergency management agencies in the District of Columbia, State of Maryland and Commonwealth of Virginia to continue to test, exercise and refine the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan and

maintain and staff the Regional Incident Communications and Coordination System used for emergency and incident notification and conference calls among decision-makers. Without sustained funding, it will be difficult to continue to provide this regional service and support to the federal government and state and local governments first responders and other private and public sector stakeholders, such as the Red Cross and businesses in the National Capital Region. Additional federal investments in the health infrastructure are also needed in the National Capital Region, for example, the ability to respond with medical services, such as inoculations and to do surveillance. COG believes enhanced regional collaboration and coordination in necessary on health and medical services, as well as emergency response and public safety activities.

What have we achieved, or do we expect to achieve, with the funds provided to date?

Prior to the attacks of September 2001, the region did not have a regional plan for communication and coordination on emergencies and incidents. The Regional Emergency Coordination Plan and the Regional Incident Communications and Coordination System are now in place and have been used to improve collaboration, communication and decision-making in response to several small-scale emergencies and incidents. The use of the RECP and RICCS has proven to be excellent training that will enhance preparedness and coordination in the event of a larger, weapon of mass destruction incident or emergency. In addition, COG's recent Regional Leaders Seminar, a tabletop exercise of the RECP demonstrated the value of this plan and the relationships that have been forged in the planning process.

Are federal terrorism prevention funds targeted exclusively for terrorism related activities or are the funds being used to develop an all-hazards approach to natural and man-made disasters and emergencies?

COG's activities have generally focused on an all hazards approach to emergency planning and coordination. For example, the RICCS communications system was used extensively to communicate between and among local government managers, police chiefs and school superintendents in sharing information and coordinating the response to the recent series of sniper shootings in the National Capital Region.

What is the impact on emergency preparedness in not receiving the $44 million in the FY 2002 Supplemental for Further Recovery from Terrorist Attacks?

Approximately $1.7 million of these funds were sought by COG to maintain technical support for the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System and continue to enhance communications and communications interoperability. The failure to receive requested funds jeopardizes the continuation of these successful new initiatives.

Does your organization plan to be a signatory to a memorandum of understanding with the Council of Governments for the maintenance and utilization for its Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) and Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS)?

COG is the sponsor of the RECP and RICCS. A memorandum of understanding pertaining to the RECP and RICCS has been adopted by the COG Board and is currently being submitted to

area local governments, key federal and state agencies and other private and non-profit organizations for signature.

Concerns have been raised that federal resources allocated to area jurisdictions were not ultimately devoted to the greatest public safety risks and vulnerabilities. Do you share this assessment?

COG believes that funds allocated to local and state governments in the National Capital Region were put to good use.

Communications

Fire fighters, rescue workers and police were hampered in their efforts in September because they encountered difficulties in being able to communicate on the same radio channel or frequency. Why was such a basic communication problem not previously resolved?

COG is currently implementing a Department of Justice funded radio communications interoperability initiative entitled Public Safety Wireless Interoperability Network (PSWIN). This program is currently being signed by the member jurisdictions as an addendum to the police and fire mutual aid plans and is referred to as the Metropolitan Interoperability Radio System, MIRS. Although it could have been used at the time of September 11, 2001 to connect federal responders with local members, the system was not fully tasted and exercised throughout the NCR. Through COG owned 800 MgHZ radio frequencies, and the Police and Fire Mutual Aid Radio System, many local jurisdictions did have communication connectivity. The inability to communicate was primarily between the Federal Response agencies and the COG member jurisdictions. This should be alleviated by the full implementation of MIRS and COG's goal of purchasing a cache of regional 800 MgHZ radios, which can be distributed to regional federal partners.

What has been done to ensure that the public health sector is receiving timely and accurate information from the federal government and local emergency responders?

Local, state and federal public health officials and departmental medical offices and private medical services providers are participants in the RICCS. Federal agencies, including HHS, FEMA, and Department of Defense are represented on the COG Health Work Group and participated in development of R-ESFs 6 (mass care), 8 (health, mental health and medical services), 11 (food), and 15 (volunteer and donation management). The COG Health Officials Committee and Bio-Terrorism Task Force members are working with HHS Assistant Secretary Jerome Hauer and representatives of many federal agencies to develop standard information channels between federal medical offices and local public health officials. All local emergency operations centers include local health officials.

In 1999, the Capitol Wireless Integrated Network (CapWin) project began in response to a growing need for an integrated transportation and criminal justice information network in the

Washington, D. C. metropolitan region. What is the status of this project? What has it accomplished? What do you anticipate it will accomplish in the next year?

CapWin completed a one-year Strategic Planning Initiative in 2001. Outcomes of the strategic plan have been the creation of an ad hoc executive group, operational working group and technical working group. A partnership has been developed with Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN) and NIJ, including coordination of related communication activities.

In January 2002, CapWin received funding from the U.S. Congress. June 2002, CapWIN crafte and established initial agreements for connectivity and access with the Control Terminal Office of Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia. As a member of the Executive Board, COC anticipates in the next year for CapWin to move from strategy to implementation with full operational deployment.

What are the primary security vulnerabilities associated with wireless communication and how will these vulnerabilities be reduced? Are the emergency services of the governments in the National Capital Region able to communicate with each other in an emergency?

COG has produced an Infrastructure Security/Vulnerability Assessment of the National Capit Region to survey the vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructure of the region and the plan initiatives and activities offered by federal, state and local governments, private industry an stakeholders to reduce or eliminate these vulnerabilities. COG identified four (4) majc categories energy, communications, water and wastewater, and transportatior We believe governmental officials in the region want to develop cooperativ actions to protect vulnerable infrastructure, minimize risk to the public insulate the regional economy, and accelerate recovery in the National Capita Region.

An assault on a single part of the system could and most probably will lead to a partial disruptic of the national grid. This likely due the convergence of Internet, data and public switche facilities that are located or transverse out region. The area governments have begun to take th necessary steps to ensure interoperability and connectivity to effectively communication in th event of an incident.

When you visit the Outer Banks or the Maryland Eastern Shore, you will notice that there are signs posted on various routes that they are emergency evacuation routes in the event of a hurricane. Does this National Capital Region have an evacuation plan that informs employees, workers, and visitors what routes should be used in the event of an announced evacuation, when they should go, what they should do, and how they should get there?

The District of Columbia has announced a set of emergency event routes. Maps of these routes are available at http://ddot.dc.gov/information/event_route.shtm on the Internet. Specialized signage has been installed on these routes in the District of Columbia as well as in surrounding suburban areas. Event routes "outbound" from downtown Washington are indicated by the "shield" for Interstate 495 (the Capital Beltway), and inbound by a sign showing a drawing of the national monuments of the Mall area. There is still a need, however, to develop an emergency evacuation plan for metropolitan Washington that includes wider geographic

coverage than the DC plan; additional detailed engineering analysis, route planning, and planning for sheltering and staging areas; development of instructions to the public on specific evacuation procedures to follow in such emergencies; and additional planning for the particular evacuation needs of workers, visitors, residents, persons in hospitals, persons in nursing homes, and other groups. Preliminary estimates are that development of such a plan by the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments or by another agency or agencies would cost on the order of $1 million, and would take about two years to complete. No funding source for this work has yet been identified.

On 9-11, the emergency broadcast system was never activated. Is there a plan that identifies what officer of the local, state, or federal governments will activate the system and under what circumstances?

A regional EAS plan currently identifies the technical aspects of activating a regional warning. However the protocols for issuing a protective action message or alerts still rest with the individual State plans and the District of Columbia's EAS plan. Additional engagement by Maryland and Virginia emergency management officials is necessary to develop a protocol for a joint inter-state alert or protective action announcement. COG's is currently taking the lead in the aftermath of 9-11 to draft and coordinate a mutual aid agreement between the directors of the respective emergency management agencies of the National Capital Region that would pave the way to develop and exercise a regionally accepted protocol for the EAS plan.

The Homeland Security Advisory System is designed to be a national alert system and is not designed to assess the level of risk for a discreet area like the National Capital Area. Is there an effort to develop a discreet alert system for the National Capital Region?

COG's member police chiefs have addressed this issue and have considered the creation of standards of response based on individual jurisdiction alert systems that would be consistent with the current color code utilized by the Homeland Security Advisory System. This would allow for individually perception of risk threat and regionally consistent standards of response to those risks. Although agreed upon in principle, this initiative is still in the conceptual stage and would require commitment of financial and personnel resources to fully develop and test.

The Federal Emergency Decision and Notification Protocol identifies a number of federal and local entities that will be contacted to provide information to inform the OPM Director, FEMA Director, and GSA Director's decision to close executive branch agencies and what agencies should be informed when the decision is made. What is the status of procedures to implement the Protocol that identifies what decision criteria will be used to make the decision, what media will be used to communicate the decision, and what time standards will apply to the various standards of the notification process?

The Federal Decision and Notification Protocol is a very significant initiative designed to insure that the actions of executive branch agencies are coordinated in the event of an emergency – such actions may include early release of employees, evacuation, or shelter in place. The protocol was shared with the region during the June 6, 2002 Familiarization Workshop hosted by COG and sponsored by federal, state and private sector organizations. Further

work is required to fully integrate the federal protocol with the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan and specifically with the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System protocol. These efforts are underway, with a COG goal of completion of the protocol by early January 2003, and testing later in 2003 during regional exercises and drills.

What efforts are we taking to ensure that the public understand what our emergency plans are and what their role and responsibilities are in implementing those plans?

COG prepared a summary document of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan designed for public distribution and available on COG's website along with numerous additional materials about regional emergency coordination and response. COG's Annual Conference will be centered on communications with the public about emergency plans and the public's role and responsibilities – this conference is scheduled for December 11, 2002. COG has also prepared a series of television programs for local public access channels describing various elements of the regional emergency coordination plan and the public's role. During the coming year, COG intends to focus on communications with the public in cooperation with the Board of Trade Potomac Conference.

Public Health

How prepared is the public health infrastructure in the National Capital region to handle a terrorist attack?

As collaborative planning has expanded it is very apparent that the public health infrastructure, which has been shrinking for many years, is inadequate to handle a serious terrorist attack. Local health departments regularly collaborate on response to disease outbreaks, such as West Nile Virus, but emergency planning and data collection efforts have dangerously stretched existing resources, and response capacity is inadequate. Most public health departments have few or no medical service providers. Resources are needed for additional surveillance and to develop mass medical treatment capacity.

Is surge capacity a problem in local hospitals within the National Capital region? Are regions developing partnerships with other entities for assistance in case of such an occurrence (such as VA hospitals, universities, public schools, private sector, etc…)? What is being done to solve this problem?

Most hospitals have staffing shortages on a daily basis. Even with staff for all beds, the surge capacity is not available for a large-scale emergency that required tens of thousands of beds. Arrangements have been made by the DC Hospital Association to house less critical patients in local hotels. Local colleges and universities have developed non-traditional nursing programs targeting career changing students in an attempt to decrease staffing shortfalls.

What is the federal government doing to effectively integrate public health officials in the regional fight against bioterrorism?

HHS Assistant Secretary Jerome Hauer is working with COG to integrate the Secretaries Command Center with the regional efforts. HHS has worked with COG to develop a regional plan for use of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. The Department of Defense has a plan to increase the number of Bio-detectors in the region in collaboration with the local health departments, and is supporting a syndromic surveillance pilot project, ESSENCE II that will provide regional data analysis.

What is the status of the Regional Bioterrorism Operational Health Response Plan?

The COG Bio-Terrorism Task Force developed a Planning Guidance for the Health System Response to a Bioevent in the National Capital Region, which was adopted by the COG Board in September 2001. The COG Health Officials have used that to develop a Bio Terrorism Operational Health Response Plan, which will be released shortly. The collaboration structure outlined in the document features four levels of response and is now in use. COG has completed a disease surveillance feasibility study, in cooperation with Rand, which recommends increases in information gathering, analysis and sharing and use of more modern technology. To implement such a system, additional resources will be needed at the regional and local levels.

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Response to questions for
Hearing on National Capital Region Terrorism Preparedness Sept. 27, 2002
Richard A. White, CEO
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Final

Hearing on Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region Preparedness

What are the goals of your emergency preparedness plans and what primary risks and vulnerabilities do they respond to?

The goals of WMATA's emergency preparedness plans are 1) preparedness, 2) prevention and mitigation and 3) response and recovery. WMATA has developed several formal documents which illustrate these goals, including a System Safety Program Plan, a System Security Program Plan, and Emergency Standard Operating Plans. The risks and vulnerabilities to which these plans respond are primarily those situations which threaten WMATA's system.

The primary risks and vulnerabilities that exist, in spite of these plans, include lack of system redundancy, lack of standard decontamination procedures, and lack of communication of the continuity of operations plan (COOP) of federal, civilian, and military agencies in the region.

What standards are applicable for an assessment of readiness?

The standards that are applicable for an assessment of readiness of the WMATA system are currently under development at the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). WMATA is working with both agencies to develop these standards.

The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is a voluntary review process for state and local emergency management programs. Under EMAP, emergency organizations are evaluated against national standards. Does your organization endorse and participate either in EMAP or some other form of assessment exercise of your emergency plan?

The EMAP applies only to state and local emergency management programs, and not to entities like WMATA, which participates in other voluntary oversight programs.

WMATA has participated in several system safety reviews. WMATA voluntarily implemented the American Public Transit Association's (APTA) standards in designing its System Safety Program. FTA adopted these

same standards, and FTA functions as one of WMATA's oversight entities. The regional Tri-state Oversight Committee (TOC) reviews WMATA's rail safety on a triennial basis. FTA reviews WMATA's system safety and security programs every 3 years.

WMATA has a history of participating in peer review panels with other transit agencies. For example, on April 20, 2000, New York City's public transit system, along with APTA representatives reviewed a WMATA exercise in emergency preparedness. WMATA also reviews other transit agencies' emergency exercises.

What is the feasibility of national standards as a benchmark for preparedness and to be used as a guide for assessing preparedness, purchasing equipment, and evaluating training and exercises?

WMATA is working with FTA and TSA to determine the feasibility of national standards as a benchmark for preparedness and as a guide for assessing preparedness, purchasing equipment, and evaluating training and exercises in the transit industry.

WMATA has coordinated with APTA to develop best practices with the Transportation Research Board (TRB). WMATA is part of APTA's Security Task Force, and has provided oversight to a number of security-specific Transit Cooperate Research Projects. WMATA's participation was made possible through an allocation of $2 million to the Transportation Research Board from FTA. WMATA is helping to develop best practices in such areas as:

- **Emergency Response Mobilization Strategies and Guidelines for Transit;**
- **Use of Portable Explosive Detection Devices;**
- **Robotic Devices;**
- **Communication of Threats;**
- **Use of Dogs for Transit Security;**
- **Update of Security Program Planning Guide and Transit Security Handbook;**

- **Security-Related Training and Customer Communications; and**
- **Intrusion Detection Devices for Public Transportation Facilities.**

Would you support an independent peer assessment of the region's readiness to respond to a terrorist attack?

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority supports independent peer assessment of the region's readiness to respond to a terrorist attack. In fact, FTA conducted an independent security readiness assessment of WMATA in January 2002, as part of a program of readiness assessments that FTA conducted for the 30 largest transit systems. WMATA participates in peer review panels of other transit agencies and other transit properties come to WMATA to observe its emergency preparedness drills.

WMATA supports the Office of National Capital Region Coordination amendment, which was introduced by Senator Sarbanes in October 2002, and is under consideration as part of the Department of Homeland Security legislation currently being considered by the Senate (HR 5005). WMATA welcomes such evaluations as they promote public accountability in the use of public dollars.

It has been brought to the attention of the Subcommittee that FEMA has created the "National Capital Region 2002," a task force to coordinate emergency preparedness. Would you please explain the scope of the task force and how it differs from other entities set up for this area? When was the task force created? Where did it receive its mandate? Is the business community part of its membership? If not, why not? Why wasn't the business community given notification to alert them of this endeavor or asked to participate?

WMATA works through the Washington Council of Governments (COG) to coordinate emergency preparedness. COG submitted a continuity of operation plan (COOP) to FEMA, called "The Regional Emergency Coordination Plan," which was released September 11, 2002. WMATA respectfully defers to FEMA for a description of the National Capital Region 2002 Task Force which coordinates emergency preparedness.

Do you believe that the typical business owner knows what to do in the event of an emergency or what actions to take when a color code alert activity level under the Homeland Security Advisory system is announced?

WMATA respectfully defers to the expertise of those in the business community who are more familiar with what actions a typical business owner knows to take in the event of an emergency.

Has the business community been adequately involved in the development and implementation of the various emergency preparedness and communication plans?

WMATA is a member of the Board of Trade, and participates on the Board's Homeland Security Task Force. Given that WMATA has a unique role in the region, and is not a "traditional business," we do not feel qualified to comment on how more traditional businesses have been involved in the process.

WMATA respectfully defers to the expertise of those in the business community who are more familiar with the ways in which the business community has been involved in the development and implementation of the various emergency preparedness and communication plans.

At the Subcommittee's November 2001 hearing on emergency preparedness, FEMA indicated that it was preparing a federal contingency plan and response team devoted to the National Capital Region. What is the status of those two efforts?

WMATA respectfully defers to FEMA for a status report on the preparation of a federal contingency plan and response team devoted to the National Capital Region.

Is there a network of hospital in the National Capital Region that is prepared to handle an outbreak of an infectious disease? Is there a plan how patients would be quarantined?

WMATA respectfully defers to the medical community and others on the panel who are in a better position to assess the ability of hospitals to handle an outbreak of an infectious disease.

Have there been any tests of your emergency plan? Have those tests been primarily tabletop exercises?

WMATA has prepared a System Safety and Security Program Plan, developed operating procedures to guide a variety of responses, established procedures for activating and utilizing our emergency operations command center using an incident command system protocol, and created redundant communications systems. In November 2002, our line supervisors will participate in two days of security training with staff from the National Transit Institute at Rutgers University.

We have been conducting annual counter-terrorism and explosive incident training for police and operations personnel and had a high level of interagency coordination with the many federal, state and local law enforcement, fire, and emergency response agencies in the area. We have monthly meetings with our local fire and emergency rescue agencies. We maintain daily contact with our local police departments.

WMATA has conducted a number of familiarization exercises in order to acquaint fire and police departments with WMATA's trains, tunnels, and overall system. WMATA's safety and security office includes 2 people who are dedicated to coordinating with fire and police departments. WMATA holds regular drills in the field, including its most recent drill with regional firefighters on October 20, 2002. During the week of October 28, WMATA will participate in a two-day seminar on preparedness, sponsored by COG, where regional leaders and responders will conduct tabletop exercises.

As the Northern Virginia Transportation Alliance noted on Wednesday in Testimony before the National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board, "...in focusing almost exclusively on chains of command, procedures, playbooks, and technology, COG's plan is devoid of substantial recommendations regarding the fundamental issue of lack of system capacity and reliability." The question for today's panel is: why is there not yet a list of key infrastructure improvements necessary to respond to future disasters?

FTA conducted a readiness assessment of WMATA in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. That report addressed, in part, key infrastructure improvements necessary to respond to future disasters. In January 2002,

WMATA received $49.1 million in federal FY02 funds to buttress its safety and security by purchasing: protective equipment; fiber optics infrastructure; chemical emergency sensors; intrusion detection equipment at all entrances to all WMATA facilities; additional K-9 teams; backup emergency management command center; ID entry system; bomb-resistant trash containers; automatic vehicle locators, and digital security cameras. A more detailed description of WMATA's $49.1 allocation is included as "Attachment A" at the end of this document.

WMATA made a second request to the Congress in April 2002 for an additional $107.5 million for key infrastructure and other improvements. None of this request was granted. A more detailed explanation of the projects that would have been funded if $107.5 million were granted is included as "Attachment B" at the end of this document.

Coordination

The State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the District of Columbia are signatories to Emergency Assistance Compact (EMAC). What is the status of efforts to implement EMAC and what are the impediments to its implementation? How is it contemplated that counties will function under EMAC? Will the counties in your state develop a memorandum of agreement with the state to implement EMAC? What is COG's role under EMAC?

The Emergency Assistance Compact applies to states and the District of Columbia. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority is not a signatory to this compact and has not been involved in the implementation of EMAC or any memoranda of understanding.

How are the various emergency plans, particularly at the different governmental levels, aligned to ensure continuity and seamlessness to the public?

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) is coordinating various emergency plans at the different governmental levels to ensure continuity and seamlessness to the public. WMATA remains concerned that there is no single point of contact in the federal government with respect to homeland security matters in the National Capital Region. We are also concerned that we do not know the details of any federal

COOPs, including those in the federal legislative and judicial branches, that may place responsibilities and demands on Metro.

How are our transportation and land-use plans being affected by the security and evacuation considerations? Are we designing our road and street and transportation systems with the end of moving great numbers of people in an emergency?

Security plans and evacuation considerations will tend to have a greater impact on the regional bus systems than the rail systems. Metrorail has proven over the years that it can effectively move hundreds of thousands of people in a relatively short period of time. On September 11, 2001 and during various weather emergencies in the past, Metrorail has shown the capacity to run service at rush hour levels over longer periods of time in order to meet travel demand in emerging and fluid situations. Certainly having the ability to operate 8-car trains system-wide increases the rail systems' carrying capacity and will allow WMATA to evacuate more people from the region's core even faster.

However, plans to eliminate or reduce street capacity in the core areas around federal buildings and other facilities and plans to close segments of major streets that are a part of the region's National Highway Systems (Independence Avenue and possibly Constitution Avenue between 1st Street NW and 1st Street SE) will result in increased traffic congestion and severely limit bus carrying capacity during emergencies. It is important to remember that in an emergency, buses have the ability to transport people and supplies to required locations. However, buses may be subject to the same traffic congestion that ordinary automobiles face in an emergency. Therefore, we recommend the implementation of transit-preferential street improvements. For example, we believe instead of closing lanes to traffic in core areas adjacent to federal buildings, these lanes should be converted into bus-only travel lanes which will reduce bus travel times and give them travel time advantages over single occupant and lower capacity carrying vehicles.

In August 2002, WMATA noted its concern with a proposal to close off part of a street near federal buildings in downtown Washington DC for the purpose of enhancing pedestrian flow. WMATA commented on a provision

to relocate bus operations at 10th Street, NW between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues in order to enhance security at the Department of Justice. In a letter to the National Capital Planning Commission, WMATA offered an alternative suggestion to the provision in the Commission's proposed plan to relocate bus operations at 10th Street, NW between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues in order to enhance security at the Department of Justice. This block of 10th Street is currently used as a terminal stand for nine Metrobus routes and as a stop for five additional routes. On weekdays, 348 bus trips terminate on 10th Street, 33 of them in the peak hour. Another 72 weekday trips pass through without terminating, nine of them in the peak hour. WMATA recommended that 10th Street between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues be converted to a "Metrobus-only" street, so that Metrobus could continue to operate a terminal facility there.

WMATA has worked with the local jurisdictions to identify streets (corridors) where a variety of measures ranging from the construction of dedicated running ways for buses to implementing various Intelligent Transportation Systems Technologies, such as: traffic signal priority, bus queue jumpers and traffic systems integrations that will also improve bus travel times and traffic flow in general. There are other technology improvements proposed, such as automatic vehicle locator systems, bus scheduling and integrated transit information systems that will make Metrorail, Metrobus, local bus, commuter bus and rail services more seamless in their operations thus more effective during emergencies.

Funding the Fight Against Terrorism

How much funding has the Washington region received from the federal government for the fight against terrorism?

WMATA has received $49.1 million in federal funds for the fight against terrorism. We received $39.1 million in FY02 funds from the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2002 (PL 107-117), and a $10 million grant from FTA (Grant No. DC-40-X001-00).

What is the governing regional strategy, if one exists, for use of those funds? If a regional strategy for the use of funds in the war against terrorism does not exist, why? And, are there plans to develop such a strategy?

WMATA's Metropolitan Planning Organization, COG, supported WMATA's request for $49.1 million in supplemental appropriations. The funds were appropriated to WMATA for specific purposes, and we are prepared to work with the region to determine the best use of these funds.

How were the federal funds allocated and used by local entities?

The federal funds were used to purchase: protective equipment; fiber optics infrastructure; chemical emergency sensors; intrusion detection equipment at all entrances to all WMATA facilities; additional K-9 teams; backup emergency management command center; ID entry system; bomb-resistant trash containers; automatic vehicle locators, and digital security cameras. A more detailed description of WMATA's $49.1 allocation is included as "Attachment A" at the end of this document.

What were the principal differences in the use of these funds by local entities?

WMATA used the $49.1 million for enhanced security and emergency response capability. Specifically, we concentrated on three areas: target hardening, equipment and training, and communications and information-sharing.

To what extent have federal funds for terrorism prevention and response been used for routine purchases and activities, such as purchase of fire trucks and overtime costs for first responders?

WMATA has not used any federal funds for routine purchases and activities.

How can we ensure that federal funds do not supplant state and local funds?

WMATA's capital program, which includes basic safety and security needs, and which is supported through a combination of federal, state, and local funds, is severely underfunded. Currently, the federal government provides approximately $150 million in annual capital funding under the

federal surface transportation program. The District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia make a combined capital contribution of more than $90 million per year. This contribution exceeds the federal matching requirements by 40 percent. In addition to this capital contribution, the three major jurisdictions also combine to provide more than $350 million per year in operating assistance. WMATA receives no federal operating funding.

What are the outstanding funding needs for the region in the fight against terrorism?

The outstanding funding needs that WMATA has in the fight against terrorism are: a backup control center, system redundancy, and system access and capacity. In accordance with the FTA Security Assessment Report recommending redundancy in critical systems, the $85.0 million redundant Operations Control Center/Business Systems is the number one security priority for WMATA.

Other critical systems also need redundancy. They include:

- **installing chemical sensors in an additional 15 underground stations ($20 million minimum);**
- **conducting a pilot program with US Navy to detect biological agents in Metrorail stations ($1 million minimum);**
- **conducting a decontamination test program to test decontamination procedures at a Metrorail station following chemical or biological exposure ($2 million minimum);**
- **expanding intrusion detection systems to bus facilities ($6 million);**
- **adding 1350 cameras so entire Metrobus fleet can be covered ($14 million);**
- **upgrading public address systems so approximately one-half of the Metrorail stations can communicate critical information during emergencies ($31.5 million);**

- **deploying electronic employee ID cards for entry into secured areas ($10 million).**

Finally, while WMATA performed exceptionally well on September 11 in response to region-wide crush loading of the system, the loads provided a snapshot of conditions to come as ridership continues to grow and any existing passenger capacity of the system is absorbed. Given the fact that WMATA is located in the National Capital Region and is so integral to the workings of the federal government, there is an even greater need to make sure we can meet the operational and security challenges. As we saw on September 11, WMATA has proven to be an indispensable asset that provides essential services to the federal government and its workforce.

What have we achieved, or do we expect to achieve, with the funds provided to date?

The Federal Government has made available to WMATA $49.1 million to meet region-wide security requirements. A more detailed explanation of the use of these funds can be found in Attachment A.

Are federal terrorism prevention funds targeted exclusively for terrorism related activities, or are the funds being used to develop an all-hazards approach to natural and man-made disasters and emergencies?

The terrorism prevention funds are primarily allocated to enhance safety and security due to a terrorist threat, although some of the funds will enhance safety and security in other emergency situations. For a more detailed description of the expenditure of funds, please refer to Attachment A.

What is the impact on emergency preparedness in not receiving the $44 million in the FY 2002 Supplemental for Further Recovery from Terrorist Attacks?

The most significant impact on emergency preparedness of not receiving $44 million in the FY02 Supplemental for Further Recovery from Terrorist Attacks is that WMATA could not begin planning for a backup Operations Control Center (OCC) because our request for eight million dollars was not granted. If our OCC were disabled due to any number of scenarios,

underground rail service would be severely impacted, if not rendered inoperable.

Does your organization plan to be a signatory to a memorandum of understanding with the Council of Governments for the maintenance and utilization for its Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) and Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS)?

On October 24, 2002, the CEO of WMATA was granted authority to sign a memorandum of understanding with COG which would commit resources for the implementation of COG's Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) and Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS).

Concerns have been raised that federal resources allocated to area jurisdictions were not ultimately devoted to the greatest public safety risks and vulnerabilities. Do you share this assessment?

WMATA shares the assessment that federal resources allocated to area jurisdictions were not ultimately devoted to the greatest public safety risks and vulnerabilities. At WMATA, both capacity and security must be enhanced at significant additional cost, and a station decontamination procedure must be developed, if we are to protect transit riders and be able to serve this region in case of an emergency evacuation. Our rail system was built as a two-track railroad with little redundancy or ability to re-route trains or meet extra capacity in response to an emergency. Our Operations Control Center (OCC) likewise lacks redundancy. If our OCC were disabled due to any number of scenarios, underground rail service would be severely impacted, if not rendered inoperable. Likewise, the public safety could be jeopardized and transit service could be disrupted in the event of a chemical attack in one of WMATA's stations. Funding a decontamination plan, along with improvements in capacity and security, is a high priority for the allocation of federal resources to the area's public safety risks and vulnerabilities.

Communications

Fire fighters, rescue workers and police were hampered in their efforts in September because they encountered difficulties in being able to communicate

on the same radio channel or frequency. Why was such a basic communication problem not previously resolved?

WMATA did not encounter communications difficulties with first responders on September 11, 2001. WMATA is capable of communicating with police and fire departments using a Unified Command line.

What has been done to ensure that the public health sector is receiving timely and accurate information from the federal government and local emergency responders?

WMATA respectfully defers to the public health sector members of the panel to discuss how the public health sector receives timely and accurate information from the federal government and local emergency responders.

In 1999, the Capital Wireless Integrated Network (CAPWIN) Project began in response to a growing need for an integrated transportation and criminal justice information network in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan region. What is the status of this project? What has it accomplished? What do you anticipate it will accomplish in the next year?

WMATA is not part of the CAPWIN project yet. This project integrates a computer network among several police departments in the Washington DC metropolitan region. WMATA understands that this project is in the test bed stage with a small number of police departments in the region. WMATA is, however, installing computers in each of our police cars next year, and we are part of the Metropolitan Interoperability Radio System (MIRS), which connects radios of police cars from other jurisdictions.

What are the primary security vulnerabilities associated with wireless communication and how will these vulnerabilities be reduced? Are the emergency services of the governments in the National Capital Region able to communicate with each other in an emergency?

The primary security vulnerability associated with wireless communication is the ability of people to tap into radio communications. This risk can be eliminated with the aid of encryption technology, but this is very costly. WMATA has recently procured a new radio system that provides somewhat reduced vulnerability. This technology is a trunk radio system which

multiplexes the radio signal, which makes interfering with the signal much more difficult.

MIRS, the Metropolitan Interoperability Radio System, allows police in the region to communicate with emergency services (police and fire). WMATA's police department is linked to this communication network, and was one of the four police departments that evaluated this system in its test bed stage. The test program before MIRS was AGILE, the Advanced Generation for Interoperability for Law Enforcement system. After it was tested and evaluated, AGILE evolved into the larger MIRS.

When you visit the Outer Banks or the Maryland Eastern Shore, you will notice that there are signs posted on various routes that they are emergency evacuation routes in the event of a hurricane. Does this National Capital Region have an evacuation plan that informs employees, workers, and visitors what routes should be used in the event of an announced evacuation, where they should go, what they should do, and how they should get there?

An emergency evacuation plan that informs employees, workers, and visitors what routes should be used in the event of an announced evacuation, where they should go, what they should do, and how they should get there is in the provenance of the District and states' departments of transportation. COG's Subcommittee on Transportation and Emergency Evacuation Annex coordinates the departments of transportation, along with WMATA and other agencies, to develop and implement the transportation elements of the evacuation plan. Some components are already in place. For example, the Washington DC Department of Transportation (DDOT) has posted emergency evacuation signs which direct motorists in Washington DC.

On 9-11, the emergency broadcast system was never activated. Is there a plan that identifies what officer of the local, state, or federal governments will activate the system and under what circumstances?

WMATA respectfully defers to other members of the panel who can discuss a plan that identifies what officer of the local, state, or federal governments will activate the system and under what circumstances.

The Homeland Security Advisory System is designed to be a national alert system and is not designed to assess the level of risk for a discreet area like the National Capital Area. Is there an effort to develop a discreet alert system for the National Capital Region?

WMATA is not aware of an effort to develop a discreet alert system (similar to the Homeland Security Advisory System) for the National Capital Region. The region is already served by two alert systems: PMARS (Police Mutual Aid Radio System) and NAWAS (National Warning System). PMARS is a radio system that updates all police control centers in the region. NAWAS is a dedicated, nationwide, party line telephone warning system operated on a 24 hour basis. It is used for the dissemination of warning and other emergency information from federal and state warning points to county warning points. Both systems are used in the event of a warning or emergency. For example, these systems were used to disseminate information to area police departments during the recent sniper attacks in the Washington metropolitan region.

The Federal Emergency Decision and Notification Protocol identifies a number of federal and local entities that will be contacted to provide information to inform the OPM Director, FEMA Director, and GSA Director's decision to close executive branch agencies and what agencies should be informed when the decision is made. What is the status of procedures to implement the Protocol that identifies what decision criteria will be used to make the decision, what media will be used to communicate the decision, and what time standards will apply to the various standards of the notification process?

WMATA respectfully defers to the federal agencies that are coordinating the procedures for implementing the Federal Emergency Decision and Notification Protocol.

What is OPM's statutory authority to send executive branch employees home? Can cabinet officials of other agencies independently decide to send employees or retain them at their offices in the event of an emergency?

WMATA respectfully defers to the Office of Personnel Management's discussion of its statutory authority to send executive branch employees

home in the event of an emergency. The OPM notification protocol includes WMATA and would give WMATA some (indistinct) lead time

What efforts are we taking to ensure that the public understands what our emergency plans are and what their role and responsibilities are in implementing those plans?

WMATA is working with COG to ensure that the public understands its role and responsibilities in implementing the region's emergency plans. WMATA also initiated a "Safety in Numbers" campaign, featuring WMATA employees, and reminding our customers that even though Metro has an expert security force, and 10,000 employees who are vigilant when riding the system, Metro's riders are an extension of our eyes and ears. Moreover, WMATA has distributed several "Dear Fellow Rider" letters which explain the role of riders in an emergency.

Up-to-date information and frequently asked questions about safety and security and corresponding answers are located on WMATA's web site at http://www.wmata.com/riding/safetyfaq.cfm. In addition, Metro customers may e-mail WMATA with their safety or security questions at csvc@wmata.com. A transit police officer or safety manager will respond as quickly as possible.

Public Health

How prepared is the public health infrastructure in the National Capital region to handle a terrorist attack?

Is surge capacity a problem in local hospitals within the National Capital region? Are regions developing partnerships with other entities for assistance in case of such an occurrence (such as VA hospitals, universities, public schools, private sector, etc...)? What is being done to solve this problem?

What is the federal government doing to effectively integrate public health officials in the regional fight against bio-terrorism?

What is the status of the Regional Bio-terrorism Operational Health Response Plan?

Response to questions for
Hearing on National Capital Region Terrorism Preparedness Sept. 27, 2002
Richard A. White, CEO
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Final

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority defers to the expertise of members of the medical community in response to the following questions related to public health community. Please note that the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority is very concerned about the issue of bio-terrorism. We hope to conduct a test to determine how to decontaminate a station in the event of an attack of bio-terrorism, and to standardize decontamination procedures.

Attachment A

Project Implementation Status of

WMATA's security Improvements

Using $49.1M in Federal FY02 Funds

Allocated to WMATA January 2002

June 14, 2002

The Honorable Joe Knollenberg
Chairman
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Knollenberg:

The Federal Government has made available to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) $49.1 million to meet region-wide security requirements. Public Law 107-117, Section 402 of Chapter 4, requires the Chief Financial Officer of WMATA to report on a quarterly bases to the President and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the use of these funds.

WMATA received these funds in January of this year, and has already obligated $12 million, or approximately 25% of the amounts available. The program is on schedule, and it is expected that $45 million, more than 90% of the total funding, will be obligated by the end of this calendar year.

The enclosed report is the second installment on our progress in implementing security measures. In addition to the financial report, enclosed is a program summary, project schedules, and a status report on the program.

Sincerely,

Peter Benjamin
Chief Financial Officer

Enclosure

Washington
Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority

600 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
202/962-1234

By Metrorail:
Judiciary Square—Red Line
Gallery Place-Chinatown—
Red, Green and
Yellow Lines
By Metrobus:
Routes D1, D3, D6, P6,
70, 71, 80, X2

A District of Columbia,
Maryland and Virginia
Transit Partnership

P.03/21

NOV-01-2002 16:10

Congressional Appropriations (PL 107-117, Chapter 4)

Program	Funds Appropriated	Funds Made Available Through Prior Quarters	Funds Made Available This Quarter	Total Funds Available	Funds Obligated by WMATA
Protective Equipment	$ 5,000,000	$ 4,031,000	$ -	$ 4,031,000	$ 1,704,621
Fiber Optics Infrastructure	2,200,000	1,774,000	-	1,774,000	459,778
Emergency Chemical Sensors	15,000,000	12,092,000	-	12,092,000	4,685,000
Employee & Facility Security	16,900,000	13,623,000	-	13,623,000	2,110,000
Total	$ 39,100,000	$ 31,520,000	$ -	$ 31,520,000	$ 8,959,399

Federal Transit Administration Grant (DC-40-X001-00)

Program	Funds Appropriated	Funds Made Available Through Prior Quarters	Funds Made Available This Quarter	Total Funds Available	Funds Obligated by WMATA
Additional K9 Teams	$ 500,000	$ 500,000	$ -	$ 500,000	$ 365,826
Alternative Command Center	1,700,000	1,700,000	-	1,700,000	469,766
ID Entry System	1,800,000	1,800,000	-	1,800,000	795,873
Bomb-Resistant Trash Containers	1,000,000	1,000,000	-	1,000,000	715,840
Automatic Vehicle Locators (AVL)	4,000,000	4,000,000	-	4,000,000	500,000
Digital Camera Pilot Program	1,000,000	1,000,000	-	1,000,000	90,000
Total	$ 10,000,000	$ 10,000,000	$ -	$ 10,000,000	$ 2,937,305
Grand Total	$ 49,100,000	$ 41,520,000	$ -	$ 41,520,000	$ 11,896,704

NOV-01-2002 16:10 P.04/21

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Safety and Security Program
Project Implementation Status: June 7, 2002

PL 107-117	Appropriation	Remarks
Protective Equipment - procure protective masks, suits and emergency kits.	$5.0m	Most equipment has been ordered. Programming for training and maintenance is underway. Inventory and distribution facilities are being prepared.
Fiber Optics Infrastructure - provide initial redundant communications capability to assure emergency control.	$2.2m	Phase 1 and 2 installation in progress. Phase 3 contract proposals being negotiated.
Chemical Emergency Sensor Project - provide detection capability in several subway stations.	$15.0m	The prototype has been installed and has proven to be successful. Design coordination for an additional twelve underground stations continues. Fabrication of sensor units has begun.
Employee & Facility Security - provide intrusion detection capability at all entrances.	$16.9m	Design and contract development in progress. Specifications are currently being developed and most of the equipment has been determined.

NOV-01-2002 16:11 P.05/21

FTA Grant
DC-40-X001-00

Additional K-9 Teams - provide eight additional dogs, equipment, support vehicles and training for explosives detection.	$0.5m	All dog teams purchased as of [illegible] was awarded February 27, 2002. All support [illegible] ordered.
Alternative Command Center - provides a backup emergency management command center at an alternative location.	$1.7m	Command Center space renovation in progress. Audio/Visual equipment procurement is complete. Furniture and computer procurements initiated.
ID Entry System - provide electronic employee ID targets and entry gates at all unguarded Metro facilities.	$1.8m	Estimates, drawings and specifications completed. Most material and equipment has been ordered and delivered. Installation begun.
Bomb-Resistant Trash Containers - replace trash receptacles in the entrance areas of 83 stations.	$1.0m	First Article inspection and testing complete. 350 units ordered with delivery to begin in July.
Automatic Vehicle Locators (AVL) - equip the entire bus fleet to provide central tracking of all vehicles and improved response time in emergencies.	$4.0m	An existing contract is being modified to accommodate this work. Design and engineering is underway.
Digital Security Cameras - equip 100 Metrobuses with digital cameras and recording capability.	$1.0m	Testing of pilot installations is completed. Engineering evaluation of results is being conducted. Assessment of vendors and availability of equipment is underway.

Security Improvements

Project: Protective Equipment

Budget: $5,000,000 PL 107-117

Scope

Procure disposable protective masks for 5,000 employees who work underground. Procure Level C disposable protective equipment and emergency kits for 300 WMATA Transit Police officers.

Activity

Most equipment has been ordered. Programming for training and maintenance is underway. Inventory and distribution facilities are being prepared.



Security Improvements

Project: Fiber Optic Infrastructure

Budget: $2,200,000 PL 107-117

Scope:

Provides an initial level of redundant communications feed.

Activity:

The Phase 1 and 2 installation in progress; Phase 3 contract proposals being evaluated.



Security Improvements

PROJECT: Chemical Emergency Sensor Program

Budget: $15,000,000 PL 107-117

Scope

Design, procure, and install chemical sensors in underground stations to read particulate in the air. Technology is classified and public safety sensitive. This project will expand the installation to additional stations.

Activity

Prototype has been installed and has proven to be successful. Design coordination for an additional twelve underground stations continues. Fabrication of sensor units has begun.



Security Improvements

Project: Employee and Facility Security

Budget: $16,900,000 PL 107-117

Scope

Design, procure, and install intrusion detection devices at all secured yards and stations. Monitoring cameras will be installed as well as programmable intrusion devices.

Activity

Design and contract development in progress. RFP's have been issued.





Security Improvements

Project: Additional K-9 Teams

Budget: $500,000 FTA Grant DC-40-X001-00

Scope:

This initiative will add eight additional dogs trained for explosives detection, including training and support vehicles. Implementing this initiative will significantly decrease response time for explosive detection.

Activity:

All dog teams purchased as of March 2002. The vehicle contract was awarded February 27, 2002. All support equipment has been ordered.



Security Improvements

Project: Alternative Command Center

Budget: $1,700,000 FTA Grant DC-40-X001-00

Scope:

This system provides for continuity of operations in the event of a catastrophic failure of the primary Command Center. It provides locations for portions of redundant vital computer and communications equipment at remote site and outfits existing space to serve as a backup operations center.

Activity:

Command Center space renovation in progress. Audio/Visual equipment procurement is complete. Furniture and computer procurements initiated.



Security Improvements

Project: ID Entry System

Budget: $1,800,000 PL 107-117

Scope:

Provide electronic employee ID targets and/or turnstile gates at all unguarded Metro facilities.

Activity:

Estimates, drawings and specifications completed. Most material and equipment has been ordered and delivered. Installation begun.



Security Improvements

Project: Bomb - Resistant Trash Containers

Budget: $1,000,000 FTA Grant DC-40-X001-00

Scope:

400 bomb-resistant containers will replace trash receptacles in the entrances of 83 stations.

Activity:

First Article inspection and testing complete. 350 units ordered with delivery to begin in July.



NOV-01-2002 15:14

Security Improvements

Project: Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL)

Budget: $4,000,000 FTA Grant DC-40-X001-00

Scope

Design, furnish, and install an AVL system for the entire bus fleet to provide central tracking of all vehicles and faster response time in emergencies.

Activity

An existing contract is being modified to accommodate this work. Design and engineering is underway.



Security Improvements

Project: Digital Security Cameras

Budget: $1,000,000 FTA Grant DC-40-X001-00

Scope:

Introduce pilot program providing digital cameras mounted on 100 Metrobuses, placed in strategic locations to view passenger activities. Buses will be equipped with cameras which will serve as a deterrent for criminal behavior and provide information for accident investigation and response to claims.

Activity:

Testing of pilot installations is completed. Engineering evaluation of results is being conducted. Assessment of vendors and availability of equipment is underway.



Attachment B

April 2002 Request for $107.5M

in Federal Supplemental FY02 funds

For the Purpose of Key Infrastructure and

Other Improvements

(None of this request was granted.)

ITEM	Total Cost ($Millions)	Year One ($Millions)	Outyears ($Millions)
WMATA Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)	$85.0	$50.0	$35.0
Construction of a back-up Operations Control Center to enable continued Metrorail operations in the event that the primary train control facility is incapacitated. Includes facility modification, redundant computers, radios, telephones, and equipment, interconnection of data facilities, and installation of fiber optic cable.			
Expand Chemical Sensor Program	TBD	$20.0	TBD
Install chemical sensors in an additional 15 underground stations. Presently, prior year funding is sufficient to install sensors in 13 of our 47 underground stations. The WMATA program is based on a technology application developed by the US Department of Energy and the National Laboratories and is prototype development for the nation and the world.			

NOV-01-2002 16:15 P.18/21

ITEM	Total Cost ($ Millions)	Year One ($ Millions)	Outyears ($ Millions)
Biological Sensor Pilot Program	TBD	$ 1.0	TBD
Conduct pilot program, in conjunction with the Department of the Navy to detect biological agents in Metrorail stations.			
Decontamination Pilot Program	TBD	$ 2.0	TBD
In partnership with the National Laboratories and the military, conduct decontamination test program at Memorial Tunnel, in Standard, West Virginia. Objective is to decontaminate a Metrorail station following a chemical or biological exposure.			

NOV-01-2002 16:16 P.19/21

ITEM	Total Cost ($Millions)	Year One ($Millions)	Outyears ($Millions)
Expand Intrusion Detection Systems to Bus Facilities	$ 6.0	$ 6.0	
Improve security at bus facilities, given that buses are often a target of terrorist activity. Install intrusion detection and monitoring systems on bus facility doors, gates and fences.			
Additional Cameras on Buses	$14.0	$ 7.0	$ 7.0
FY02 funding is enabling WMATA to install 100 cameras on buses. This initiative would expand camera coverage to the entire Metrobus fleet, by adding 1350 cameras.			

P.20/21

NOV-01-2002 16:16

TOTAL P.21

ITEM	Total Cost ($Millions)	Year One ($Millions)	Outyears ($Millions)
Public Address Upgrade for Rail Stations	$31.5	$16.5	$15.0
Improve announcement capability at rail stations in order to communicate critical information and instructions during emergencies. The $16.5 million will cover approximately one-half of the Metrorail System.			
ID Card Access for Sensitive Field Locations	$10.0	$ 5.0	$ 5.0
Improve access and tracking of entry into secured areas by utilizing employee ID cards as a key card. Conventional keys would no longer need to be monitored from falling into the wrong hands because ID cards could quickly be deactivated.			
TOTAL	$169.5*	$107.5	$62.0*

***Current estimate, excluding amount To Be Determined (TBD).**

P.21/21

NOV-01-2002 15:16

NCPC
NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION

401 9th Street, NW
North Lobby, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20576
tel 202 482-7200
fax 202 482-7272
www.ncpc.gov

OCT 28 2002

Commission Members

Appointed by the
President of the United States
John V. Cogbill, III, Chairman
Richard L. Friedman
Robert A. Gaines

Appointed by the Mayor of
the District of Columbia
Arrington Dixon
Dr. Patricia Elwood

Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

Secretary of the Interior
The Honorable Gale A. Norton

Administrator of General Services
The Honorable Stephen A. Perry

Chairman, Committee on
Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman, Committee on
Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Dan Burton

Mayor, District of Columbia
The Honorable Anthony A. Williams

Chairman, Council of the
District of Columbia
The Honorable Linda W. Cropp

Executive Director
Patricia E. Gallagher, AICP

The Honorable Constance Morella
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
Committee on Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
B 349-C, Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairwoman Morella:

Please find attached our responses to questions for the record submitted by you and Congressman Tom Davis regarding the hearing on National Capital Region Terrorism Preparedness that are pertinent to the National Capital Planning Commission.

I appreciated the opportunity to testify at the hearing. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

John V. Cogbill, III
Chairman

Questions Submitted by the D.C. Subcommittee

How are our transportation and land use plans being affected by the security and evacuation considerations? Are we designing our road and street and transportation systems with the end of moving great numbers of people in an emergency?

While the District of Columbia is responsible for the management and operation of the city's transportation system, NCPC coordinates planning efforts to ensure that land use decisions related to federal facilities adequately consider the capacity of the transportation system.

In relation to the recently adopted Urban Design and Security Plan, the Commission has recommended that funding be provided to conduct much needed mobility studies to identify the impacts that street closures and physical perimeter security improvements have had on the transportation system, and to identify ways these impacts can be minimized and mitigated. In addition, in its 1997 *Extending the Legacy* vision, the Commission proposed the addition of a water taxi system that could provide additional transportation options in the event of an emergency.

Does your organization plan to be a signatory to a memorandum of understanding with the Council of Governments for the maintenance and utilization for its Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) and Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS)?

NCPC has been a contributor throughout the development of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) and Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS). In addition to participating in the planning sessions, NCPC jointly sponsored a forum on the use of GIS in Emergency Response Planning with MWCOG. NCPC has been identified (see page xiv of the Regional Emergency Coordinate Plan) as one of the federal agencies expected to sign the MOU and intends to be a signatory to the agreement once it has been completed.

Question Submitted by Representative Tom Davis

As the Northern Virginia Transportation Alliance noted on Wednesday . . . "COG's plan is devoid of substantial recommendations regarding the fundamental issue of lack of system capacity and reliability." The question for today's panel is: why is there not yet a list of key infrastructure improvements necessary to respond to future disasters?

In relation to the recently adopted Urban Design and Security Plan, the Commission has recommended that funding be provided for coordinated design and installation of perimeter security improvements around federal facilities in the District. In addition, the Plans calls for the funding of mobility studies to identify the impacts that physical perimeter security improvements have had on the transportation system, and to identify ways these impacts can be minimized and mitigated. In addition, in its annual Federal Capital Improvements Program, the Commission has recommended several key infrastructure improvements to enhance security and transportation systems, such as access improvements to the 14th Street Bridge. Finally, the Commission has coordinated with COG in preparing its annual prioritized long-range plan of improvements to the roadway system to increase capacity of that system, and we understand that WMATA has recently completed a 10-year plan that identifies infrastructure improvements necessary to significantly increase the capacity of the Metrorail system.

Moreover, the Commission's 1997 *Extending the Legacy* vision calls for a variety of large-scale transportation and infrastructure improvements. While not initially proposed as emergency preparedness steps, these measures are designed to improve mobility in the city and the surrounding suburbs and would provide improved infrastructure to support evacuation efforts. Such *Legacy* proposals include:

- Establish transit centers where passengers may easily switch from cars to trains, subways, buses, water transport, the proposed circulator, and other public transportation

- Reroute deteriorating railroad infrastructure in the District to improve rail services and to distance rail route from sensitive public facilities such as the U.S. Capitol

- Replace the 14th Street and Frederick Douglass Bridges in the course of normal infrastructure rebuilding

- Improve transportation access along South Capitol Street, a major artery into and out of the District. The Commission is currently working with the District Office of Planning to prepare an urban design study for South Capitol Street that will provide a framework for transportation investments and other public/private redevelopment along the South Capitol Street corridor.

○